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STATE AND REGIONAL POLITICS *

INT DDUCTION
The policy decisions of the states have become increasingly important
to social welfare in recent years.
In that sense, it is an opportune time
to introduce an interdisciplinary collection of articles which has as its
principal focus the circumstances and the processes of policy at the state
level.
With one exception, the articles which address regional concepts do
so in the context of comparative or case studies of one or more state policy
decisions.
Much of the states' new prominence in social welfare is due to a conspicuously diminished scope and level of federal activity since 1980. Four
of these articles establish significant connections between their research and
one or more of these recent reversals in national policy. Mueller and Comer
examine the fate of state health system agencies, following federal deregulation in 1981.
They explore several potential explanations for state decisions, grounded in the framework of an interesting varient of general innovation theory as developed within political science.
The results of their
analysis suggest that "dissinnovation" or termination of the agency is negatively related to general factors normally associated with decisions to
adopt reforms initially but in interaction with several variables which are
more specific to the problem, such as the costs of hospitalization in the
states.
The aftermath of federal deregulation and reduced block grants is
also explored in Sink and Wilson's case study of initial allocations in Alabama.
In that article they develop a model of interaction between the initiation of that mechanism of fiscal transfers and regionally placed systems
of political culture and balances of power among the branches of state goverment. Demone and Gibelman contribute an examination of factors effecting
state decisions in the design of social service delivery strategies within
the rubic of expanded state discretion. They devote special attention to
purchase of service arrangements and relate the examined advantages and disadvantages to a discussion of future trends.

* The editor wishes to gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the
following reviewers who provided able assistance in the preparation of this
special issue: Dr. Elwin Barrett, Bobbeye Humphrey ACSW, Bernice Hutcherson
ACSW, Dr. Art Crowns, Donovan Rutledge ACSW (Wichita State) Dr. John Bardo
(Southwest Texas State) Dr. Buford Farris and Dr. Gary Hamilton (Saint Louis
University) Dr. Shirley Porter (Western Illinois) Dr. Marie Caputi,
Hugh
Gibson ACSW, and Thomas Racunas ABD. Thanks is also extended to Drs. Robert
Leighninger and Normon Goroff, regular editors of the Journal of Sociology
and Social Welfare, for their help in the completion of this project.
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The results of Heffernan's study of welfare spending are illustrative
of a number of common objections to increasing reliance upon the states.
They are also indicative of the challenges facing social welfare scholarship
and advocacy even if future elections restore a period of incremental growth
in federal funding roles. Controlling for differences between state wealth
and several other measures similar to those used in Mueller and Corner's study,
Heffernan concludes that in their allocation of their own revenues there are
rather stable patterns in which some states exceed predicted spending, while
Since the states appear
others regularly make less than predicted efforts.
in their desire to carry out programs consistent with their
to be "resilient
own traditions," reduced federal funding would compound benefit inequalities
On the one hand, these
between states on the basis of those varied traditions.
inequalities may substantiate need for national standards requiring a larger
On the other hand, to defer
federal funding role than that of the seventies.
actions to promote benefit allocations in the states in favor of creation of
an adequate federalized program appears to be a remote prospect in the imediate future unless accompanied by a "swap" which yields a net loss of federal
One of his principal points is that
social program transfers to the states.
as yet social research lacks & reasonable understanding of what exact circumstances account for the differences in spending efforts.
explore regional constructions as partial explanThree of these articles
The two case studies in that
ations of differing state policy decisions.
Sink and Wilson's
within traditional boundaries of the south.
group fall
on block grants in Alabama, already mentioned, was the only one of
article
McNeece and Ezell discuss the interthe two which focused upon spending.
culture and symbolism in describing the backlash to reform
action of political
Along with Block's overview of a
in Florida's juvenile detention criteria.
sunset review of social work licensing, the study of juvenile detention reform
one of the reasons the framework of this collection was not equated
illustrates
Both issues
with the scope or duration of the Reagan agenda for social welfare.
within domains of state policy which are largely removed from federal
fall
politics.
Savage's article is the most ambitious of the studies concerned with
regional traditions in state policy in that it is national in scope and hisIt should be noted that his inferences about regional
torical in perspective.
traditions in the states' adoptions of policy innovations are drawn from statfactors which underlie relations between the states over a broad range
istical
of policies including innovations outside common definitions of social welfare.
Stated differently, his analysis is oriented towards the discovery of underlying
Regional
patterns which apply to policy innovation in its most general sense.
traditions which might be operating only for one or several related fields of
state policy would not be suggested. In terms of generally applicable regional
traditions, he concludes that such patterns appear to be declining especially
The two exceptions, he notes, are southern and northeastern clusters.
since 1930.
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While suggesting some continuation of societal development along multilinear
regional lines, he concludes that the forces of national integration appear
Parenthetically, all but one of
increasingly dominant in such evolution.
the six regional case studies of state politics received for review were concerned with the dynamics operating in the south. The two included in this
collection have already been introduced. (Sink and Wilson) (McNeece and Ezell).
The receptivity of state governments and their legislatures in particular
to the perspectives of and information provided by social welfare advocates
and representatives of social agencies is often presumed to be low. Freeman
and Lyons' comparative study of sunset reviews in Kentucky indicates that social
welfare programs emerge from legislative evaluations with a lower probability
of termination or major change than non-welfare systems. The pattern was reversed in terms of the liklihood and number of "minor" administrative changes
which the agencies typically made in consultation with the review prior to completion of the formal sunset report. Along with Block's paper, the collection
includes two articles on the performance of sunset mechanisms now found in over
half of the states.
The activities of legislative staff are analyzed in the case study by
Prindle and Burshtyn. In one of the less "professionalized" legislatures, at
least, differences appear in the allocation of time to such activities as
policy research for the staff of "liberal" and "conservative" members of the
Texas assembly. Interestingly, McNeece and Ezell found the "tradition" oriented Florida legislature to be conspicuously inattentive to the research findings which supported retention of the reformed detention criteria for juveniles.
Baney's study suggests that women legislatures may be especially receptive to
the initiation of social legislation. Variables which have appeared to make
gender differences in the introduction of bills spurious in other studies did
not seem to do so in this case study.
Cox's paper on Black families in Appalachia is the only regional study in
this issue which does not have state policy processes as a principal focus.
Following a brief historical account of settlement patterns, it focuses upon
the problems associated with the population's marginality within the region
particularly in terms of economics as well as with the region's own typical
marginality to the centers of state economics and politics.
Substantial attention is given to the group's unique historical experience and to adaptative
responses found within the group. His article includes recommendations for
more responsive social service designs. Readers may wish to relate the state
purchase of service options described by Demons and Gibelman to Cox's assessment of the role of the Appalacian church and informal family supports.
The
following two articles concern models of state policy planning and implementation which seem responsive to intra-state regional differences found in
most states.
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Ahn, Horan, and Taylor's paper focuses primarily on the development of
describe
an advocacy design in public administration. It and Korr's article
Korr outlines how a regional office
regional models of state coordination.
in the field of mental health functioned as a catayst for community supports in
underserved and inappropriately served minority neighborhoods.
Finally, Hathews describes a set of factors which influence the ability
of social work political
action committees to organize on behalf of the priorities
of professional associations in the states.
It is one of several papers
which provide case histories of advocacy in the policy arenas of the states.
They include Block's report on sunset review of licensingaud MeNeec and Ezell's
analysis of Juvenile detention reform.

Timothy Lause, Ph.D.
Special Issue Editor
Department of Sociology
and Social Work/BSW Program
Wichita State University
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Welfare Spending in the American States:
A Comparative Perspective
W. Joseph Heffernan
Professor, LBJ School of Public Affairs and The School of Social Work
The University of Texas, Austin, Texas

ABSTRACT
The federal-state system of welfare is the result of a compromise between
the desire for national standards and the opportunity for each state to have its
own adaptation. As a compromise, there is a constant tension in the system.
During the 1970's, there was a pressure toward federalization, but the states have
preserved their diversity. The Reagan Administration has clearly indicated a
desire to "return" greater freedom to the states to chart their own course. The
purpose of this paper is to identify variations among the states in such a way as
to identify those states with consistently "high" or consistently "low" expenditures for welfare after allowance is made for differences in need, capacity, and
chance variations. Individual states deviations from expected expenditures are
noted over the past decade. The resilience of the states in pursuit of their own
welfare paths is noted and the implication of this for tension in federal-state
relationship is shown.

The changing relationships between the national government and the state
governments have been a significant element in shaping the debate about welfare
in this nation for the last twenty years. The perception that one set of governments or another would be likely fiscal losers in any reshaping of welfare has
stood as an impediment to reform. At the same time, the absence of a clear cut
consensus of where power, capacity and responsibility lay in the coordinate system
has fueled a significant portion of the welfare debate. The debate about welfare
responsibility between those concerned with national standards and those concerned
with the opportunity for state adaptations would, no doubt, have taken place even
in the absence of legalistic and fiscal problems. The federal systems demand for
dual responsibility along side very uneven fiscal capacities for state programs
has magnified the already difficult problem of selecting and implementing welfare
policy. (1)
In recent years voices from virtually all points on the political spectrum
have called for a reassessment of the federal-state responsibilities in AFDC, Food
Stamps, and Medicaid programs. The goals of these reassessments are clearly not
the same for all of the interested parties. The goals of the various reform
proposals involved modification of welfare itself as well as changes in federal/
state responsibilities for welfare policy. The goals most frequently articulated
are these:
(1) a desire to eliminate (or at least reduce) inter-state differences in
benefit schedules
(2) to increase the benefits of lower paying states
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(3) to achieve a better balance between fiscal demands of welfare programs
with fiscal capacity to meet the need
(4) to reduce the aggregate spending on these transfer programs (or at least
to reduce the rate at which these programs grow)
(5) to more effectively target benefits to those in the greatest need
(6) to shift fiscal responsibility from one level of government to another
(7) to sort out the federal/state responsibilities to achieve a higher
level of policical accountability and fiscal responsibility
Particular plans for reform reflect different priorities among these goals. It
is also clear that some of these goals are incompatible with one another. Each
president since John Kennedy has provided some measure of leadership in a welfare
reform effort, but each presidential initiative has been defeated because of
internal beauracratic and legislative inability to forge a compromise among these
goals. The most recent initiative has been President Reagan's proposal for a
swap of welfare responsibilities.
Behind each new proposal for welfare reform there lies a complex tangle of
political desires and deeply held convictions about both welfare itself and the
federal/state responsibilities involved in the delivery of welfare services. Any
welfare proposal must address simultaniously a theory of povery and a theory of
inter-governmental relations. The first issue is reasonably well addressed in the
literature. If one believes that the low income condition is a function of insufficient employment opportunities of low skilled workers, then a jobs and skills
enhancement strategy needs to be given priority. If one beleives that the problem
lies with specific character and motivational problems of low income persons,
then social work services need to be emphasized. If one believes that inequality
is a systemic consequence of capitalism, then a negative income tax and direct
re-distributional schemes need to be emphasized. (Sommers, 1982) At the pragmatic
political level the proposals usually contain a complex misture of such goals.
Two decades of poverty research reflect the diversity of poverty theories and the
resulting differences of grand strategies of welfare reform. Relatively less
attention has been paid to the question of inter-governmental relations.
Questions of the appropriate relationship between the central and state
governments are of obvious fiscal and political importance. The fact that one or
another set of governments perceive of themselves as fiscal losers in a reshuffled set or responsibilities clearly affects the course of reform within Congress and the state capitols. A complete history of the welfare reform effort
needs to include the details of the various cost-estimating techniques used by the
administration, the Congressional Budget Office and the various state welfare
establishments. During the Carter welfare reform effort the administration
originally estimated that the new program would cost an additional 2.6 billion
dollars, but the CBO estimated the federal cost at 25 billion dollars. Haskins,
1981 During the Reagan administration's effort the Office of Management and
Budget estimated a net savings to the state of 2.6 billion dollars, but the
Congressional Budget Office estimated a 4.4 billion dollar state loss.( U.S.G.A.0.,
1982 ) The lack of confidence in cost estimations is only one of the problems
associated with disentangling federal/state responsibilities.

A second, equally difficult problem is the impact of dual federalism on
interstate diversity in benefits, which appear intractable in the face of incremental reform. The present set of programs, of AFDC, Food Stamps and Medicare
interact with one another in curious and unintended ways. The net effect of
increasing AFDC benefit is to reduce food stamp benefit to the household by 30
cents for each dollar of benefit increase. Increase in AFDC benefits also expand Medicaid eligibility. The resulting consequences impacts on the state
budgets in ways that are difficult to predict. During the 1970's there was a
considerable political effort to decrease diverisity in benefits. One of the
intents of the food stamp program was to reduce the inter-state diversity in
total benefits to households elegible for both programs. Despite some progress,
the states have acted in such ways as to retain considerable diversity. This
is shown in Table I.
TABLE I
Diversity in AFDC Benefits
And AFDC/Food Stamp
Benefits, 1970-1980.
(State Maximum Payment To A Family Of Four With No Other Income)
1970
AFDC Schedules
Range

1980
AFDC Schedules

1980
AFDC with Food Stamps

3756-828

6828-1680

7549-3990

2413
800
.311

4218
1532
.363

5829
1010
.173

Mean
Standard Deviation
Co-efficient of Variation

The Reagan Administration has made it abundantly clear that it will seek
Along the
to place emphasis on state responsibility and control. Thomas, 1981
federal political fault line, the pressure will now come from the opposite
direction. In light of this new emphasis of an old conflict in the federal/
state contest, it is instructive to examine the differential performance among
the states.
During the last eight years, despite significant political pressures for
federalization of AFDC, the proportion of federal dollars spent on AFDC has been
remarkably stable as is shown in Table II. The change in federal participation
is a function of the changes in the Food Stamp Program.
TABLE II
Inter-Governmental Expenditures
For AFDC & Food Stamps
1970 - 80
AFDC

A F D C

STATE
(millions $)

Federal
Proportion

FEDERAL
(millions $)

Federal
Food Stamp

Total
Federal

(millions $)

Proportion

1970

2,234

2,623

54.0

551

58.7

1973

3,426

4,153

54.8

2,136

64.7

1978

5,507

6,332

1980

5,914

6,838

53.5
53.6

5,165
9,210

67.6
73.1
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Table II shows that while federal expenditures have exploded, so too have
state expenditures in the aggregate. What has not been equally noted is that
the expansion in the states has been decidely uneven. Some states have significantly increased their benefit schedules, coverage and hence expenditures on
AFDC programs, while other have declined in real dollar terms. In light of the
lack of progress toward comparible programs after a period of federalization and
now the apparent desire of some actors "to return" these programs to the states,
it is instructive to provide a closer examination of the states different roles
in funding their parts of welfare programs. These funding patterns as measured
by per capita expenditures from their own funds have remained diverse. After
a decade of federal pressures, AFDC remains a collection of varied state plans
in part funded by federal dollars. See Table III.
The differences noted above reflect real differences in the socio-economic
conditions and political pressures in the various states. Because the states
have different traditions and resources in their spending on welfare programs
the result is variations in benefits paid from one state to the next.
One of the questions extensively discussed in the political science
literature has been the extent to which political structures, political processes,
socio-economic needs, and/or economic resources are influential in "explaining"
state welfare performances. (2)
In the field of public finance, there has been voluminous empirical
literature dealing with the budetary impacts of inter-governmental grants. These
studies have typically found strong and significant coefficients for the grants.
One of the best of these studies, that of Larry Orr, finds that the grants to
the state are varied inversly to per capita income and range from 50% to 78% of
state dollars. Orr's research indicates that there is slippage in the grants,
and that about one-third of the grant is used to increase benefits and the rest
is released for other budgetary purposes and/or tax relief. (Orr, 1976)
The question posed in this paper is different. We are interested in
identification of the states with unusually high and unusually low expenditures
after allowance is made for differences in need and capacity, and for chance
variations made. In light of current circumstances,there is every evidence that
states will need to assume a much greater responsibility for the funding of social
programs. A careful examination of expenditure dollars in the past psovides the
best clue to state spending in the immediate future.
Methodology
Like the previous studies, which attempted to identify the determinants of
public spending, our basic statistical tool is regression analysis. Unlike past
studies, however, we are not developing a causal model. Rather we are building
on the causal models currently available in the literature. We have developed
this investigation based on a procedure developed by Robert Klitgaard and George
R. Hall. We are using the information learned from causal models to judge unique
state performance. (Mosteller, 1977)
1.

Instead of concentrating on property of the regression line, the per2
centage of variaticn ecplained (R )and the coefficients of the regressor
to the residuals from the regression
is
devoted
variables, attention
line.
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TABLE III
State Expenditures Per/Capita
From Their Own Sources On
5
1972-1980 (In Constant 1980 Dollars)
1974

1976

1978

1980

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California

118
201
67
132
316

128
184
66
148
308

129
228
66
159
337

141
288
68
141
286

.965
1.391
.839
.993
.771

Colorado
Conneticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia

172
164
139
84
149

169
189
84
84
142

174
209
178
78
142

139
212
165
78
142

.735
1.197
1.012
.821
.768

Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indianna
Iowa

226
122
232
102
105

266
130
238
117
173

297
127
246
121
178

240
123
223
121
189

1.086
1.098
1.360
1.222
1.549

Kansas
Kentucky
Louisianna
Maine
Maryland

127
127
142
202
175

158
173
153
206
179

162
170
154
237
183

158
177
154
235
179

1.596
1.301
.945
1.298
1.065

Massachusets
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

331
264
224
140
118

300
300
263
128
127

314
285
280
156
130

314
292
254
156
134

.966
1.242
1.329
.951
.971

Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey

123
119
117
151
201

125
121
122
179
217

144
136
121
173
228

137
122
96
182
208

1.123
1.103
.814
1.300
1.078

New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakato
Ohio

132
356
100
95
149

119
404
109
112
174

118
374
108
130
187

128
358
131
140
169

.865
1.003
1.191
1.186
1.300

Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
S. Carolina

177
145
217
271
85

176
129
248
301
105

178
224
307
314
123

181
181
236
145
116

.790
1.351
1.249
1.221
1.590

South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont

118
110
112
110
215

145
131
125
131
248

148
140
116
152
217

152
130
105
129
187

1.288
1.102
.833
1.040
.813

Virginia
Washington
W. Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

122
182
105
209
84

131
125
135
248
85

143
188
139
269
89

144
191
130
261
91

1.310
1.067
1.101
1.591
1.071

Mean

159

174

168

176

1.170

66

69

66

67

.228

Standard
Deviation

64
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1980+1970

2.

Instead of including an abundance of regressor variables to explain
as much variation as possible, we are diliberately attempting to avoid
over-controlling.

3.

The critical intent is to "understand" the residuals.

Residual variation can arise from many causes: imperfections in measurement,
misspecification of variables, omitted variables, incomplete and/or inaccurate data,
as well as poor choice of fitting techniques. Our goal is to separate non-random
outlyers from random variations.
The basic null hypothesis of this investigation is that there are no unusually
effective (or ineffective) states. The assumption is then, when one has a well
specified model with properly measured variables, deviations from the regression
line are essentially random.
In order to gain a perspective of the randomness of the error terms we observe
the standardized residuals. This formula is:
obse ed - esti ted 1
Standardised = spenaYng
spenang
Standard error fo the the
estimate
ifrom regression model
The basic model estimates state welfare spending by controlling for variations
in per capita income, percent high school graduates, percent non-white, and percent
urban. Typically, these variables explain about one quarter of the interstate
variations. The addition of politcal variables to this model does not significantly
alter the estimates of welfare performance. This result is consistent with previous
studies using step-wise regression models to estimate spending on welfare. (Stonecash,
1981) See Table IV. The basic intent here involves looking at a series of distributions of residuals over time. States which consistently score some distance above
or below their expected performance provides fairly strong evidence that that state
has an unusual pattern of determining its committment to welfare. See Table V.
The null hypothesis is that all states have their welfare spending similarly
determined and that all of the variations in a particular distribution are the
results of chance. Then, by using the nominal theorem and assuming independence,
we compute the theoretical frequency of distribution of the number of times a state
would have a spending deviation greater than one standard residual or less than one
standard residual. This is contrasted with the observed occurences in Table VI.
A remarkedly consistend patter of deviation occurs which is decidely nonrandom. No state, for example, deviates both above and below its expected levels.
While 25 states deviated at least once, 8 of these deviated all 5 times. This is
consistent with the notion that circumstances which impel a state to unusual performance levels are stable. Clearly, if one knew what that cirsumstance was, the
search would conclude. One could suggest that welfare performance is highly determined and the residuals would disappear. The point is, we do not know what they are.
The states identified by this procedure are each different in some unknown ways.
There is thus a strong persumptive evidence that welfare spending is vital, not
deterministic. Close inquiry -- perhaps by case studies -- is likely to give
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TABLE IV
Regression Estimates of AFDC:
Dependent Variable:

1972-80

Per Capita Spending From

Own Sources on AFDC

1980
Independent Variables

Beta

t

Per Capita Income

80

.2430

1.55

Percent Metro

80

.3120

2.09

Percent Non-White

80

-. 0297

.74

Percent H.S. Grads.

80

-. 1167

.21

r

2

.2444

1978
Independent Variables

Beta

t

Per Capita Income

78

.2613

1.46

Percent Metro

77

.3434

2.32

Percent Non-White

70

-. 0945

.63

Percent H.S. Grads.

76

-. 0947

.52

2

r = .2277

1976
Independent Variables

Beta

t

Per Capita Income

76

.3146

1.83

Percent Metro

76

.2965

1.98

Percent Non-Whtie

70

-. 1260

.83

Percent H. S. Grads.

76

-. 1168

.68

2

r = .2304

1974
Independent Variables

Beta

Per Capita Income

74

Percent Metro
Percent Non-White
Percent H.S. Grads.

t

.4108

2.35

76

.2262

1.45

70

-.0478

.33

74

-. 0901

.55

r2

.2841

1972
Independent Variables

Beta

t

Per Capita Income

72

.3910

1.90

Percent Metro

70

.1779

1.04

Percent Non-White

70

-. 0584

.31

Percent H. S. Grads.

70

-. 0408

.27
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2

r = .2462

TABLE V
Direction

& Duraition

Significant Residuals

State

1
1972-1980
Sign of Deviation of Residual in
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980

Maine
Massachusets
New York
Rhode Island

+
+
+
+

California
Vermont

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

0
0

Hawaii

0

0

+

+

0

Aississippi
Oklahoma

0
+

0
0

0
0

0
0

+

Remaining States

0

0

0

0

0

N

Michigan
Minnesota
Wisconsin
1

0

Colarado
Kansas
South Carolina

Virginai
Connecticut
Delaware
North Dakota

0
0
0

0
o

o

Wyoming

o

Texas

0

Arizona
Florida
Indiana
Nevada
1A (+) indicates performance (spending) greater than one standard
deviation above what is predicted by the regression, while a (-)
indicates a deviaion greater than ono standard deviation below the
A zero indicates performance within the predicted
regression lint.
range.
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TABLE VI
A Comparison of Theoretical* and Actual Distributions of Residuals With A Consistent
Sign in Four Time Periods

Deviation from
Projection
Sign
Frequency

Probability

Expected
Frequency

Observed
Frequency

+

5

.0000524

.00262

4

+

4

.0013763

.06881

2

+

3

.0144507

.72253

3

+

2

.0758661

3.79331

1

+

1

.1991485

9.95743

2

n.a.

0

.4182119

20.91060

25

-

1

.1991485

9.95743

7

-

2

.0758661

3.79331

1

-

3

.0144507

.72253

1

-

4

.0013763

.06881

0

-

5

.0000524

.00262

4

.9999999

49.9999

50

*Theoretical frequency is calculated by using the biomial theorem and assuming
independence. For the details of this procedure contact the author.
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important lessons from inquiry into the welfare politics of these "good" and "bad"
states. Each reader can decide for himself whether consistently high or consistently low spending is good or bad.
Conclusion:
The exercise provides strong presumptive evidence that state variations are
decidely non-random. The empirical portion of this paper clearly suggest a
resilient desire among the states to carry out their welfare programs consistent
with their own tradition. These differences persisted throughout a decade of
federalization of welfare programs. If, in the immediate future, the states are
"freed" from nationally imposed constraints, it is reasonable to assume that these
differences will intensify. For those concerned with national standards, this
will be an undersirable result. For those who focus on the opportunity for each
satate to chart it's own path, this result may be cheered. These attitudes
reflect the tension of a federal state welfare system. What is, however, clear
is that a retreat from federally imposed standards will most assuredly reintroduce
drastic interstate diversity in benefits, coverage and costs.
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NOTES
For a review of the complex political history of recent welfare reform efforts
it is instructive to read in serial form accounts of various efforts to change the
system. A careful summary of literature follows:
1

President's Johnson's Presidential Commission on Income Maintenance, (Heffernan,
A Political Farce on Two Acts",
W. Joseph, "The Failure of Welfare Reform:
Institute Research on Poeverty, University of Wisconsin, Sept. 1973).
President Nixon's Family Assistance Plan, (Bowler, M. Kenneth). Nixon
Guaranteed Income Proposal Cambridge, Pollinger Publishing Company, 1974).
President Ford's Income Security Plan, (Lynn, Saureace E. Designing Public
Policy. Santa Monica, Goodyear Publishing Co. 1980, Ch. 5.)
President Carter's Program For Better Jobs and Income (Lynn, Saurence & David
DeF. Whitman. The President As Policy Worker. Philadelphia, Temple V. Press
1981.
The seminar paper in this field is Richard E. Dawson's and James E. Robinson's
"Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables and Welfare Policy in the American
States," Journal of Politics, Vol. 25 (May, 1963), pp. 265-289. This literature
2
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has been significantly expanded and modified in the years since that publication
and has spawned an entire subfield of political science.
An incomplete yet incisive restatement of the development of the literature
is found in Thomas R. Dye's "Politics versus Economics: The Development of the
Literature on Policy Determination", Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 7 (Summer, 1979),
pp. 652-663. A more critical review along with very complete, but date, bibliographical statement is found in Robert L. Savage's "The Literature of Systematic
Quantitative Comparison in American Stae Politics: An Assessment, Center for
the Study of Federalism, Center Report #11, Temple University, Philadelphia, 1976.
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DISINNOVATION IN THE AMERICAN STATES:
POLICY TOWARD HEALTH SYSTEMS AGENCIES

Keith Mueller and John Comer
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Political Science Department

ABSTRACT
Requiring the states to involve consumers in health
planning through local health planning boards (HSAs) was an
attempt by the federal government to control health care costs.
Elimination of this requirement more recently has meant some
states have discontinued the program. The elimination of HSAs
can be considered a case of policy disinnovation. Drawing on
the innovation literature, the following variables were expected
to correlate, although negatively, with elimination of HSAs:
value added to manufacturing, average acre value of farms, per
capita income, population living in metropolitan areas, and
party competition. All were found to correlate negatively.
Predisposition to spend reflected in per capita state
expenditures was also correlated negatively with elimination of
HSAs, as was the average daily hospital room charge and average
hospital cost per stay.

Innovation is a term that has been applied to the adoption
of new programs and policies by state governments. The process
by which policies diffuse among the American states has been
described and explained, the latter chiefly in terms of state
characteristics found to correlate with the adoption of a
particular policy. While it has been recognized that there is a
reverse process, disinnovation, there has been little, if any,
effort to describe and understand it.
This can be attributed to
an ever widening public sector over the years, spurred on by the
demands and resources of the federal government. Withdrawal of
federal initiatives and funds more recently may, however, make
disinnovation a more frequent phenomenon and perhaps a more
frequently studied one. This paper examines one such
disinnovation, the elimination of health systems agencies (HSAs)
in the American states. More specifically, it explores the
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correlation between characteristics of the states and
elimination of HSAs.
Health systems agencies are local health planning boards
provided for in the 1974 National Health Planning and Resource
Development Act in combination with Title 19 of the Social
Security Act (Medicare and Medicaid).
Under the provisions of
the law (P.L. 93-641) and subsequent amendments in 1979, state
governments were to divide their states into local and/or area
wide health planning and development agencies which were to be
responsible for synthesizing HSA plans into a single statewide
plan.
State governments would also be responsible for reviewing
HSA activities including HSA decisions on certificate of need
applications, i.e., applications from hospitals, nursing homes,
etc., for proposed construction and expansion of health care
facilities. Funds for HSA staff were to be provided from
federal monies. Failure of states to comply would mean a loss
of federal funds for hospital construction and medicare and
medicaid payments. A change in the law in 1981, however,
permitted states the option of meeting the health planning
requirements of the 1974 act without continuing HSAs.
One of the objectives of the 1974 act was to involve
consumers of health care services in health planning. Federal
regulations thus required that at least one half of the
membership of HSA boards be consumers. The remaining members
were to be health care professionals, e.g., physicians and
others involved in the provision of health care services.
Involving consumers in certificate of need review it was hoped,
would provide a check on unnecessary expansion of health care
facilities, limiting capital expenditures, and thus reducing the
cost of health care. While HSAs have increased the number of
consumers involved in health planning (Burlage, 1979; Sigelman,
1982), it is less clear what the impact of HSAs has been on
health care costs (Downs, 1982; Duhl and Blum, 1981).
The
concern here, however, is with the response of state governments
to the change in federal policy toward HSAs. Withdrawing the
requirement that states have HSA planning boards meant that
states were free to retain or eliminate local planning boards.
The elimination of HSAs by a state can be considered a case of
disinnovation, and it is variation among the states in t.-s
regard that the study will try to explain.
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INNOVATION LITERATURE
Jack Walker has defined innovation as "simply a program or
policy that is new to the states adopting it, no matter how old
the program may be or how many other states have adopted it"
(Walker, 1971: 335). Disinnovation can be considered a program
or policy that is terminated or discontinued by a state (Rogers,
1962; Eyestone, 1977).
While the focus of this study is
disinnovation, the literature on innovation provides a useful
framework.
Two principle questions are asked in research in policy
innovation in state government. 1. What are the patterns of
diffusion of policy innovations among the states?
2. Which
states are likely to be "early adopters" of policy innovations?
With respect to the first, Walker (1971), borrowing from
theories of human choice and organizational decision making,
suggests that decision makers in the states may look to other
states for cues regarding new programs and appropriate levels of
services. While a few states fancy themselves as leaders in the
adoption of new ideas and can be expected to move on their own,
most delay waiting for other states to act, particularly those
states which, for one reason or another, serve as a reference
point. Walker refers to regional reference groups.
States
often compare themselves with others in their region and look to
these states for new ideas and programs.
Certain states may
become regional pacesetters with new ideas failing to spread to
the region until adopted by the pacesetter. Thus, we might
expect patterns of diffusion to reflect a clustering pattern
through time, with little variation in time of adoption within
regions, but some variation between regions. We would also
expect those states that use the self starting states as
references to be the first to adopt innovations.
While regional ties work to slow the diffusion process and
lead to an evenness in the diffusion pattern, specialized
communication and increasing professionalism among state
decision makers may have the opposite effect. Walker (1971)
notes that the total time of diffusion has decreased over time.
For the period 1930-1966, the total time for innovations to
diffuse was 25.6 years, for 1870-1899, 52.3 years. The increase
in associations that monitor developments in state government,
such as the Council of State Governments, which disseminate
information on new ideas to the states and the development of
professional orientations among state decision makers, which
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leads to a commitment to improved ways of doing things, is
having an homogenizing effect on state government. The result
is a faster diffusion process, with typically laggard states
adopting much sooner than in the past.
There is also the impact of federal incentives stimulating
innovation diffusion. Welch and Thompson (1980) find, for
example, that programs with federal incentives diffuse more
rapidly than those without, and that positive incentives are
more effective in diffusing programs than negative incentives.
Light (1978) too, based on a survey of state administrators,
finds that the federal government is an important stimulus to
innovation, but observes that this varies with policy area. He
notes that the federal government is perceived by state
administrators as an important stimulus in the areas of human
resources and criminal justice, but less important in natural
resources and transportation. He concludes that the study of
innovation by policy area is a promising approach to
understanding the diffusion process. Downs and Mohr (1976)
reach similar conclusions. With respect to which states lead in
developing innovations, Grupp and Richards (1975) find variation
across policy areas.
Virginia Gray (1975) has also examined patterns of
Gray examines
diffusion of policy innovations in the states.
twelve policies in the areas of education, welfare, and civil
rights. Employing a model based on the assumption that
interaction among adopters and non adopters, similar to Walker,
accounts for the spread of adoptions, she is able to generate a
The
regression reflecting the pattern of diffusion over time.
predicted pattern for the twelve policies is a close fit to the
observed. The cumulative percentage of adopters is "S" shaped,
the frequency distribution normal. Gray also observes variation
in the diffusion process by policy area. The diffusion of
education policies follows a regular and consistent pattern.
Policies in the civil rights and welfare areas vary in diffusion
patterns. Moreover, states that are innovative, early adopters,
in one area are not necessarily innovative in another. Nor are
the same states necessarily innovative within policy areas,
i.e., a state may be quick to adopt one education innovation but
slow to adopt another. She concludes that "innovativenesa" is
both issue and time specific.
In spite of Gray's findings, differences among the states
in certain characteristics may be related to early adoption.
Gray herself finds that per capita personal income in the states
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distinguishes the first ten adopters with respect to the twelve
policies she examined. The governor's electoral margin was also
correlated with the first ten states to adopt.
In an effort to
uncover general correlates of innovation, Walker (1971) ranked
the states by innovation scores based on 88 programs and
policics.
Reasoning that available resources in terms of wealth
and expertise might lead to a willingness to experiment as well
as risk failure, he hypothesized that the larger and wealthier
states, those with the most developed industrial economies and
the largest cities, would have the highest innovation scores.
It is plausible, Walker suggests, to assume that the great
cosmopolitan centers of the country would likely be the most
adaptive and sympathetic to change, and thus, the first to adopt
new programs.
Consistent with this line of argument, Walker finds that
innovation scores do correlate with the value added to goods by
manufacturing, the average per acre value of farms, the size of
the urban population, and per capita income. He also examined
the correlation between degree of party competition,
malapportionment of the state legislature and innovation score.
Both were positively related to innovation. Correlations with
several other political variables lead Walker to conclude that
the states that adopt new programs more rapidly are bigger,
richer, more urban, more industrial, have more fluidity and
turnover among elected office holders, and have legislatures
that more adequately represent cities.
The Walker and Gray studies are particularly relevant to
this study.
It is plausible to assume that some of the factors
found by them to correlate with inovation also correlate,
although negatively, with disinnovation. That is, it is
expected that those characteristics which are positively
correlated with early adoption are negatively correlated with
elimination. Based on this line of reasoning the following
propositions can be derived: The value added to goods by
manufacturing, average per acre value of farms, per capita
income, size of urban population, and degree of party
It is
competition are inversely related to elimination of HSAs.
also logical to assume that Walker's innovation scores for the
states relate inversely to elimination.
Extending Walker's argument, expenditure levels among the
states might be another variable significant in accounting for
variation among the states in.elimination of HSAs. Per capita
state expenditures are not only another indicator of a state's
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wealth, but in some way may reflect a predisposition to spend.
If so, it is plausible to assume that states with higher levels
of expenditures are more likely to add to those levels with the
addition of programs than states with lower levels.
In other
words, states currently spending at a high level are more likely
to retain HSAs than those spending at a lower level.
Thus,
another proposition is that expenditures per capita are
inversely related to elimination of HSAs.
Other variables relevant to the particular policy lead to
another set of propositions. HSAs were set up to cut hospital
costs. Where hospital costs are high, it is plausible to assume
a greater need for HSAs. In other words, the higher hospital
costs are, the greater need to control them, and thus, the
greater the need to maintain cost cutting mechanisms such as
HSAs. Therefore, there are the following propositions: Average
daily hospital room charge and average hospital cost per stay
are inversely related to elimination of HSAs.
METHOD
The Omnibus Reconciliation Bill of 1981 gave the states the
option of retaining or eliminating HSAs. While some states
continue to deliberate the fate of HSAs and this makes the
study's conclusions somewhat tentative, many have decided
whether or not HSAs will continue operation.
In the Spring of
1982, questionnaires were sent to the governors in the 50
states. Followup questionnaires were sent in the Summer to
those failing to respond to the first wave. Thirty-eight
questionnaires were returned, wijh 33 (66%) indicating that the
issue of HSAs had been resolved.
Responses from the 33 are the basis for the analysis.
States were categorized on the dependent variable, elimination
of HSAs based on their response to the following question: As
you know the federal requirements and support for the
continuation of Health Systems Agencies have been dropped.
Whether or not a state will continue with HSAs will be for each
state to decide. Some states may continue with HSAs and allow
them to operate as they did previously; other states may
eliminate them altogether. Still others may transfer the
functions of HSAs to other agencies of state government. Please
check the statement below which comes closest to what your state
is planning to do or may already have done. 1. No change. HSAs
will continue to operate as they have in the past. 2. HSAs will
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be eliminated, but their review functions will be transferred to
other state agencies.
3. HSAs will be eliminated.
Many responses did not fit neatly into the above three
categories. For example, some states indicated that HSAs would
continue but without the state providing funds.
In most cases,
local government and/or private funding sources were mentioned.
Such responses were considered no change only if review
functions of HSAs with respect to certificate of need review
would continue. The transfer of HSA review functions to other
agencies also presents some problems of classification. The
nature of the review with respect to local input was not always
clear; nor was it obvious in the case of some states whether
certificate of need review would continue. In many such cases,
however, it was clear that certificate of need review would not
continue and consumer participation would be limited and/or not
expected, at least not in a way comparable to HSAs. One might
argue that such arrangements amount to elimination. Because of
the problems of classification, we have created two variables
based on these responses. One is a dichotomy with elimination
and transfer coded one, all other responses zero. A second
maintains all three categories. These two variables are
correlated with the independent variables outlined earlier.
ANALYSIS
Of the 33 useable responses, 24 (73%) states indicated that
HSAs were or would be eliminated; nine states (27%) indicated
the continued existence of HSAs with the same or basically the
same functions as before. Of the 24 indicating that HSAs would
be eliminated, 15 (45%) responded that the function of HSAs
would be transferred to other agencies of state government.
Thus, we have nine no change, 15 elimination but transfer of
function, and nine elimination with no transfer, or elimination
of structure and function.
Previous studies suggest a number of variables are
correlated with innovation, as defined by Walker, in the
American states.
Table I shows the correlation, measured by
Pearson's correlation coefficient, between the two depeVent
measures and the independent variables reviewed earlier. As a
check on the appropriateness of Pearson's correlation with a
trichotomous dependent variable, plots against each independent
variable were examined and showed patterns of relationship to be
reasonably linear. A check on the use of Pearson's with what
amounts to an ordinal classification was also made by
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Table 1.

Correlates of discontinuation of HSAs

Elimination/
Transfer{
No Change
Value added by manufacturing (1977)
Average per acre value of
farms (1980)
Per capita income (1979)
Percent population living in
urban areas (1978)
Degree of party competition
(1974-1980)
Per capita state expenditures
(1978)
Average daily room charge
(1979)
Average cost of a hospital
stay (1978)
Walker's innovation score

**
*

-.17

-.13
-.33*
-.12

Elimination/
Transfer
No Change

*

-.23*
-. 33**

-.20

-.30**

-.11

-.25"

-.13

-.29*

-.22*

-.37**

-.33**
-. 23*

-.41*
-.28**

Probability less than .05
Probability .05 to .10

Coding:
1. Dependent variable coded 0 equal to no change; .5
transfer and 1 elimination.
2. Dependent variable coded 0
equal to no change and 1 equal to transfer and elimination.
Degree of party competition is coded 1,2,3, with 1 equal to one
party, 2 equal to modified one party, and 3 equal to two party.
Taken from John F. Bibby, et. al., "Parties in State
Politics" in Politics in the American States, ed. by Virginia
Gray, Herbert Jacob, and Kenneth N. Vines (4th ed.; Boston:
Little, Brown, 1983) Walker's innovation scores are taken from
Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovation Among the American
States," American Political Science Review 63: 880-889, 1969.
All other measures taken from U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1980 (101st edition.)
Washington, D.C., 1980.
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calculating Spearman's rho. While somewhat lower in magnitude,
the results using rho were equivalent to Pearson's correlation.
We have selected to report our findings in terms of Pearson's
correlation because it is, we believe, more typically employed
and likely to be familiar to a wider audience, and because it
has multivariate extensions which permit more powerful
analytical techniques.
A negative correlation in the Table means that a variable
is inversely related to elimination of HSAs. Expectations
fashioned from the innovation literature suggest all
relationships should be negative and examination of the Table
shows that they are.
The variables Walker found to correlate
with innovation are inversely correlated with disinnovation, as
The pattern
is Walker's own innovation scale for the states.
holds with both the trichotomous and dichotomous measures,
although the correlations are somewhat higher for the dichotomy.
The finding holds out the prospect that disinnovation can be
explained by the same theoretical structure that underlies
innovation. Spending patterns too, relate negatively to
elimination of HSAs, which is consistent with the thesis that
predisposition to spend among the states is likely to lead to
the retnetion of innovations, at least those that cost money.
The Table also reveals that elements relevant to the particular
policy make a difference. Both average daily room charge and
average cost of hospital stay are negatively correlated with
elimination of HSAs. It may be that innovation and
disinnovation are correlated with variables that reflect wealth
and expertise, as Walker hypothesized, but it is also quite
plausible to assume that variables specific to a particular
policy can also be important. In some situations one can
anticipate that policy relevant factors can enhance prospects
for innovation or disinnovation, while in others, retard
prospects.
In some cases, one can imagine that the influence of
policy factors may have effects opposite and perhaps stronger
than wealth and/or expertise. These possibilities may help to
explain what appears to be a contradiction in the literature on
innovation diffusion among the states.
While all the variables Walker examined in his study
correlated in the expected way with elimination of HSAs, the
correlations were quite modest. This may reflect the crude and
imprecise manner in which disinnovation is measured. But it
also raises the question of the utility of these variables for
understanding disinnovation. Why did the variables not
correlate higher? One can argue that slack resources, available

-197-

expertise, and a willingness to take risks may push states with
these characteristics to innovate, however, once an innovation
is in place, neither expertise nor potential risk should play a
role in retaining it. Once a program is underway, the obstacle
of risk has been overcome and expertise, if by this we mean the
skill necessary to implement and administer a policy or program,
while still important, at least through the years immediately
following adoption, would presumably be less of a factor as a
state begins to acquire knowledge of the program or policy in
operation. Furthermore, we can anticipate that a tight fiscal
situation would not necessarily lead to withdrawal of an
innovation, particularly if interests have developed with a
stake in preserving it, which is often the case.
While no one would suggest giving up on the development of
what might be called a non policy specific explanation for
innovation or disinnovation at this point, with respect to
disinnovation, a more fruitful approach may be one that focuses
on factors and elements unique to the particular policy or group
of policies. This is especially likely to be the case where
policies remain controversial.
Health planning or at least the
issue of who should be involved in it are quite controversial.
Therefore, we expect that policy specific and other
idiosyncratic factors will be important in explaining health
planning policy. In addition to patterns of health care costs,
one might expect variables such as the strength of the medical
lobby and the personal preferences of significant public
officials, e.g., governors, to be important.
Bivariate relationships do not allow one to sort out the
relative importance of variables in explaining a dependent
variable, however, a multiple regression procedure can. While
we must be cautious in our conclusions owing to the small number
of cases and intercorrelations among the independent variables,
regression provides additional evidence that bears on our
hypotheses. Table 2 contains the results of regressing the
dependent variable on the independent variables. The numbers in
the Table are standardized regression coefficients (betas). We
have included only one of the health care cost variables in the
regression because they are correlated (.68) with each other and
reflect basically the same thing.
The regression analysis shows Walker's variables, or some
of them, to be more important in explaining variation in policy
toward HSAs than either per capita state expenditures or average
cost of a hospital stay. While the latter are not unimportant,
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Table 2. A Regression Analysis of Correlates of
Discontinuation of HSAs

Elimination/
Transfer/
No Change
Value added by manufacturing
Average per acre value of
farms
Per capita income
Percent population living in
urban areas
Degree of party competition
Per capita state expenditures
Average cost of a hospital
stay
I.

.061

Elimination/
Transfer/
No Change

.09

-.15
.10

-.05
-.04

-.20
-.16
-.18

-.25
-.22
-.28

-.11

-. 18

Numbers are standardized regressions coefficients (betas).

the variables Walker used as measures of wealth, expertise,
etc., rank higher at least in terms of their ability to explain
variation in the dependent variable. Although conclusions must
be considered tentative, analysis here would not allow us to
reject the thesis that conditions giving rise to adoption of
innovations are also important in the retention of innovations.
To be sure, further research is required not only with respect
to health policy but other areas of policy as well.
If
disinnovation becomes mere widespread, as it may well, this
issue can be examined more fully.
CONCLUSION
Mandating consumer involvement in health planning through
HSAs in the states was an attempt by the federal government to
control health care costs. More recent elimination of this
requirement has meant some states have abandoned the program.
The discontinuation of HSAs can be considered a case of policy
disinnovation. While there have been several studies of
innovation in the states, little work has focused on
disinnovation. Drawing on the innovation literature, the
following variables were expected to correlate, although
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negatively, with elimination of HSAs: value added to
manufacturing, average per acre value of farms, per capita
income, population living in metropolitan areas, and party
competition. All were found to correlate negatively with
elimination of HSAs. However, correlations were not
particularly high. One explanation for this is that
disinnovation is something different than the reverse of
innovation, and therefore, variables that correlate highly with
one will not correlate highly with the other.
Predisposition to spend reflected in per capita state
expenditures was also inversely related to elimination of HSAs.
This too was expected. States willing to pay for one program or
policy, it is suspected are likely to pay for another.
Two
policy specific variables also correlated with elimination of
HSAs.
These were the average daily hospital room charge and
average cost per hospital stay. It is reasonable to expect that
where health care costs are high, the felt need to control costs
will be strong. The negative correlations for both confirm
this.
Much of the literature on innovation stresses the need for
policy specific research on factors related to adoption
patterns. While the data presented here would lead us to
concur, the data also direct us to consider the more general
influences suggested by Walker which reflect the fiscal and
intellectual capacity of the states.
In seeking to understand
state responses to HSAs and perhaps other programs designed to
cut costs, patterns of health care costs within the states seem
to be an important variable. It appears, however, that they
work with other variables that also bear on such programs and
policies.

NOTES
1.

Differences between respondent and non respondent states do
not appear to be severe, at least on the independent
variables included in the analysis. Statistically
significant differences, measured by a difference of means t
test (p equal to .05), exist only on the variables average
cost of a hospital stay and state expenditures per capita.
Non respondent states are mere likely to have higher
hospital costs per stay and higher expenditures per capita.
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2.

While cases in the analysis do not constitute a random
sample, statistical tests can be considered as a check
against an undefined random process or some other source of
variation producing a result.
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POLICY TRADITIONS IN AMERICAN STATE POLITICS*
Robert L. Savage, University of Arkansas
Political Science Department

ABSTRACT
An examination of the states across a wide range of policy innovations during three historical periods reveals policy traditions having distinctive geographic limits roughly conforming to major regions commonly recognized in American politics. Only two of these traditions, the "Southern Parochial" and the
"Northeastern Bureaucratic," persist across time and even these have been weakened.
This provides some evidence that while multilinear evolution along regional
lines will continue to contribute to differences in policy values among the American states in the foreseeable future, sociocultural integration is the stronger
dynamic in American political development, especially since about 1930.

Social scientists have long recognized the unique research opportunity afforded by the American states, constituting as they do, many separate laboratories
for political investigation. As these semi-autonomous political systems seek to
regulate the conflicts arising among citizens within their respective boundaries,
each is confronted by problems of varying degrees of uniqueness and with different
historical records of managing these conflicts. Each American state, then, is
more than simply a location for happenings or a holder of attributes. Each state
is a complex, semi-autonomous system with patterned modes of behavior, structural
regularities in social relationships, and characteristic societal attributes. And
each state, in the process of acquiring its own milieu, has considerable autonomy
to choose among alternative lines of development. The states are in this sense
producers of values as their choices help to shape the culture, social structure,
and population within their respective boundaries. As the states are also political systems acting to regulate social conflict, they continually readjust the
bases of conflict in response to both internal and external changes of their
milieu. Choice, then, is a key ingredient in the differences that occur among the
states, and differences in choices among them arise from variations in information, values, and actions that are available to decision makers in the several
states.'
Certainly, previous studies of American state political behavior have addressed the element of choice even if in many cases only to stress its constraints. But the focus in most comparative studies has been on information and
action with relative exclusion of value as a consideration. This emphasis flows
rather naturally from subscriptions to the input-output model of systems analysis in which one looks to the conversion of demands and supports (information) to
policy outcomes (actions). This view of the political process tends to ignore the
fact that each step toward a policy is subject to the decisions of many agents,
each deciding in the fact of a multi-valued choice. This view further tends to
disregard the realm of values imposed upon the actors by previous choices not
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only at the individual level but at the systemic level as well.
The elements of choice assuredly are not easily untangled in the real world.
Information and action are always value-laden, and values must confront the realities of information and action. Still, values provide a continuity, a patterning,
that injects a note of stability into the processes of choice. At the same time,
values are typically inferred from series of actions. Actions in turn reflect the
interplay of configurations of information and values that are themselves interdependent. Given this essential circularity and autocorrelation, then, the "facts"
that are the building blocks of empirical research must always be accepted as tentative and multi-faceted.
This emphasis upon choice, as a derivative of the interplay of information
values, and actions, clearly suggests a cybernetic conception of the states as
Cybernetic models focus especially upon goalpolitical entities (Deutsch, 1966).
seeking activities. In the face of dissatisfaction, behaving entities make
choices so as to move closer to a desirable condition. For any complex system,
however, many satisfactions and dissatisfactions may exist at any given time.
Thus, complex systems are rather continously faced with the multivalued choice,
but to the extent that certain desirable conditions are preferred more or less
with regard to others, such entities can be viewed as seeking goals in a developmental fashion. Development in this sense refers to the successive institutionalizations of such goals or values. For the American states, development is indicated by continuing approximations to values sought through policy choices.
This linking of goal-seeking and development in human behavioral systems implies sociocultural evolution wherein values serve as genetic structures that are
transmitted from one pointin time to a later point in time (Deutsch, 1966; ThorAnd like their genetic counterparts in the biological realm, values
son, 1970).
impel behavior but do not necessarily compel it, i.e., values determine ranges of
possibilities for social systems. For example, the American South has developed
along lines diverging from other areas of the nation with respect to the bonds of
democratic political association. Southern states did not, however, eschew democratic association as the fundamental political bond. Culture, then, understood
as a "socio-genetic system of information transmission," suggests constraints and
possibilities, not mechanisms and causes (Thorson, 1970: p. 130; cf. also Paige,
1966; Riggs, 1968).
These considerations--the ubiquity of conflict, and thus of choice, in and
among behaving systems, a multifaceted rather than a hierarchical image of reality, and a developmental, as opposed to a causal, perspective--propel the realm of
values to the forefront in behavioral analysis. What are needed, then, are appropriate data manipulated by a technique that slices through to present the American states in full array as entities confronting challenges and making decisions
as to what is, what ought to be, and what can and will be done. Certainly, no
research procedures exist that will parsimoniously compare the full ranges of political behavior within and among the states. Still, the study of state politics
is enhanced to the extent that certain dominant patterns within particular segments of behavior are found (see, e.g., Luttbeg, 1970; Savage, 1973, 1975; Walker,
The analysis of dominant patterns of policy values should particularly
1969).

provide an opening wedge into the study of the symbolic realm of political behavior, a research concern that has tended to be lost in the quantitative analysis of
state politics.
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POLITICAL CULTURE, POLICY TRADITIONS, AND REGIONALISM
Culture has been construed variously but one useful definition argues that it
consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior
acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive
achievement of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e.
historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered
as products of action, on the other as conditioning elements of
further actions (Kroeber and Kluckhohn, n.d.: p. 357; see also
Kluckhohn, 1951; Kluckhohn and Kelly, 1945).
This construction of culture focuses upon patterned behavior, symbolic transmission, group action, traditional ideas, and values. Thus, culture as a word-construct refers first of all to structured regularities in behavior that are embedded in the symbolic interplay within and between generations. Moreover, this symbolic activity embraces with varying degrees of penetration an entire group or
society. As ideas are formulated and validated by symbolic activity valuations
come to be attached to them such that the ideas become embedded deeper and deeper
as traditional axioms of subsequent behavior. In this way values become structured and represent one mode of human experience, the "oughtness" that pervades
the cultural field.
The prevailing value system emerges over time with many of its components the
by-products of unintended consequences. Yet, much of that value system is consciously produced and often through the actions of government. It is this aspect
of culture that ought to be of most particular interest to students of politics.
Yet, as Karl Deutsch (1969) points out, political science especially has tended
more readily to accept "mechanistic" models of the political process and focused
more and more on the allocativd function of public policies to the relative exclusion of their function in producing values.2 Assuredly, value allocation and
value production are not unrelated. Both are reflected in governmental policies.
Such policies may be, for example, the initiation of new programs, funding of
established programs, or perhaps simply resolutions, symbolic expressions giving
or denying rhetorical support to some goal that may or may not require subsequent
action by government. Every instance of policy making is, thus, an allocative
effort--"who gets what, when, how" in the celebrated Lasswellian formulation. The
production of values appears in the patterning of such allocative efforts over
time. Thus, for example, the commitment in the United States to democracy was
initially both ill-defined and sverely restricted. One line of development in
the growth of this value of democratic association has been the gradual widening
of the franchise to include ever larger portions of the population. Allocation
and production, then, are inextricably linked in a cyclical process.
To the extent that a governmental system pursues a more or less coherent set
of policy directions across time, then, we can speak of a policy tradition. This
tradition directs the general production and growth of values within the society
as well as the more specific allocations granted at any given points in time. In
examining the American states there is the two-headed problem of their uniformity
within a national system and their autonomy as components of a federal system.
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For comparative analysis, their shared, invariant characteristics must be sorted
out and their utterly unique characteristics most often glossed over. In other
words, for the sake of utility on the one hand and parsimony on the other, a small
number of basic types or traditions is desirable.
Indeed, the literature of American state politics richly suggests that a
small number of such types is highly probably, given the tendencies toward shared
regional configurations of attributes.
Regional groupings in patterns of policy
responsiveness are likely due to the variant physical geographies across the states
combined with the concommitant economies attached to those geographies. These regional regularities are sometimes complimented, and at other times crosscut, by
historical settlement patterns as Elazar (1970, 1972) has shown. Thus, two problems
emerge in the analysis of policy traditions as an aspect of regional political cultures:
the physical contiguity of states adhering to a common tradition and the
likelihood of changes over time in socio-economic structure and settlement patterns.
Social scientists, unwittingly or not, usually apply the term "region" in a
functional sense that generally requires territorial contiguity.'
Unfortunately,
the requirement is imposed a priori and not empirically. However, in some disciplines a region is defined in a formal sense that requires some specific level of
homogeneity in a given set of attributes.
Region may be construed in this sense,
then, as a set of states which share locally and relativistically distinctive uniformities in cultural content and form--regardless of their geographical locations
relative to one another. Thus, Delaware and Vermont may form a more meaningful region for some purposes (or more strongly share a tradition) than Delaware and Maryland or Vermont and New York. Of course, if geographical contiguity is present as
well, then regional analysis is enhanced. Still, the formal definition of region
with its requirement for prior, rather than post hoc, analysis and its focus upon
the dynamics6 of man-environment relationships is preferable for most examinations
of culture.
Linked with this problematic decision is the problem of regional instability
over time. Particularly in the modern era, as technology allows greater independence from the physical environment and as settlement patterns move in ways other
than the classical spillover into "virgin" lands, human culture witnesses an expansion of available options, including policy choices. To the extent that diffusion processes are involved, technological advances in communication and transportation further enhance the likelihood of breakdown of functional regions, but not
necessarily formal ones. And at the same time, formal regions must always be put
to the empirical test of essential homogeneity.
Beyond these considerations, a formal definition more clearly pushes toward
theoretical questions as to the dynamics of cultural change. Certainly, if policy
traditions are the substantive concern, then these dynamics are of central importance. Those dynamics offer two possibilities with regard to regional distribution: multilinear evolution or sociocultural integration. If the states sharing
a regional similarity continue to be distinctive in that same fashion from other
states over time, then a pattern of multilinear evolution is evident. Students of
comparative state policy making more often, however, argue that the states are becoming more and more alike; indeed, these assertions usually suggest that sociocultural integration is moving so as to bring all the other states up to the "stan-
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dard" of the states in the industrialNortheast.7 Such arguments ignore the multi'8
dimensionality of development, or "modernization."
The more thoroughgoing empirical examinations that actually focus on political change in the states are more
equivocal, however. Generally, these studies suggest that regionalism may have
been more stable in the past with an accelerated movement toward greater sociocultural integration in the twentieth century, especially in the past three or four
decades (Sharkansky, 1970; Savage, 1975, 1978).
The research reported here focuses
upon policy traditions as indicated by proneness to adopt policies reflecting particular values across time and is thus likely to be the strongest test of sociocultural integration.
AN EMPRIRICAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF POLICY TRADITIONS
While public expenditure data reflect values in state policy, the various categories into which such data are aggregated are relatively limited. Moreover,
these decisions reflect environmental constraints to a greater degree than do the
decisions that actually come prior to these appropriations. Thus, a measure of
policy authorization is preferable for the analysis of policy traditions.
Such a
measure is the speed of adoption of a given policy, the length of time in years required by a state to adopt a policy after its first adoption. These lapsed-time
scores are computed for each of 207 policies for all 48 contiguous states. 9 The
last state to adopt a given policy is assigned a zero for that adoption item. The
lapsed-time scores for a given policy are then derived for the first and subsequent
units of adoption from the date for the last state to adopt that policy (or 1971
where one or more states had failed to adopt the policy as of that date).
Allowance has been made for states that had not achieved territorial status at the time
of the first adoption of a policy by adding to their scores the number of years between the initial adoption date and the date of acquisition of territorial status.
These adoption scores provide flexible statistics with a common unit of measurement
and are susceptible to a variety of statistical treatments.
The adoption measures have been compiled so as to obtain data for the widest
possible variety of policies. These measures include the creation of sundry state
agencies; the extension of state activity into various areas of public concern
such as education, health, housing, and welfare; the expansion of economic development, including the support of transportation facilities and the regulation of
business and professions; the regulation of political participation; intergovernmental relations; and taxation.
The 207 measures of adoption speed are segmented into three broad temporal
categories that permit developmental analysis. These three periods were selected
so as to give roughly equal numbers of measures for each period and, as much as
possible, to mark watershed points in the political development of the states,
namely the beginning (about 1900) and ending (about 1930) of the Progressivist era.
Thus the nineteenth century offers 72 adoption measures, the early twentieth century has 60 measures, and there are 75 measures for the later twentieth century.
As the concern here is with the extent to which states share coxmmon patterns
of variation across an array of policies, the Q-data slice is appropriate and factor analysis determines these underlying dimensionalities, i.e., the common types
°
of variation.1
Thus, a policy tradition is operationally defined by a Q-factor
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(depicting the degree of similarity among the states) and its typal array of factor
scores across the policy adoption items. The typal array promotes analysis of policy values by presenting the modal configuration of policy adoptions for each type
of state.
For each time period the data are correlated, factored by principal components, and rotated with a Varimax solution. Originally the number of factors was
determined by the eigenvalue-one criterion, but for each of the three time periods,
idiosyncratic factors emerged that made comparisions difficult. Examination of the
three matrices by the scree method suggested that a four-factor solution for each
11
matrix is appropriate.
Accordingly, the analysis here uses the four-factor solutions.
EMERGENT TRADITIONS IN AMERICAN STATE POLICY MAKING
A four-factor solution explains more than sixty percent of the variation in
each instance with a low of 62.2% for the early 20th century and a high of 77.1%
2
for the later 20th. Communalities (h ) for individual states rarely fall below
0.50 (three instances in the 19th century and three in the early 20th). The empirical results, then, support the decision to use four-factor solutions. Still,
the substantive utility of the factor results for each period is the ultimate test
of the validity of the decision. Accordingly, each of the time periods is examined
in depth below.
POLICY TRADITIONS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
The factor matrix presented in Table I presents four "regions" defined operationally in the formal sense but even a cursory examination suggests that these
regions tend strongly to be functional regions as well. Factor I, best represented by the states of Arizona, Montana, Utah, and Washington, groups fifteen contiguous states from west of the Mississippi River along with the more easterly
states of Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, and Maine. Assuredly, this points to a "Western" policy tradition in the 19th century. Factor II, best represented by Alabama,
Tennessee, and Texas, is hardly a surprise; it is a "Southern" tradition including
all the Old Confederate states and the five adjoining states of Missouri, Kentucky,
West Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware. Factor III, best represented by Connecticut and New Hampshire, is "New England," excluding Maine. Factor IV, best represented by New Jersey, exhibits the least contiguity, combining three Mid-Atlantic
states in the east with four Midwestern states and Wyoming. For reasons that will
become more apparent later, this factor can be called "Mid-American."
Note should also be made of significant secondary saturations as well. Thus,
several Factor I states of the Great Plains (Montana, South Dakota, Colorado,
Nebraska) load on Factor IV, as well as scattered others. This subsidary regional
tendency is less apparent with Factor I states having secondary saturations on
Factor II, just as Factor II states having secondary saturations on Factor I are
not necessarily the more westerly of the Southern states. On the other hand, four
of the five more westernly Factor IV states and only one of the more easterly ones
have secondary saturations on Factor I.
All in all, similarities in the responsiveness to new policies in the 19th
century strongly reflected sectional divisions in the young nation. An examination
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Table 1
CONFORMANCE TO POLICY TRADITIONS IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY: A Q-FACTOR MATRIX*

Factor
2

I

II

III

IV

h

Arizona
Washington
Utah
Montana
South Dakota
Colorado
Nebraska
Idaho
New Mexico
Kansas
Nevada
Oklahoma
Michigan
Maine
California
Iowa
Indiana
Oregon

89
83
82
80
79
79
76
74
74
73
71
70
69
67
65
64
63
57

16
16
10
17
15
10
18
16
33
24
33
35
15
09
29
36
48
46

14
18
22
12
-02
16
-04
-01
13
-12
-06
11
01
29
-05
-26
-14
-17

12
17
15
36
37
29
35
46
-12
23
35
22
14
04
38
16
06
27

0.86
0.77
0.76
0.81
0.79
0.75
0.74
0.79
0.69
0.65
0.74
0.67
0.52
0.54
0.65
0.63
0.65
0.64

Ohio

51

44

-13

37

0.60

Alabama
Tennessee
Texas
Florida
Virginia
South Carolina
Georgia
Kentucky
West Virginia
Louisiana
Arkansas
Missouri
North Carolina
Mississippi
Maryland
Delaware

14
09
25
03
16
05
08
30
31
29
30
25
22
33
42
33

86
82
82
80
79
78
75
73
71
70
69
68
66
65
60
41

12
09
13
27
-03
20
10
09
18
-02
-11
04
27
-16
-08
19

04
-05
12
01
05
-01
16
15
05
26
01
24
06
-04
20
-06

0.77
0.69
0.77
0.72
0.66
0.65
0.60
0.66
0.64
0.64
0.58
0.59
0.55
0.56
0.58
0.32

State
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82

Connecticut
New Hampshire
Vermont
Massachusetts
Rhode-Island

0.76
0.76
0.63
0.79
0.30

1821
1791
1761

48

New Jersey
Minnesota
North Dakota
New York
Pennsylvania
Illinois
Wyoming
Wisconsin

24
42
45
33
-01
15
48
46

-07
09
06
-08
32
02
-09

08
-03
04
21
10
-21
16
02

Cumulative percentages
of total variance are:

25.3

46.5

54.1

27

73
70
69
65
64
57
57
56

0.61
0.67
0.69
0.58
0.52
0.46
0.58
0.54

64.8

*Decimals are omitted from factor loadings. FL 0.29 are significant
with p 0.01; significant secondary saturations are underlined.
of typal arrays in Table 2 for the four factors fleshes out the bases for these
distinctive policy traditions.
Factor I states are distinctive for their quicker response to policies suggestive of what Elazar (1972) calls a Moralistic political subculture. Thus, policies supportive of popular participation either directly (female suffrage) or indirectly through expanding educational opportunities (establishment of a state
college) received quicker response from these states. Localism, another aspect of
the Moralistic orientation, is reflected both in the quicker adoption of a constitutional provision for municipal home rule and a greater reluctance to accept Morrill Act provisions or to establish regulatory agencies (Board of Health) at the
state level or to constitutionally limit the powers of municipal governments. On
the other hand, where local efforts seem contraindicated, e.g., state hospital for
the insane, a state-wide governing board for higher education, and efficient Judicial administration (code of civil ptocedure and rule-making power for the supreme
court), this type of state could be more responsive. Curiously, despite the modern
image of the old wild West, these states were also quicker to abolish capital punishment and, on the surface seemingly just as curious, they were even more quick,
relatively speaking, than Southern states to adopt anti-miscegenation laws. But
the latter instance simply reflects the demographic reality of greater potential
for racial mixture with the larger number of Amerindians and Asian immigrants.
Similarly, in the reverse direction, a state college for Negroes was an unnecessary luxury. And their comparative youth and capability for profiting from other
states' experiences meant that a constitutional revision commission was less nec-
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essary and the pre-modern income tax was a dead issue before most of these states
had even achieved territorial status. In sum, the states of Factor I in the 19th
century were laying the foundations for a Western Populist tradition of public
policy that largely fits Elazar's Moralistic political subculture in its overall
tone.
Factor II, the "Southern" type, not surprisingly, is positively distinctive
for innovativeness with regard to race relations. To a lesser degree, such states
are notable for their concern with establishing constitutional minimums for the
initial organization of counties and some limitations on state indebtedness. More
important for an understanding of Southern political values, however, are the many
policies for which states of this type lagged behind other American states. Contrary to the Western states, Southern states were slow to respond to measures promoting mass participation and education. They also lagged with regard to early
social welfare legislation, bureaucratic development, business regulation, and conservation. To a lesser degree, the Type II state was also slow in regulating the
electoral process, a policy area touching directly upon the maintenance of the political elite. Thus, Factor II conforms to Elazar's Traditionalistic political
orientation. More than that, the policy array suggests a stagnant political order
seeking to avoid trends prevalent elsewhere in the nation and to cope with internal pressures in a repressive fashion. Hence, in the nineteenth century, a Southern Parochial tradition of public policy emerged quite distinctively.
The New England states of Factor III were just as busily racing toward a modern, secularized system of government with the establishment of a wide array of
state government agencies for the better regulation of many public purposes, including health, welfare, and highways. Moreover, these states early began to regulate political parties and to establish merit systems for public employment
pointing toward a professionalized governmental system. While the New England
states were less supportive of direct measures promoting popular participation than
the Western states, they were more quick to expand mass education. On the negative
side, Type III states were not so likely to adopt constitutional limitations upon
the powers of the legislature in fiscal matters. Thus, while public policy in New
England reflected the Moralistic orientation described by Elazar, the more evident
thrust of that tradition was governmental expansionism, a Northeastern Bureaucratic
tradition.
Factor IV in many ways seems to be a residual type rather than a distinctive
policy tradition. The type is positively distinctive for its ardor in constitutionally limiting fiscal powers of the legislature and negatively for its rejection of measures directed against Negroes. To a very large extent, on the other
hand, these tendencies reflect prevailing conditions in these states in the postCivil War period, a rising popular concern for the more extreme excesses of the
new industrial order and a relatively lily-white population. Tentatively,
then,
1 2
the type may be called the Mid-American Industrial policy tradition.

State policy making in the first century and a quarter of American political
experience reflected the sectional patterns of settlement that have become traditional elements in American folklore. Beyond that, these emerging policy traditions are imbued with the basic subcultural variations predicted by Elazar.
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Table 2

TYPAL ARRAYS FOR NINETEENTH CENTURY POLICY
TRADITIONS: Q-FACTOR SCORE MATRIX
Types
Policy
Acceptance of Hatch Act provisions
Game protection law
State park
Constitutional Revision Commission
Abolition of capital punishment
State Superintendent of Public Instruction
Compulsory school attendance
State College
State normal school
Acceptance of Morrill Act provisions
Statewide governing board for higher education
Agency for public library extension
Australian ballot
Regulation of party nominations
Complete female suffrage
Female suffrage: school elections
Female suffrage: municipal elections
Female suffrage: non-constitutional elections
White suffrage
Poll tax as suffrage requirement
Literacy test as suffrage-requirement
State debt limitation
Constitutional allowance for casual state deficits
Duration of state loans constitutionally limited
State constitutionally prohibited from assuming
local or corporate indebtedness
State constitutionally prohibited from lending
credit to private corporations
State constitutionally prohibited from contracting debts for internal improvements
State tax to pay loan is constitutionally
irrepealable
State constitutionally prohibited from becoming
stockholder in private corporations
Aggregate state debt constitutionally limited
Internal improvements by state government constitutionally encouraged
Legislative post-audit

I

II

III

IV

-0.1
2.4
-0.2
-0.7
-0.1
2.3
-0.3
0.7
-0.0
-0.5
-0.6
-0.3
0.2
-0.8
0.2
1.2
0.4
0.4
-0.2
-1.1
-0.3
1.4
1.1
0.6

-1.1
2.1
-0.2
-0.7
-1.2
1.5
-1.0
0.4
-0.7
-0.2
-0.9
-0.4
-0.0
-0.9
-0.9
-0.6
-0.7
-0.5
2.0
0.2
-0.3
0.8
-0.0
-0.2

-0.8
2.3
0.5
-0.4
-0.7
2.5
0.4
0.3
0.5
0.3
-0.8
0.5
0.5
-0.6
-0.6
1.4
0.0
-0.4
-0.5
-0.2
0.9
-0.7
-0.7
-0.9

-1.3
2.6
-0.0
0.1
-0.2
2.6
-0.3
0.2
0.1
-0.3
-1.2
-0.1
0.1
-0.7
-0.9
1.1
-0.2
-0.2
0.4
-1.4
-0.6
1.9
1.9
0.9

-0.3

-0.3

-0.7

-0.8

1.1

1.4

-0.7

1.9

-0.5

-0.4

-0.9

0.2

0.1

-0.9

-0.9

0.8

0.7
0.7

1.0
-0.5

-0.9
-0.7

0.3
1.7

-0.1
-0.9

-0.3
-0.6

-0.9
-0.2

-1.1
-0.8

Restriction upon special and local laws
State merit system

1.8
-0.8
0.9
2.3
-0.2
-0.6
1.1
0.0
-0.4
-0.2
-0.4

Court interpreter
Code of civil procedure
Rule-making power for State Supreme Court
State Board of Health
State Hospital for the Insane
Maximum hours legislation
Child Labor Law
Minicipal home rule (constitutional)
Municipal home rule (statutory)
Local government aid to private corporations consti-0.8
tutionally prohibited
-1.0
Ratio limit on municipal indebtedness
0.2
Municipalities may not lend credit
0.2
Municipalities may not become stockholders
Minimum size for counties
0.3
-0.6
Minimum population for counties
-0.2
Professional licensing: pharmacists
-0.2
Professional licensing: dentists
-0.5
Professional licensing: midwives
Personal liberty law
-0.8
4.5
Antimiscegenation law
-1.0
Jim Crow law: railways
0.2
Segregated schools
-0.6
Black Law (fixing status of free Negro)
-1.1
Reconstruction of Negro marital relations
-0.6
Limitations on Negro witnesses
0.7
Prohibition of alcoholic beverages
-0.6
State Tax Commission
-0.8
Bank deposits tax
0.9
Death tax
-1.1
Pre-modern income tax
-0.7
State liquor monopoly
-0.9
State Highway Department
-0.9
State aid for roads and highways
-0.4
State Board of Charities
-0.2
Blind education
-0.1
Deaf education

1.2
-1.0
-0.2
0.2
-0.6
-0.4
0.6
-0.4
-0.9
-0.8
-0.3

-0.6
-0.3
-0.2
-0.3
-0.8
0.1
-0.2
0.7
0.5
-0.5
-0.2

2.1
-0.6
1.1
1.6
-0.5

-0.1
-1.0
0.7
0.7
1.6
1.0
-0.4
-0.3
-0.7
-1.3
3.6
0.6
1.3
0.7
1.2
-0.2
0.1
-0.9
-1.0
0.6
3.2
-0.9
-1.1
-1.1
-0.6
-0.4
-0.3

0.4
-0.4
0.4
0.4
-0.9
-0.9
0.4
0.2
-0.4
1.3
0.7
-0.9
-0.4
-0.9
-0.9
-0.9
2.2
0.0
0.9
1.2
5.1
-0.5
-0.3
-0.4
0.3
0.5
0.7

0.1
-0.1
1.1
1.1
0.6
0.3
0.0
0.0

-0.4

0.7
0.5
-0.3
-0.5
-0.4

0.2
-1.1

-1.4
-1.4
-0.2
-1.0
-1.2
-1.0

0.8
-0.9
-0.7

1.4
-1.1
-1.2
-1.0
-1.0
0.1
0.0
0.1

POLICY TRADITIONS IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY
In the first three decades of the present century, the most important forces
affecting public policy in the American states were the one-two punches of the Populist movement followed by the Progressivists. We continue to see the impact of
these colorful movements even today with the "Taxpayer Revolt" on the one hand and
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institutional streamlining measures such as the Sunset Law on the other. Still,
as Table 3 shows, these movements did not drastically reshape the topography of
policy traditions. Factor I is still basically a western aggregation, sixteen contiguous states west of the Mississippi River and four other states in the Northeast.
Factor II is just assuredly the South with ten contiguous states of the Old Confederacy and Delaware. Factor III seems to have spread outward but is still essentially northeastern with Indiana the only non-contiguous state. Factor IV consequently becomes a more midwestern aggregation with only New Jersey as a non-contiguous eastern state adhering to the tradition.
Factor I states continue to reflect the concern for mass participation in
politics, being most distinctive for the four measures of direct legislation (see
Table 4). At the same time, fiscal conservatism is indicated by the slower response to a variety of new taxes, although this may be only the contemporary mode
of rejecting government at higher levels in favor of more localized government.
The relative reluctance to accept the provisions of the national government's Sheppard-Towner Act supports this interpretation. In any event, the Western Populist
tradition is carried on to the 1930's.
Just as clearly, the Southern Parochial tradition continued through this period.
Factor II states continue to innovate in the area of repressive measures for fixing
the lower status of blacks and to restrict popular participation, wherever possible.
A further development of the image of a Southern Parochial tradition includes the
anti-corporatism reflected in the quick adoption of the chain-store tax and the lack
of enthusiasm for an anti-injunction law to protect the organizational efforts of
the labor movement. Less clearly related are the positive responses to a wide array
of new taxes and the simultaneously slow move to adopt programs of public welfare.
Factor III seems to emphasize even more strongly the concern of states of this
type to build a modern governmental apparatus. Indeed, this emphasis falls in line
especially with Progressivist concerns for more efficient governmental operation,
hence acceptance of a legislative research agency, a centralized administrative
agency, and various court reforms. These states are also continuing to expand public regulation of the economy and society generally. The Type III states seem to
be least concerned with the development of local autonomy, or grass-roots politics.
In general, then, the Northeastern Bureaucratic tradition remained live and well
and even expanded its geographical spread considerably in the early twentieth century.
Factor IV, again, seems almost a residual type even though its territorial
basis is more definite. The stress in states of this type is, in opposition to
Factor III states, on expanding grass roots control in local communities although
perhaps not at the county level and certainly does not include direct legislation
at the state level. A Mid-American Industrial policy tradition remains, then, even
more problematic in the early decades of this century.
POLICY TRADITIONS IN THE LATER TWENTIETH CENTURY
Geographical
apparent as shown
but are dispersed
for a majority of

contiguity of policy traditions in the period 1930-1970 is less
in Table 5. The western states no longer constitute a major bloc
across three factors. Still, three factors exhibit contiguity
the states constituting them. Factor I is a Northeastern aggrega-
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Table 3
CONFORMANCE TO POLICY TRADITIONS IN THE
A Q-FACTOR MATRIX*
EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY:

Factor
State
Arizona
Colorado
Nevada
Nebraska
Oregon
North Dakota
South Dakota
Washington
California
Missouri
Idaho
Ohio
Michigan
Arkansas
Montana
Oklahoma
Massachusetts
Utah
New Mexico
Maine
South Carolina
Mississippi
North Carolina
Georgia
Alabama
Virginia
Tennessee
Florida
Louisiana
Texas
Delaware
Rhode Island
Connecticut
Vermont
New York
New Hampshire

I

II

87
83
82
81
81
81
76
75
75
75
74
74
70
70
70
67
64
60
58
55

04
05
-05
14
-05
14
34
03
10
30
24
08
08
28
20
50
13
-01
34
06

15
24
17
-04
16
-19
20
-02
11
39
22
07
14
20
18
25

90
81
80
77
73
70
67
64
63
57
4_491
02
06
26
32
13
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IV

h2

08
08
-06
20
02
15
02
19
12
13
04
26
07
07
14
-02
39
36
13
31

26
25
19
17
18
20
18
34
20
-06
32
05
22
-05
30
-04
03
11
37
15

0.83
0.76
0.71
0.75
0.69
0.74
0.73
0.72
0.63
0.67
0.71
0.62
0.56
0.58
0.64
0.70
0.58
0.50
0.61
0.42

-06
-07
02
33
12
35
44
32
-06
21
34

12
22
16
-20
22
-20
04
02
33
32
23

0.84
0.77
0.70
0.75
0.62
0.69
0.68
0.52
0.52
0.62
0.46

06
13
03
14
19

0.70
0.68
0.73
0.68
0.60

II

801
n79

72
69

154

42
35
-16

0.58
0.52
0.64

36
47
34
46
46
32
28

03
31
16
45
15
24
42
24
38

06
34
46
22
53
33
14
42
20

65
60
58
57
57
56
56
54
40

0.58
0.74
0.71
0.80
0.74
0.70
0.72
0.62
0.42

26.9

42.8

55.9

62.2

15
18
31

18
15
47

Wyoming
Minnesota
Illinois
Iowa
New Jersey
Kansas
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Kentucky

39

Cumulative percentages
of total variance are:

(591
59

Pennsylvania
Indiana
Maryland

*Decimals are omitted from factor loadings. FL 0.32 are significant
with p 0.01; significant secondary saturations are underlined.

tion primarily, including all of the New England and Middle Atlantic states confounded with three smaller blocs of states from the Northwest, Upper Middle West,
and Border States. Factor II is once again the Southern type including Oklahoma
with all of the Old Confederacy states except Tennessee. Factor IV aggregates a
continguous belt of thirteen Mid-American state from West Virginia to Wyoming with
a1 bloc of four Desert Southwest states. The altogether non-contiguous Factor III
nonetheless is constituted of three western states; yet, examination of secondary
saturations suggests that the factor is not really "western."
As the major forces shaping the broader contours of public policy in the states
during this latter period have tended to obscure traditional sectional differences,
the breakdown of geographical contiguity along the lines evident in the earlier
periods is not surprising. Those forces include important nationalizing thrusts
such as the Great Depression of the 1930's accompanied by the great expansion of
national grant-in-aid programs and the parallel enhancement of interstate communications through the creation of many associations of state officials. At the same
tiwe, this later period has witnessed the emergence and spread of a metropolitantechnological frontier that deviates from earlier settlement patterns with respect
to the maintenance of sectionalism (Elazar, 1972).
What may be really surprising is the degree of geographical contiguity that
persists. Still, nationalizing influences have had a major impact. One bit of
evidence showing that impact is the dramatic decrease in the number of "pure"
states, i.e., states with no secondary saturations. There are 21 "pure" states for
each of the earlier periods but only four for the last period, all on Factor I.
This nationalization is further indicated in the greatly increased number of "consensus" policies, i.e., items having a difference of less than one standard devia-
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Table 4
TYPAL ARRAYS FOR EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY POLICY
TRADITIONS: Q-FACTOR SCORE MATRIX
Types
I

Policy

II

III

IV

1.7

1.2

2.1

2-0

-0.9

-0.4

-0.4

Gas and oil conservation law
Amendment XVI: Income tax
Amendment XVII: Direct election of senators
Amendment XVIII: Prohibition
Amendment XIX: Female suffrage
Unratified amendment on child labor

0.3
1.7
1.5
1.3
1.3
0.1

-0.2
1.7
-0.2
1.8
-0.7
-1.2

-0.6
0.1
1.5
1.0
1.8
-0.6

0.2
1.1
1.7
0.9
1.5
0.7

Juvenile probation
Adult probation
Juvenile court

0.4
0.6
1.9

0.6
0.1
2.3

1.2
1.9
2.9

0.4
0.7
1.8

0.0
-1.1
-0.7
0.9
1.8
0.3
0.9
-1.5

0.3
-0.8
-0.0
-1.2
-1.2
-1.0
1.3
1.5

-0.6
-0.9
-0.9
-1.2
-1.2
-1.2
0.5
-1.2

0.3
-1.0
-0.7
-1.4
-1.4
-0.8
1.2
-1.4

1.9

-1.2

-1.0

-1.4

1.9
1.5

1.2
1.0

-1.0
-1.2

Blue-sky law
Air pollution law

Junior college enabling act
Coordination commission for higher education
Government research bureau at state university
Constitutional initiative
Statutory initiative
Recall
Statewide direct primary
Grandfather clause
Optional referendum

Enabling act:
Enabling act:

local initiative
local recall

Enabling act:

local referendum

-0.4

2.1
1.8

1.8

1.5

0.2

2.1

Central administrative agency
Female eligibility for jury service
Legislative research agency
Original budgeting law
Statute revision agency
Retirement system for state employees
Judicial council
First recognition of ABA judicial Canons
Minimum wage provision
Equal pay for females

-0.8
0.4
0.1
-1.1
-0.3
-0.7
0.1
-0.6
0.7
-0.8

-0.9
-0.5
0.3
-0.8
0.3
-0.3
-0.1
-0.4
-0.9
-1.2

-0.0
0.8
2.2
-0.8
0.2
0.3
0.7
-0.3
0.5
-0.1

-0.3
0.7
0.4
-0.9
0.2
-0.5
0.5
-0.3
0.4
-0.6

Anti-injunction law

-0.1

-1.1

0.7

-1.2

-1.0

0.5

County home rule

-1.0

-1.0

-0.9

-1.3

State municipal league
Enabling act: municipal zoning

0.7
-0.9

0.9
-0.6

0.0
-0.6

1.3
-0.6

Criminal syndicalism law
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0.3

0.5

Enabling act: rural zoning
Optional forms of county government
Professional licensing: engineers
Professional licensing: accountants
Professional licesning: nurses
Jim Crow law: streetcars
Personal income tax
Corporate income tax
Gasoline tax
Motor vehicle tax
Chain-store tax
Cigarette tax
Mortgage registry tax: state
Forest yield tax
Forest serverance tax
Automobile registration
Highway patrol
Workmen's compensation
Old age pension
Mother's aid
Blind pension
Acceptance of Sheppard-Towner Act provisions

-0.5
-1.2
-0.6
0.9
-0.5
-1.3
0.2
0.4
-1.2
-1.0
-0.8
-0.1
-0.6
-0.9
-1.3
-1.2
-1.1
0.2
-1.1
-0.3
-0.5
-1.2

0.1
-0.3
0.1
1.2
-0.1
2.3
1.1
1.3
-0.8
-0.8
1.1
0.7
0.4
-0.5
-0.8
-0.8
-0.9
-0.0
-1.1
-0.6
-0.7
-0.8

1.3
-0.9
-0.4
1.9
0.3
-1.0
-0.3
1.0
-0.9
-0.3
-0.7
0.6
-0.3
-0.1
-0.9
-0.5
-0.1
1.0
-0.9
-0.0
-0.2
-1.0

0.0
-1.4
-0.2
1.4
-0.1
-1.4
0.1
-0.1
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.2
-0.3
-0.9
-1.3
-1.0
-0.9
0.6
-1.0
-0.1
0.0
-1.2

tion across the factors. Just over 47% of the policies were "consensual" in the
nineteenth century, 50% in the early twentieth, and nearly 83% in the later twentieth. Still, distinctive policy traditions remain.
Type I states are most distinctive for their quick ratificatiol of the TwentyFirst Amendment, repealing Prohibition, and their rejection of the sales tax, segregated buses, and the Oil and Gas Compact (see Table 6). More generally, these
states have been more responsive than others to measures that enhance governmental
operations including interstate agreements in the criminal justice field, collective bargaining for public employees, and the establishment of a planning and development agency. Beyond this, these states are leaders in supporting equity of
opportunity beyond governmental circles to the private economic sector. In general,
then, while new concerns are evident, the Northeastern Bureaucratic policy tradition has continued in to the later twentieth century.
The Southern states are most distinctive for their rapid adoptio of Jim Crow
laws on buses and, somewhat less so, a right-to-work law. On the negative side
these states dragged their feet with regard to the ratification of Repeal, the establishment of a State Human Relations Commission, and outlawing age discrimination in employment. In general, the Southern states remain unsupportive of popular participation, e.g., the lack of response to the 23rd and 24th Amendments;
anti-organized labor if not anti-corporate; and relatively unconcerned about modernizing government.
Type III states are different not only in their geographical dispersion but in
the peculiar array of preferences indicated by policy adoption scores. There is
some evidence to suggest support for the redistribution of wealth, most notably the
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Table 5
CONFORMANCE TO POLICY TRADITIONS IN THE
LATER TWENTIETH CENTURY: A Q-FACTOR MATRIX*

Factor
2

h

I

II

III

IV

Vermont
Delaware
New Hampshire
Minnesota
Massachusetts
Idaho
New Jersey
New York
.Oregon
Montana
Maine
Connecticut
Wisconsin
Kentucky
Pennsylvania
Maryland
Rhode Island
Tennessee

83
81
80
75
74
74
72
71
70
69
68
66
65
60
60
60
58
48

23
24
20
24
-01
25
06
12
20
26
22
11
16
25
18
26
13
45

01
05
04
45
26
14
11
04
45
04
16
37
56
17
08
14
58
36

24
17
34
17
22
47
01
33
15
50
51
42
15
51
49
33
25
44

0.80
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.66
0.86
0.54
0.62
0.76
0.80
0.79
0.76
0.78
0.72
0.64
0.56
0.76
0.77

Georgia
South Carolina
Mississippi
North Carolina
Florida

06
19
01
05
36

88
80
79
74
73

01
16
13
43
0

38
28
46
05
42

0.88
0.78
0.84
0.73
0.83

Arkansas

37

71

02

45

0.84

Oklahoma
Alabama
Texas
Virginia
Louisiana

04
30
31
45
08

70
68
67
64
61

43
-06
-22
28
53

34
44
34
-08
25

0.79
0.74
0.71
0.70
0.72

Washington
California
Colorado

47
51
42

19
22
19

5

39
43
40

0.75
0.82
0.63

Kansas
North Dakota

13
01

38
43

23
23

State
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52
r

1761

0.84
0.83

Illinois
New Mexico
South Dakota
Indiana
Michigan
Ohio
Wyoming
Utah
Arizona
Nevada
Iowa
Missouri
Nebraska
West Virginia
Cumulative percentages of
total variance are:

p

45
46
11
51
50
55
49
52
42
9
50
58

28

28
26
44
4
25

29
33
40
34
24
30
5

39

48

30

27.2

45.0

20

75
73
71
69
69
67
66
65
64
64
61
58
58
56

53.7

77.1

20
20
27
18
27
28
18
18
20
07
25
29

T1

0.89
0.89
0.78
0.89
0.86
0.92
0.82
0.89
0.75
0.71
0.76
0.84
0.58
0.67

*Decimals are omitted from factor loadings. FL 0.28 are significant with
0.01; significant secondary saturations are underlined.

early adoption of the gift tax but these same states tended to be slow in accepting the various welfare programs funded by federal grants. These states also exhibit a strong interest in reforming the judiciary.
Type IV, combining both Mid-American and Western states, is even less clear as
a tradition of public policy. The type positively emphasizes the adoption of a
sales tax, the establishment of a Legislative Council, and membership in the Oil
and Gas Compact. There are no policies that states of this type have clearly resisted.
The analysis of typal arrays further supports the contention of a breakdown
in longstanding traditions of policy preferences among the American states. It remains to show in a straightforward fashion the extent to which policy traditions
have persisted or merged over time.
EVOLUTIONARY PATTERNS IN POLICY TRADITIONS
Where a given policy tradition for an earlier temporal period is correlated
positively with policy traditions of later periods, it seems reasonable to assert
that the tradition is a persistent one in American state policy making. On the
other hand, since the content of policy arrays changes necessarily, this assertion
means simply that some states continue to share a similar pattern of adoption
proneness over time. Such persistence can be determined by correlating the loadings of the states for a given factor against those for every other factor. Table
3
Clearly, the Southern Parochial tradition is per7 presents these correlations.'
sistent in this regard with the weakest correlation at 0.68 for the nineteenth and
later twentieth centuries. Likewise, the Northeastern states, with New England
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Table 6
TYPAL ARRAYS FOR LATER TWENTIETH CENTURY POLICY
TRADITIONS: Q-FACTOR SCORE MATRIX

Types
Policy

I

Soil conservation districts
Fair trade law
Cooling off for door-to door sales
Oil and gas compact
Pest control compact
State grant for municipal waste treatment
facilities
Radiation control act
Amendment XXI:
Repeal of Prohibition
Amendment XXII: Two-term limit for President
Amendment XXIII: Electoral vote for D.C.
Amendment XXIV: Elimination of poll tax
Amendment XXV:
Presidential succession
Victim compensation
Interstate parolee compact
Interstate juveniles compact
Agreement on detainers
Police standards law
State medical examiner
State commission of post-mortem examiners
State planning board
Planning and development agency
Science and technology advisory council
Compact for education
Personnel qualification agreement for education
State board for junior colleges
Interstate library compact
Court administrator
Judicial code of ethics
Judicial qualifications commission
Legislative Council
Collective bargaining:
state employees
Collective bargaining: municipal employees
Collective bargaining: policemen
Collective bargaining: firemen
Collective bargaining: teachers
Interstate compact on mental health
Mentally disordered offender compact
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II

III

IV

-0.2
3.8
-0.7
0.2
-0.7

0.3
3.0
-0.6
1.9
-0.7

-0.1
3.0
-0.7
0.8
-0.5

0.1
3.6
-0.6
2.1
-0.6

0.1
0.2
4.5
1.9
0.5
0.2
-0.2
-0.8
1.0
0.7
-0.1
-0.3
-0.1
-0.5
0.1
0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.6
-0.4
-0.3
0.4
0.5
-0.8
1.8
-0.6
-0.5
-0.6
-0.5
-0.5
0.7
-0.8

-0.4
0.3
1.1
1.7
-0.4
-0.6
-0.3
-0.7
0.0
0.2
-0.5
-0.5
-0.2
-0.0
0.2
0.7
-0.3
-0.3
-0.6
-0.6
-0.5
-0.1
0.5
-0.6
1.6
-0.7
-0.7
-0.7
-0.7
-0.7
-0.0
-0.7

-0.4
0.3
3.2
0.8
0.2
0.0
-0.3
-0.7
0.6
0.8
-0.3
-0.2
-0.8
-0.8
0.1
0.3
-0.8
-0.4
-0.7
-0.5
-0.5
0.7
1.3
-0.3
1.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.6
-0.7
-0.4
-0.4
-0.8

-0.5
0.2
2.6
1.8
0.5
0.2
-0.2
-0.7
0.7
0.4
-0.5
-0.4
-0.5
-0.6
0.2
0.7
-0.6
-0.4
-0.7
-0.4
-0.6
0.1
0.5
-0.6
2.6
-0.7
-0.6
-0.6
-0.6
-0.6
0.1
-0.6

Abortion law liberalized
Screening for PKU in infants required
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
State Housing Finance Authority
Anti-age discrimination in employment
Right-to-work law
Department of Community Affairs
State commission on local government
Civil defense compact
Military aid compact
National Guard compact
Human Relations Commission
Fair housing law: private housing
Jim Crow law: motor carriers
Liquor tax
Multistate tax compact
Sales tax
Mortgage registry: local
State lottery
Gift tax
State income tax withholding
State Department of Transportation
Vehicle registration agreement
Bus taxation proration
Taxation of motor fuels compact
Equipment safety compact
Driver license compact
Medical advisory board for driver licensing
Passenger restraint device required in automobiles
Old age assistance
Aid to dependent children
Aid to the blind
APTD
AABD
Unemployment insurance
Child placement compact
Extension of unemployment payments to 39 weeks
Highway relocation assistance

-0.8
-0.2
-0.7
-0.6
0.3
-0.8
-0.2
-0.9
1.9
-0.2
-0.9
1.2
-0.0
-0.9
-0.4
-0.8
0.2
-0.5
-0.7
0.2
0.7
-0.7
-0.5
-0.4
-0.6
0.1
-0.5
-0.9
-0.2
-0.6
1.7
1.2
1.8
-0.5
-0.7
-0.5
-0.9
-0.8

-0.5
-0.2
-0.5
-0.7
-0.4
1.8
-0.1
-0.6
1.7
-0.5
-0.7
-0.6
-0.7
4.2
-0.3
-0.6
2.7
-0.3
-0.7
0.5
0.4
-0.7
-0.7
-0.7
-0.7
-0.1
-0.4
-0.7
-0.2
-0.5
1.5
1.3
1.8
-0.3
-0.6
-0.7
-0.7
-0.6

-0.5
-0.3
-0.6
-0.8
2.0
-0.8
-0.0
-0.8
1.4
-0.8
-0.8
1.1
-0.1
-0.8
-0.4
-0.7
3.1
0.7
-0.8
2.5
-0.3
-0.5
0.9
-0.8
-0.8
0.0
-0.0
-0.8
-0.2
-0.6
1.2
1.0
1.1
-0.8
-0.7
-0.8
-0.8
-0.8

-0.7
-0.3
-0.5
-0.6
-0.4
0.8
-0.6
-0.5
1.8
-0.7
-0.7
0.5
-0.5
-0.7
-0.4
-0.5
3.6
-0.7
-0.7
-0.7
-0..1
-0.7
0.3
-0.7
-0.7
0.2
-0.2
-0.7
-0.2
-0.5
1.4
1.1
1.5
-0.3
-0.7
-0.6
-0.7
-0.7

constituting the core area, show this persistence, albeit much weaker. The weakest
correlation (r-0.35) is again between the nineteenth and later twentieth. The Western Populist tradition is clearly sustained in the early twentieth century but appears to move toward a more midwestern locus in the later twentieth. The Mid-American policy tradition weakens in the early twentieth century and then seems to disappear altogether in the last period. Unfortunately, the correlation matrix gives
no further information.
An alternative approach to analysis of the data is available that provides fur-

-222-

C) I

0

0

-t C

I

CtN
I

I

It
0000

1

1

0000

(N I00

V)
I CI

N0
I 1

Oo
N

Ir- 0

W
00-

0D0

0'

1 I

I

-

N c.0

N

F- CD -

0

W)

0000
I I

I
000

to

z0

000

Coco
0000

0000
I

II

.0
4.

I

0000
00

E.

r- Mt N1 cr ,

c0

z
I

0uu

I

I

II
0

04
00

0

00-

. 00-'
N
z

G

A

t

N

0

-223-

N-

N
,4

-

4 41
4 H

w

pa

I

39

0
4

-

4
H

4

ther insights: higher-order Q-factor analysis. Just as with the factor analyses
of the raw data matrices, the states are clustered in terms of their similarity in
loadings across the twelve policy traditions. Table 8 presents that matrix, showing that the geographical basis of the policy traditions found originally in the
4
nineteenth century generally persists across the entire time frame.'
The "MidAmerican" tradition very definitely weakens, however, as only Illinois and Pennsylvania have statistically significant saturations on Factor IV. The typal arrays of
the twelve policy traditions across the "higher" policy traditions, presented in
Table 9, more clearly and graphically show what is evident in the three period factor analyses and the correlations of the factor loadings. The Southern Parochial
tradition declines over time but remains strong. The Northeastern tradition persists and grows geographically by expanding into the Mid-American and Western
states. The Western Populist tradition splits asunder in the later twentieth century with some of these states moving toward the Northeastern tradition and others
toward a new Mid-Western tradition that also encompasses some of the older Mid-American tradition. The original Mid-American Industrial tradition had already split in
the early twentieth century with a number of its former adherents beginning to model
themselves after the Northeastern states. The fourth type emerging in the later
twentieth century seems, then, to be something altogether new.
POLICY TRADITIONS AND THE FUTURE
The adoption of new policies in the American states has largely reflected a
pattern of multilinear evolution revolving about well-recognized eographical seci
tions, then, rather than a pattern of sociocultural integration.
The American
South has been especially persistent in this regard but New England, as a core
area of the greater Northeast, has also been very persistent. Still, the analysis
of the larger values indicated by specific policies raises considerable doubt about
the continued viability of this multilinear tendency.
These doubts are amplified by Deutsch's concerns regarding value production
and value growth. Value production and the resulting allocations of those values
have tended along very narrow lines where regional distinctions are notable. For
varying reasons many of these regional value patterns have reached very nearly
their ultimate and do not point, in themselves, to new values. Thus, it seems that
the states are ripe for a stronger thrust of sociocultural integration than ever
before.
This "erosion" of the multilinear dynamic comes at a time when the mechanisms
of diffusion and population settlement patterns are also more conducive to integration than ever before. The diffusion mechanisms in American state policy making
are primarily national starting with the mass media generally and organizational
channels such as the various associations of state officials and related agencies.
And, of course, the influence of the national government is highly pervasive. Population settlement patterns have changed to reflect Elazar's "metropolitan-technological frontier" which, while not necessarily counterproductive of a multilinear
dynamic, is very amenable to increased sociocultural integration.
Moreover, policy responses of the states in the 1970's suggest that an integrative trend is very much dominant at the present time. While it is still too early
for any rigorous analysis, the tendency toward universal adoption of such policies
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Table 8
CONFORMANCE TO POLICY TRADITIONS ACROSS THE THREE PERIODS:
A HIGHER-ORDER Q-FACTOR MATRIX*

Factor
II

III

IV

95
94
91
90
90
87
85
85
85
83
81
81

-03
-17
-12
-09
02
-14
-11
-36
20
-03
-11
-38

-21
18
03
-26
-19
-16
-10
-14
-03
-56
-03
-05

23
03
30
09
22
-07
-02
-01
23
-02
31
-03

79
78
77

-02
01
23

49
01
-11

12
11
12

-05
-29
-04
06
-31

91
88
87
81
80

-10
07
12
-46
-16

-12
-05
-11
-09
-10

I

State

Michigan
Utah
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
California
Arizona
Colorado
Ohio
South Dakota
Idaho
Washington
Maine
Oregon
New Mexico
Alabama
Florida
Tennessee
Mississippi
Georgia
Arkansas
South Carolina

55

77

-16

-16

-21
26
11

76
73
73

-30
05
-20

-17
32
-08

Connecticut
Vermont
New Hampshire
Massachusetts
Rhode Island

-27

-23

-15
-21

-01
-16

82

33
-18

-03
-12

74

Illinois
Pennsylvania

14
-16

04
02

61
57

46
31

Kentucky
Texas

Missouri
Iowa
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h

2

1.00

0.95
0.93
0.89
0.89
0.81
0.75
0.87
0.82
1.00
0.77
0.80
0.88
0.62
0.67
0.86
0.87
0.79
0.88
0.77
0.95
0.74
0.71
0.59

-30
02

0.80
0.70
0.66
0.75
0.57

-23
32

75

0.68
0.69

11
-34

-09
46

0.60
0.75

-04

77
72

02
04

North Dakota
Oklahoma
Virginia
Maryland
West Virginia
North Carolina
Delaware
Wisconsin
Kansas
Louisiana
Minnesota
New York
New Jersey
Indiana
Wyoming
Cumulative percentages of total
variance are:

54
54
-25
29
36
-31
17
14
49
-17
17
04
00
43
42

-24
27
69
65
65
62
59
-53
08
55
-37
-29
-48
47
-41

29.8

52.1

*Decimals are omitted from factor loadings; FL
p

0.61
0.78
0.52
0.65
0.60
0.74
0.66
0.54
0.76
0.74
0.60
0.68
0.63
0.70
0.71

66.1

75.7

0.71 are significant with

0.01.
Table 9
TYPAL ARRAY OF POLICY TRADITIONS
Type

Policy Tradition
Nineteenth Century
I. Western Populist
II. Southern Parochial
III. Northeastern Bureaucratic
IV. Mid-American Industrial
Early Twentieth Century
I. Western Populist
II. Southern Parochial
III. Northeastern Bureaucratic
IV. Mid-American
Later Twentieth Century
I. Northeastern
II. Southern Parochial
III. Western (truncated)
IV. Mid-Western
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I

II

1.7
-0.6
-1.3
-0.4

-0.5
1.9
-0.9
-1.1

-0.9
-0.6
1.8
-0.9

-0.3
-0.9
-1.9
1.4

1.7
-1.0
-0.9
-0.6

-0.5
1.5
-0.4
-0.8

-0.2
-0.7
1.6
-0.8

-0.2
-0.8
0.8
0.9

0.7
-0.2
-0.4
1.1

0.1
1.4
-0.8
0.3

1.7
-0.6
-0.3
-0.0

1.5
-0.6
-0.7
0.7

III

IV

as sunset laws, energy agencies, generic drug substitution laws, and the legalization of laetrile suggest integrative tendencies. Sectional deviations still exist,
for example, in such matters as equal rights for women and collective bargaining
for employees, but these are continuing issues from an earlier time. Thus, sectionalism will likely continue to color patterns of state policy making for the remainder of this century. For better or worse, then, a more universal pattern
seems to be more likely in the foreseeable future barring any significant changes
in present American socioeconomic trends.
ENDNOTES
*This essay is a revised version of a paper originally presented at the Annual
Meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, Fort Worth, Texas, March,
1979.
'Cf. Vickers (1967).
The more general view of politics leading to this emphasis on choice as a key element in the understanding of political behavior flows
especially from Deutsch (1966) and Nimmo and Ungs (1967); and more generally from
the works of Friedrich Nietzsche and Albert Camus.
2
also the Preface to Deutsch (1966: pp.vii-viii).
3Cf.
Notable works on regionalism in American politics include Elazar (1970,
1972); Elazar and Zikmund (1975); Jensen (1951); Luttbeg (1970); Patterson (1968);
Savage (1973, 1975); Sharkansky (1970).
4V.0. Key and his students in their various works on specific American
regions
follow this mode, as does Sharkansky (1970).
'Cf. the usage of the eminent anthropologist, Julian Steward (1955).
Luttbeg
(1970) and Savage (1973, 1975) follow his construction.
6For a succinct examination of the alternative modes of regional analysis, see
the introduction to Berry and Hankins (1963).
7Cf., e.g., Hofferbert (1966).
However, he seems to retreat from this position
later (1968).
8
Unfortunately, the heuristic essay by Crittenden (1967) is generally overlooked.
9
Alaska and Hawaii are dropped from consideration as the requisite information
is not available for most of the policies.
"°The analyses reported here are not simply expansions of the Q-factor derived
structures of regional policy diffusion reported in Walker's (1969) seminal study
of innovation diffusion among the American states. His method of computing the
adoption scores has the effect of producing a doubly-standardized matrix for factoring. This reduces the variance primarily to within-state variance, and the resulting factors more closely correspond to what I have labeled as "policy proflies"
elsewhere (1971). The factors reported here retain the full temporal variation and
are rightly called "policy traditions."
1
The eigenvalue-one criterion produced 8-factor solutions for both of the two
earlier periods and a 10-factor solution for the last period. The eigenvalues for
the 19th century are 20.2, 5.6, 3.7, 2.0, 1.6, 1.3, 1.2, and 1.2 respectively. For
the early twentieth century they are 19.1, 6.0, 3.4, 2.5, 1.9, 1.6, 1.4, and 1.1.
In the last period, the ten eigenvalues are 5.5, 3.5, 2.6, 2.5, 2.3, 2.0, 1.9, 1.9,
1.7, and 1.6.
Strictly interpreted, the scree test strongly points to a three-fac-
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tor solution as more correct statistically but for comparative and substantive purposes I have used a four-factor solution. Rummel (1970) is a readable source for
reviewing this and other technical aspects of factor analysis for the reader unfamiliar with these decision criteria.
12This appellation seems further supported as the concern for limiting what
appeared to many as the unfair access of corporations to government conforms to the
marketplace conception of government as Elazar (1972) posits for the Individualistic political subculture. And it is especially in the more easterly states of
Factor IV that he locates the origins of this subculture.
13The measure of correlation is the Pearsonian r.
1 Initially, an eigenvalue-one criterion was used to determine the number of
factors, resulting in a six-factor solution. However, only the first four factors
had states with significant saturations. A five-factor solution had the same result; thus, the four-factor solution is presented here. The four factors very
acceptably explain almost 75% of the variance, and only four states have communali2
ties (h ) under 0.60.
5
' See Steward (1955) for a comprehensive analysis of these alternative cultural
dynamics. Also, see Savage (1973) for their application in a broader socioeconomic
and political context to the American states than that presented here.
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THE INTERSECTION OF POLITICAL CULTURE AND
FISCAL FEDERALISM: STATE BLOCK GRANTS IN ALABAMA
David Sink, D.P.A. and Michele Wilson, Ph.D.
University of Alabama in Birmingham
Urban Studies Department

ABSTRACT
Political culture and intergovernmental relations together shape specific
policy actions of a state government within the constraints of its economic condition. Although financial resources provided a state government strongly influence
the level of its policy outputs, the political and administrative dynamics appear
to affect the exact nature of that policy. A case study of state block grant
implementation in the state of Alabama provides an opportunity to observe these
variables in action. In particular, the prominent role played by the executive
branch appears to have influenced strongly the decisions made concerning social
services, health policy, and community development.

A state's political system of inputs, decisions, and outputs operates within
a political culture and a complex intergovernmental partnership, which together
shape the formation and execution of public policy. To consider one without the
other is incomplete, as if the distribution of resources were determined solely
by regional peculiarities or federal mandate. Both are dynamic, though regional
political cultures appear to have changed more slowly than federal-state relationships. In order to understand state policy, we need to understand how their interaction impacts the ways a state government, its leaders, and institutions do
business.
One recent opportunity to study the shaping of state policy outputs involves
nine state block grants which were enacted by Congress as part of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-35). Starting October 1, 1981 (FY1982),
1
the state of Alabama assumed responsibility for seven of those block grants.
these
health,
Reagan's
intentions,
Although modest by comparison with President
social welfare, and community development programs return considerable, though
not complete, decision-making control to the states. The importance of that
control has been diminished somewhat with severe federal budget reductions.
Organizational structures, budgetary response, eligibility standards, and program
oversight are left largely to state devices. It is the adoption and implementation of these block grants which serve as substance for this discussion of cultural
and intergovernmental dynamics in the politics of social welfare in Alabama.
Southern Political Culture and Alabama Government
Political culture is a useful concept for linking social and economical factors
with political performance. Its theory and application to public policy combines
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psychological interpretations of individual political behavior with macroanalytic
group and societal variables common to political sociology (Pye, 1965: 8-10).
According to Elazar (1972), political culture is a particular pattern of orientation to political action, a value framework shared by residents of a state which
establishes common goals and actions to achieve them. It is the product of history
and geography within the United States, of migrations, religions, and attitudes
toward power and the role of government.
Elazar identified three major political subcultures that jointly inhabit the
U.S. Although each has national proportions, individualistic, moralistic, and
traditionalistic subcultures are tied to specific sections of the country (Elazar,
1972: 93).
To understand government in Alabama is to realize the enduring strength of the
traditionalistic political subculture. The people of Alabama, and the South in
general, are characterized by a traditional culture which "reflects an older,
precommercial attitude that accepts a substantially hierarchical society as part
of the ordered nature of things, authorizing and expecting those at the top of
the social structure to take a special and dominant role in government" (Elazar,
1972: 99). Political competition is limited in scope, both in political party
structure and participation (Hanson, 1983: 31). An appropriate mission for state
government in a traditionalistic subculture includes maintaining and encouraging
the status quo or existing order. Change comes slowly, usually at the behest of
an elite.
This traditionalistic approach to government manifests itself in specific
fiscal indicators and is underscored by the relatively poor economic conditions of
the state. There exists a strong tendency to distrust government and corresponding
refusal to support it. It appears that Alabama state government suffers from both
a relative inability and unwillingness of the populace to sustain it. The former
may be seen in Alabama's rank of 48th among all states in fiscal capacity (ACIR,
1981), and median family income of $13,674, almost $9000 below the U.S. median.
The latter is indicated in numerous statistics. For example, Alabama ranks in the
bottom five states in the nation in Aid For Families of Dependent Children (AFDC)
payments, the adequacy of AFDC grants, in state contributions to welfare payments
(Albritton, 1983), and in elementary-secondary education spending .(Wirt, 1983:
306-20).
Political and bureaucratic indicators consistent with the traditionalistic
subculture are apparent as well. They may be summarized as follows:
General Centralization of State Government
1. Because of the general poverty and low taxation in Alabama local
jurisdictions, the state government must provide or fund services normally
provided by local governments elsewhere. This centralization tends to
strengthen the influence of the state government (Sharkansky, 1978: 25, 26).
2. Since Alabama is one of eight states which allow no home rule
for their local governments, the state government plays a powerful legislative role over its county and municipal government.
3. In a rural, homogeneous, one-party state such as Alabama, a strong
pressure system dominated by an alliance of interest groups, education,
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timber and coal, focuses attention on the state capital as the primary
decision-making locus for the state (Ziegler and van Dalen, 1976).
Strength of the Governor
4. Partly because of an absence of a well-organized Republican party,
the Alabama governor (always a Democrat in this century) has gained considerable political strength (Sharkansky, 1978: 25).
5. Because party labels are less important in Alabama than in most
non-South states, voters tend to identify with personalities, rather than
with parties and issues. This provides the governor an opportunity to
attract considerable attention.
6. Both the former "multifunctional" one-party system in Alabama
(pre-George Wallace) and the "dominant" faction headed by Wallace tend
to reinforce the politics of personality (Palmer, 1977: 68, 69).
7. The Alabama governorship enjoys relatively strong formal strength
based on budget and appointive powers, tenure potential and veto powers
(Schlesinger, 1976).
8. The state's Budget Management Act of 1976 establishes the governor
and finance officer (whom the governor appoints) as central and influential
figures in the state budget process (Cowles and Berry, 1982).
9. The Alabama governor traditionally names the Speaker of the House
and the President Pro Tem of the Senate. These allies are expected to
serve as floor leaders for the governor's legislative program (Jewell, 1972).
10. The Alabama governor has become (as have other governors) an
important conduit of federal aid to the point where s/he may be called
the "federal-systems-officer" at the state level. This role has enabled
the governor "to dispense a new style of patronage--of services and
programs" (Williams, 1972: 3,4).
Weakness of the Legislature
11. Partly because of the relative poorness of the state, Alabama state
legislators are poorly paid, well under the national average. This poor
support tends to discourage a more permanent body of legislators who need
seniority and time to establish policy leadership and strength (Palmer,
1977: 96).
12. Alabama's traditionalistic political culture has been linked
with a general lack of support for state assemblies (Patterson, Wahlke,
and Boynton, 1973).
13. Similarly, the traditionalistic culture has been shown to hold
a less favorable view toward government spending and regulation (Kelleher,
Goodman, and Cornwell, 1973). Hence, the legislature has less influence
over fewer resources.
14. At the bottom of the Legis 50 ranking based on five legislative
performance criteria is found Alabama. (Citizens Conference, 1971).
15. Another study ranked the performance of Alabama legislative
committees among the least effective (Rosenthal, 1974). Research and
staff capacity are lacking.
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Both the economic problems and political characteristics of Alabama state
government are apparent. The use of these data as determinants of policy is wellgrounded in the literature. Economic variables, especially in states with underdeveloped economies, predict fairly well both political variables and level of
policy outputs (Dawson and Robinson, 1963; Dye, 1966; Press and VerBurg, 1979: 42).
But, as Lineberry (1977: 46) has cautioned:
"If economic factors produce a bigger
or smaller pie, then it is reasonable to suppose that political factors determine
who gets the shares."
Further research seems to confirm this point (Fry and
winters, 1970).
Given the apparent imbalance of power between the governor's office and the
legislature, we would expect the chief executive to dominate decision-making that
allocates funds to various programs.
Secondly, given the traditionally poor
support for welfare programs in Alabama, we would anticipate that those state block
grants most directly targeted to poor people would suffer. Third, the nature of
the block grants, themselves, should affect the economic and political balance of
power within state government.
Changes in Fiscal Federalism
The second intersecting influence on state block grants is fiscal federalism.
The term refers to the extensive grants-in-aid program among governments that
began in the New Deal, was greatly expanded in Johnson's Great Society, modified
by Nixon in the early 1970s, and now modified again by Reagan with his state block
grants.
What effect do these forms of federalism have on state and local government discretion and flexibility over various social welfare programs? To the point,
are the state block grants an extension of the decentralization of power begun by
earlier federal block grants and general revenue sharing? The answer is yes and no.
Categorical grants developed under Johnson's administration provide considerable control to the grantor--the federal government (Reagan and Sanzone, 1980:
57-60). Block grants loosen that control (Hanson, 1983: 40-52; Reagan and Sanzone,
1980: 124, 125).
The recipient jurisdiction enjoys considerably more freedom.
General revenue sharing monies are virtually unrestricted. The tendency of all
three, however, is to establish a "vertical" relationship between federal and
local governments (or local extragovernmental agencies), effectively bypassing, in
most though not all cases, state government. Reagan's stated intention is to
strengthen the role of state governments in the process so that the federal monies,
however much reduced, become "pass-through" funds that provide states, not local
governments, with primary discretion. Hence, the answer is yes, the state block
grants appear to continue the decentralization or devolution of power from
Washington, but no, local governments do not enjoy that discretion--states do.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act directs the governor of each state to
take charge of block grant implementation, though the legislature is not excluded
from the process. In Alabama, those federal funds became part of the General Fund
to be appropriated by the legislature. Not surprisingly, Reagan's own governorship appears to have shaped his philosophy about not only the most appropriate
part of government to have discretion over block grants, but the appropriate policy
actor as well. Although the number of federal mandates attached to each state
block grant varies, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the
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Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUm) have imposed a minimum of regulations on the states' use of the block grants (Beyle and Dusenbury, 1981).
Hence,
the potential discretion and flexibility afforded governors is considerable.
The inherent difficulty in predicting uniform impact from sweeping change in
intergovernnental relations is that states react with great diversity. To expect
all states to assume responsibility for state block grants in an equally competent
fashion is to ignore the influence of political subcultures, fiscal resources, and
resulting state government policy actions. As Radin (1982: 62) indicates:
"Arguments for all-encompassing devolution of power to the states do not take into
account the state variations and the needs in many states for active federal
presence."
In the case of Alabama, the block grants appear to complement government
resulting from a traditionalistic political subculture. When two nearly paralleling roads intersect, the natural inclination of the resultant route is to continue in the same direction.

Elite-oriented powerPorEnmi
(traditionalistic political subculture)\

Poo

EcnoI

Executive-dominated discretion
Decentralized federalism
(State block grants)

Environment

Given this orientation, we would expect the incumbent governor to play a
central role in the implementation of the state block grants. The lack of support
for legislative oversight and active citizen involvement only reinforces such
executive domination. We may check this assumption by briefly reviewing a case
study of Alabama's first year of block grant implementation.
Taking the Block Grants in Stride
Alabama government officials prided themselves in the quickness with which the
state took on seven block grants. Whereas the executive branch assumed a leadership role, legislative involvement in the first year of block grant implementation
was minimal, providing little
in the way of a balance of power to executive branch
decision-making or a conduit for public participation and input. After co-sponsoring
two sets of public hearings with the Office of State Planning and Federal Programs
(OSPFP), the legislature did little with the block grants. Interviews with state
legislators revealed much uncertainty and confusion on their appropriate role in
the block grant process. Compared to other states, the Alabama legislature has
played an extremely minimal role (Beyle and Dusenbury, 1981).
This near-abdication of responsibility to date leads to fundamental questions
about the legislative oversight function.
Though the Alabama legislature has an
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established procedure for reviewing federal fund transfers and their utilization
within the state, it has served to "rubber-stamp" executive decisions concerning
these block grants. If the federal government is no longer charged with holding
the state to its responsibilities, who within the state guarantees fiscal, procedural, and substantive accountability? Thus far, the implementing agencies have
been slow to replace federal rules and regulations with their own nor have they
established a management audit function.
Because of the brief period between acceptance of the block grants and the
beginning of FY1982, the four executive departments responsible for the block
grants had little time to institute meaningful organizational change. In the
following year (through 1982), however, during which a thorough review and planning
process could have been conducted, little was accomplished. Hence, the state
entered into FY1983 with essentially the same organizational structure that was
in place upon initial acceptance. Interviews with state officials consistently
indicated that the executive branch, following cues from the governor, saw block
grant implementation as routine business which, at its best, required considerably
fewer application and reporting functions. Few perceived the block grant process
as an opportunity to innovate or create new means of service delivery. Innovation
and creativity had been basic assumptions of devolution of responsibility to the
states.
By necessity, the Small Cities-Community Development Block Grant and the
Community Services Block Grant required significant organizational adjustments
since the state had not been involved directly with either program. Otherwise,
in-place agencies and offices were able to include the block grant in established
sections. This low level of adaptation may be explainable since several of the
block grants are logical extentions of established programs. For example, the
Social Services Block Grant is essentially the former Title XX federal block grant
(in fact, most state and local bureaucrats continue to refer to the Social Services
Block Grant as "Title 20"). Also, the priorities established in the Alcohol, Drug
Abuse, and Mental Health Systems Block Grant were consistent with priorities of
care previously adopted by the state mental health department. Further, since
severe budget cuts accompanied most of the block grants (see next section), administrators contend that their current strategy is more "survival" than expansive.
That view is consistent with the unfortunate irony experienced in many governments
that when creative management techniques are most needed (in times of fiscal
stress), there are no slack resources with which to innovate.

Governor James' Approach
To accept this explanation as the main reason behind the former state administration's low-key approach may be misleading. Governor Fob James, who succeeded
George Wallace in 1979 and handed back the job to Wallace in 1983, sought to reduce
the size and influence of state government. Working on that premise, he chose not
to establish a separate agency to oversee block grant implementation nor did he
concentrate that effort in his own office. Instead, he depended heavily on the line
departments for block grant implementation. Formation of an Inter-Agency Council
and block grant Task Forces, which met an average of just two times, represented
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the extent of any extraordinary effort regarding block grants.
There are positive and negative aspects of this type arrangement. The governor
retained some control over the block grants through the power of appointment; however, Governor James opted for a decentralized model in which the departments are
primarily responsible for planning and implementation. The Inter-Agency Council,
unlike similar bodies in other states, did not include citizens and representatives
from outside concerns. Instead, that input was channeled (quite unevenly) through
the agencies themselves. In short, the implementation process was extremely bureaucratic in nature.
The Government's Fiscal Response*
Legislative and executive response in Alabama to federal goverment budget cuts
which accompanied the decentralization of power varies by block grant as Table 2
indicates. The totals are interesting. Overall, the seven block grants were
reduced 5.7 percent, as the state's 5.1 percent increase could not offset federal
budget reductions of an average of 9.7 percent. An attempt was made by the legislature to improve Social Services funding, but Governor James was forced by the
Table 1
State and Federal Funding Levels for FY1981 to FY1983

Block Grant

Percent Change
State

Percent Change
Federal

Total

Small Cities-Community Development
Maternal and Child Health Services
Preventive Health and Health Services

+100%
+83.5
+ 9.4

+15.2%
-27.7
+23.2

+17.4%
+ 9.8
+ 9.4

Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health

- 2.9

- 5.1

- 4.0

Low Income Home Energy Assistance
Social Services
Community Services

N.A.
-10.4
N.A.

-11.8
-14.7
-39.7

-11.8
-13.2
-39.7

TOTAL

+ 5.1

- 9.7

- 5.7

Sources: Patrick J. Cowles with Sandra E. Berry and Odessa Woolfolk, "Budget
Cuts and Block Grants: The New 'New Federalism' Comes to Alabama," Paper presented
at the 1983 meeting of the American Society for Public Administration, New York.
Data drawn primarily from the State of Alabama Executive Budget for FY1981-1982
and FY1982-1983, plus miscellaneous state documents.

*Data in this section are drawn primarily from a report by Cowles (1983).
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exigencies of the recession to transfer monies appropriated for Social Services to
the state's welfare program. As Cowles (1983) suggests, whether or not the cut was
prompted by an unwillingness to maintain those social servies or an inherent
incapacity to support them and emergency welfare assistance is unclear. He concludes that "the nature of the economic and fiscal problems faced by the state were
(and are) such that its fiscal capacity was, at the least, so severely constrained
that the decision to cut must be viewed largely as a function of this constraint"
(Cowles, 1983: 31).
Otherwise, state appropriations increased in the Small Cities-Community
Development, Maternal and Child Health, and Preventive Health block grants. The
losers were Mental Health, Low Income Home Energy Assistance, and Community Services.
The state's smaller decrease (2.9 percent) offset slightly a larger federal cut in
Mental Health. The latter two received absolutely no appropriations to offset considerable federal reductions. Though not all the evidence is consistent (i.e. the
legislative attempt to increase Social Services funding), it appears that those
block grants targeted directly to the state's needy suffered the most. Although
it is too soon to draw conclusions, a continuation of this trend could reflect an
anti-poor bias on the part of the state.
Governor Wallace's Non-Response
Given the pressures of combatting pernicious unemployment and the lingering
recession, a Justice Department requirement for new legislative elections, and his
own serious health problems, Gov. George Wallace has done little to impact directly
the state block grant implementation process. However, his style differs from
James' in that he has moved to concentrate more policy influence and power in his
office rather than disperse it to the administrative agencies. As a new budget
cycle evolves, his office's role will become clear. Long-time observers predict
that Wallace will continue to consolidate discretionary power in his office, though
he personally adopts a style of detachment. His continuing health problems may
prevent any greater degree of involvement.
Conclusions
Programs targeted directly for low-income residents suffered relative to other
block grants. Of particular note is a major reduction in the Community Services
block grant which funds the Community Action agencies and Head Start project.
Additionally, Low Income Home Energy Assistance was cut.
Conversely, health and
community development programs were strengthened by the state government.
Gubernatorial and state bureaucratic dominance of the block grant implementation process is evident. Legislative acquiescence likewise stands out. Given the
political subculture and governmental arrangements in Alabama, these findings are
not surprising. However, their impact on accountability, on oversight, and on
citizen input are of continuing importance.
A significant difference between Fob James' approach to administrative leadership and that of George Wallace is that James sought to remove block grant implementation from the political arena. A review of the case study indicates that
James and his department heads "largely saw block grant implementation as routine
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business which, at its best, required considerably fewer application and reporting
functions." James did not establish a "blue-ribbon" advisory group of state
citizens to advise him; he did not establish a separate agency to oversee the block
grants, nor did he control that function in his office. Instead, he integrated the
process into existing administrative functions, away from the oversight of the
legislature and generally removed from regular citizens observation and input. By
insulating the planning and decision-making process within the state bureaucracy,
he managed a "politics of expertise," to use Benveniste's (1972) term.
James, who entered state government from the corporate world without previous
government service nor political experience, said frequently during his term that
government should and could be run like a business. Many of his legislative and
administrative efforts were in tune with this belief. He valued rationality in
planning that could be enhanced by removing administration from politics. In
essence, he avowed the concept of neutral competence, to use Kaufman's (1963) term.
He eschewed the concept of executive leadership which, according to Kaufman (1963)
reflects the belief that state government decisions should be centrally coordinated.
In this sense, James may have been bucking the dominant political subculture.
If past performance is useful as an indicator, Wallace will "politicize" the
block grant process in Alabama by taking a firmer hold of its administration and
by using certain discretionary options permitted by the legislation to influence
implementation. This may be opposed by bureaucrats who have enjoyed a relatively
free hand under James and who traditionally value professionalism over politics.
It also may be opposed by the legislature, not because it necessarily favors a
politics of bureaucratic expertise, but because its members may resist added gubernatorial power over them.
Regardless of executive style, the locus of power and discretion lies within
the governor's domain. Together, political culture and the nature of the block
grants predict this.
NOTES
1

The seven block grants assumed by Alabama were: 1) Small Cities-CDBG for
which non-entitlement cities apply directly to a state office which reviews applications and makes awards; 2) Community Services, designed to consolidate community
action/local initiative, senior services, and community food and nutrition programs,
and operated by Community Action Agencies; 3) Preventive Health and Health Services
which consolidated programs in rodent control, flouridation, hypertension, home
health and health incentive, plus risk education/health education; 4) Alcohol, Drug
Abuse and Mental Health Services for which community mental health centers are
required to provide outpatient services, 24-hour emergency care, day treatment,
mental hospital screening, consultation and education; 5) Maternal and Child Health
Services, designed to bring together maternal and child health programs, crippled
children's services, hemophilia, lead-based poisoning, genetic diseases, sudden
infant death syndrome, and SSI disabled children; 6) Social Services which covers
services provided under the Social Security Act including child care/protective
services, adult day care and home maintenance, transportation, family services,
health support services, and special services for the disabled; and 7) Low-Income
Home Energy Assistance to assist eligible households to meet the cost of home energy.
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ABSTRACT
A recent reform in Florida's juvenile detention criteria was
over-turned during the subsequent legislative session.
This
paper describes both the initial reform and its reversal and
suggests that symbolic political rewards may often be more
important
than
the
actual
consequences
of
a
policy.
Recommendations are made for accomplishing policy reform in a
traditional political culture.

INTRODUCTION
In the late 1970's, a child entering the juvenile justice system
in Florida was more likely to be placed in secure detention than
a child in any other state (Florida Center for Children & Youth,
1980).
By 1980, "reform" legislation had been passed which
reduced the number of admissions by twenty-one per cent and
decreased the average daily population by twenty-six per cent.
Only a year later, however, new "tougher" legislation had been
passed which led to an ultimate increase in secure detentions of
forty-seven per cent and to a growth of thirty-nine per cent in
the detention population (Department of Health and Rehabilita-

tive Services, 1982).
This article provides a case history
of these two important changes in Florida's juvenile justice
legislation which were accomplished within the short space of a
year. This case illustrates some of the problems which confront
liberal, reform-minded coalitions when they oppose the power of
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local politicians and political organizations within the context
of a state legislature.
Juvenile Detention
Detention is roughly analagous to jail in the adult criminal justice system, inasmuch as it provides custody for
juveniles accused of committing delinquent acts.
It is different from jail in that detention in most jurisdictions cannot
legally be used for the punishment of children who already have
been adjudicated as delinquent by the court, while adults with
short sentences are frequently incarcerated in jail (Sarri,1974).
Detention is not intended as a punishment for children
since, like adults, they are presumed innocent at the pre-trial
stage.
Until the turn of the century, children who were deemed
criminally responsible for illegal acts were also tried and
punished much the same as adults. With the creation of juvenile
courts and the further specialization of legal codes regarding
juvenile behavior, a separate system for trying and treating
juvenile offenders gradually developed (Platt,1977).
Not until
the Kent decision in 1966 did our legal system recognize some
responsibility for the protection of the rights of children
under the juvenile justice system (Kent vs United States 383 U.S.
541 [1966]).
Over the next few years, further court decisions,
state and federal laws, and administrative practice further
defined the function of juvenile detention so that ideally
juvenile offenders:
1) could expect much the same protection of
their legal rights during detention as adults, 2) were subject to
pre-trial detention only in very limited conditions (Anbry, 1971),
and 3) were separated from adult offenders.
Those children
accused of status offenses, i.e., behaviors not defined as
criminal activity for adults, are also entitled to separate
facilities from those children accused of criminal offenses (42
U.S.C. 5633).
Detention in Florida
These legal and humanitarian ideals regarding detention were
rarely met anywhere in the nation, and they were certainly not
reached in Florida.
An LEAA-funded study of children in adult
jails in Florida by a private research/advocacy organization,
the Florida Center for Children and Youth, disclosed that one of
the state's major problems was that half of the jails violated
minimum federal standards for juvenile detention, and 95% of the
adult jails used violated minimum state standards for use as
juvenile facilities (1979).
Among the problems encountered in
these substandard facilities were overcrowding, sexual abuse,

lack

of

supervision,

and

suicide

("Faulty

Jails",

1980).

Florida also operated twenty regional, maximum-security juvenile
detention facilities with a combined capacity of more than 1,000
youths.
Previous Research on Juvenile Detention
In one of the most comprehensive studies of juvenile detention in the United States, Sarri documented widespread problems in the administration of laws regarding detention, as well
as the importance of situational or structural factors in the
detention decision (1974).
For example, the time and location
of the apprehension and the location of the detention facility
were at least as important as the severity of the offense.
A
later study by Kramer and Steffensmier supported the importance
of these factors, in addition to discovering that juvenile status
offenders were more likely to be detained than were juveniles
accused of criminal behavior (1978).
(Status offenders are also
just as likely to be incarcerated as juvenile delinquents (McNeece,

1980)).
Other research at the National Assessment of Juvenile
Corrections concluded that juvenile offenders who were detained
were less likely to have their legal rights protected by the
court or by the public defenders than were juveniles who were not
detained (McNeece, 1976).
Kihm found in a later study of detention criteria that the re-arrest rates and failure-to-appear
rates for juveniles who were released pending adjudication were
not significantly different from the rates for detainees (1980).
This finding erodes one of the major reasons for the use of
detention --insuring that the offender is present for an adjudication hearing and that he or she is not involved in subsequent
delinquent activity prior to adjudication. Unfortunately, as we
shall see in the following pages, most Florida lawmakers did not
choose to utilize this information in the development of new
juvenile justice policies.

REFORM, 1980
The Background for Reform
Prior to the 1980 changes in the juvenile detention law,
Florida statutes had provided five criteria for detention placement. They were:
(a)
(b)

To protect the person or property of others or of the
child;
Because the child has no parent, guardian, responsible
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(c)
(d)

(e)

relative, or other adult approved by the court, able
to provide supervision and care for him.
If a child
is to be detained pursuant to this paragraph alone,
a crisis home only may be used;
To secure his presence at the next hearing;
Because the child has been twice previously adjudicated to have committed a delinquent act and has been
charged with a third subsequent delinquent act which
would constitute a felony if the child were an adult;
or
To hold for another jurisdiction a delinquent, child
escapee or an absconder from probation, community
control program or parole supervision or for a child
who is wanted by another jurisdiction for an offense
which, if committed by an adult, would be a violation
of law (Chapter 39.032, Florida Statutes).

These criteria were originally intended to limit the use of
detention to children who might pose a threat to the community or
to themselves, or who were not likely to appear for an adjudication hearing if released.
The criteria, vaguely worded and
subject to broad interpretation by intake workers and courts
alike, led to the inappropriate use of detention. A report from
the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
(DHRS) in 1978 showed that 371 abused or neglected children and
754 status offenders had been housed in secure detention during
the first half of that year, contrary to both Florida law and
federal standards (1979a).
During this same time, several of the
regional detention facilities were under court orders to reduce
their populations because of overcrowded and unsafe conditions.
This situation lent an air or urgency to the need for reform.
The next year another HRS study reviewed the decisions of
intake workers to place children in detention. In one of the ten
HRS regions studied, the monitors disagreed with 61% of the
decisions to detain.
Another study reported that 38% of the
detained children in Daytona Beach were questionably, inappropriately, or illegally placed (DHRS, 1979b).
The latter report
resulted in a class action suit against local detention officials
(H.C. vs. Jarrad, et. al., N.D. FL. TCA-79-0830).
Building a Reform Coalition
During 1978-79, the Florida Center for Children and Youth
assisted citizens groups in five communities in monitoring the
processing of children in their regional detention centers.
In
all of the five sites, a large proportion of the children
processed were accused of minor offenses such as curfew vio-
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lations, truancy, liquor possession, etc.

A substantial number

of the children detained were status offenders, children who had
committed no criminal acts.
In Broward County (Ft. Lauderdale)
the Human Rights Advocacy Committee found that 30% of the cases
they reviewed represented children who were placed in detention
contrary to HRS policy or state law. This overuse of detention
was costly in both human and economic terms. In addition to the
restrictions on individual liberties, detention was estimated to
cost $35.00 per day per youth (FCCY, 1980).
At the same time, the Florida Chapter of the National
Association of Social Workers (NASW), the Florida Association for
Human Services (FAHS), and the League of Women Voters were also
active in generating support to revise the detention criteria
during the 1980 legislative session.
NASW was particularly
active in contacting legislators and soliciting their support for
adopting the detention standards developed in 1976 by the
Committee on Standards for the Administration of Juvenile
Justice, a committee of the National Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (U.S. Department of
Justice).
All three of the major participating organizations in the
drive to reform the state's detention criteria - - the Florida
Center for Children and Youth, the Florida Association for Human
Services, and the National Association of Social Workers - - had
a long history of involvement in policy development in Florida,
and they were generally well-regarded by members of the legislature.
Meanwhile, the FCCY report on the status of children in
adult jails in Florida (page above) was timed for release at the
opening of the 1980 legislative session. FCCY recommended that
the best way to solve the various problems associated with the
placement of children in jails was to make room for them in the
Juvenile detention centers.
This could be easily accomplished,
according to FCCY, by implementing specific, offense-based criteria for the use of secure detention. There was broad legislative interest in these issues and some support for the specific
proposals.
Senator Dunn, a long-time advocate for improved
juvenile justice, agreed to add language to a bill he had already filed that would severely restrict the conditions under
which a juvenile could be placed in any detention facility. (The
bill which finally passed and was signed by the governor also
contained several provisions which did not relate to detention,
but the main thrust of that bill was detention.)
Unfortunately for the advocates of the new detention criteria, Senator Dunn was having difficulty getting any of his
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legislation to the floor of the Senate because of some changes in
the Senate power structure. Senator Beard, however, had proposed
a non-controversial bill at the request of the Florida Sheriff's
Association, SB409, that would clear up vague and confusing
When
language relating to juvenile placements in adult jails.
SB409 reached the floor of the Senate, Senator Beard, a former
sheriff himself, agreed to let Senator Dunn amend his bill onto
SB409. The new detention standards allowed detention in cases in
which:
(a)

(b)

The child is from another jurisdiction and is an
escapee, (sic) from a commitment program or absconder
from probation, a community control program or parole
supervision, for an offense which, if committed by an
adult, would be a violation of law, or the child is
wanted by another jurisdiction for an offense which, if
committed by an adult, would be a violation of law;
The child requests protection in circumstances that
appear to present an immediate threat to his personal safety.

(c)

The child is charged with a capital felony, life
felony, or felony of the first degree; or a crime of
i.e., murder in the third degree, manviolence,
aggravated
robbery,
battery,
sexual
slaughter,
property
serious
or
more
two
or
with
assault;
crimes arising out of separate transactions;

(d)

property
serious
with
a
charged
is
The
child
in
defined
as
burglary
arson
or
i.e.,
crime;
or
sale
the
or
with
(3);
and
810.02(2)
s.
controlled
in
a
trafficking
of
or
manufacture
adult
an
by
committed
if
which
substance;
would be a felony, and:
He is already detained or has been released
1.
his
of
dispositions
final
is
awaiting
and
case; or
He has a record of failure to appear at court
2.
hearings; or
3.
He has a record of violent conduct resulting
in physical injury to others; or
He has a record of adjudications for serious
4.
Florida
39.032,
(Chapter
offenses
property
Statutes).

With little opposition from organized law enforcement, the
courts, or the press, the new standards were passed during the
1980 legislative session and went into effect July 1, 1980.
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OUTCOME OF THE REFORM

Public Reaction
Soon after the implementation of the new standards, strong
objections were being raised across the state by almost every
part of the juvenile justice system - - judges, law enforcement
officers, state prosecuting attorneys, and intake workers.
The
state's newspapers were almost universally critical of the new
standards. The reason for this outcry had nothing to do with the
performance of the criteria, for the changes passed by the 1980
legislature had accomplished just what was intended - a reduction
in the general use of detention.
More important, the average
detention population and detention admissions had been greatly
reduced (page 1, above) without any increase in the re-arrest
rate or the failure-to-appear rate (DHRS, 1981).
Obviously, detention had been used in the past not just as a
way of protecting the community or guaranteeing the appearance of
the accused juvenile at adjudication hearings, even though those
were the only legitimate ends recognized in the statutes. The old
standards had allowed for a type of symbolic punishment which
seemed to be lacking in the new standards.
Under the new
criteria, many critics felt that a number of offenses were not
included among those violations which warranted detention. Among
those were drug possession, grand theft, and possession of stolen
property.
Under the new legislation children accused of those
crimes would now have their day in court before being punished
-much the same as in the adult justice system.
Sanctions
could then be meted out only after a proper adjudication.
All adults accused of crimes in Florida have a right to bail
except when charged with crimes punishable by death or life
imprisonment.
In fact, most sheriffs in the state operate
"release on recognizance" programs which allow the release of an
adult without bail pending his or her trial.
We know that a
small percentage of those adults released on bail or on their own
recognizance will either commit subsequent crimes or will fail to
appear for trial.
The public may not be happy with this
situation but it is at least tolerated.
When the new juvenile
detention standards were implemented and similar rights of
pre-trial
release were granted to children,
there was an
immediate widespread protest.
One newspaper after another
printed stories with headlines such as these:
"Juvenile Justice System Aids Young Killers"
Florida Flambeau, April 16, 1981
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"Juveniles' Antics Frustrate Police"
Tampa Tribune, March 28, 1981
"New Law Helps Teenage Thugs as Victims Lose"
Miami Herald, October 24, 1980
The criticism of the new standards in each of these stories
focused on the inability of local officials to detain most juveniles accused of a crime between apprehension and adjudication. In most of the stories, there were implicit assumptions
that such juveniles were guilty, would commit subsequent crimes
and would have a low rate of appearance for adjudication hearings. In the relatively few instances where these behaviors did
occur, newspapers published graphic illustrations of the crimes
committed, thus lending support to the public's opinion of the
unsoundness of the new law.
Judges, State Attorneys and Law Enforcement Reactions
Law enforcement officials responded by "discovering" a
rising crime rate and blaming it on the inability to detain most
juvenile offenders. They publicly lamented the fact that under
the new detention criteria, "the juvenile offender is back on the
street before the victim is out of the hospital." In some cases,
police hinted that they were not pursuing juvenile arrests as
vigorously as before because of the futility of prosecuting
juveniles under the new code.
The Police Chief's Association
issued a statement calling for an amendment to the criteria which
would allow more
discretion in decision-making
regarding
detention.
Their statement also indicated a desire for strong
input from police officials in detention decisions, a factor
which they felt was lacking in the new standards (DHRS, 1981).
The Prosecuting Attorneys Association viewed the new detention criteria as too restrictive, and they believed that too
many accused juveniles were being released after apprehension
when they actually should have been held in detention.
They
recommended an expansion of the detention criteria, and they even
went so far as to recommend that adult jails once again be used
for juvenile detention (DURS, 1981).
Judges were perhaps the most vocal of all local officials in
their opposition to the new criteria.
Although it was seldom
expressed, one obvious reason for their dissatisfaction was that
the new criteria virtually eliminated the exercise of judicial
discretion regarding detention.
Six of the twenty judicial
circuits went so far as to issue court orders broadening the
detention criteria and allowing a broader category of juvenile
As a result, almost a third of the
offenders to be detained.
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juveniles detained during the last nine months of 1980 were
detained by court order (DHRS, 1981). One local judge issued an
advisory opinion (involving no litigants) stating that:
"The legislature did not intend that children
(some of which are thugs) when caught in the
act of a serious crime such as burglary .....
threatening children, scaring old people .....
BE TURNED LOOSE ON THE SPOT AND NOT BE DETAINED
IN THE JUVENILE DETENTION CENTER ............
It is further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that any
language in the new Act ....conflicting with
the language authorizing the jailing of a
juvenile thug ....is hereby declared unconstitutional..." (Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,
80-10 CCJ, 1980).
Although this opinion was quickly invalidated by a state appellate court, it represented a strong and widely held attitude
among Florida judges.
Impact of the New Criteria
It should be restated at this point that the actual impact
of the new detention criteria on the major problems of overcrowding and inappropriate use of detention was quite positive.
As described earlier, the detention population was reduced and
the number of admissions was substantially decreased.
This
allowed the State time and resources to comply with various court
orders regarding overcrowding.
Abuse and suicide rates also
dropped among the detained juveniles.
At the same time, there
were noted no significant differences in the rates of re-arrest
or failure-to-appear for hearings among those juveniles who were
now being released compared to those previously detained (DHRS,
1981). Opponents of the new criteria did not want to be bothered
with these facts, however.
The important change which had
aroused their ire was that the punitive value of detention -- at
the discretion of local officials -- had been diminished.

BACKLASH, 1981
The Law and Order Coalition
The stage had been set for a nullification of the 1980 reform bill by the opening of the next legislative session. All of
those groups which had expressed stong criticism of the 1980
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changes had sought out support in both houses of the legislature, and potential sponsors for a new "tough" bill which broadened detention criteria were in plentiful supply. Senator Beard,
perhaps
hoping
to
make
amends
to
his
constituents
for
inadvertently sponsoring the 1980 legislation, quickly filed such
a bill.
(The bill was written by Beard with considerable input
from Judge Spicola from his district.
Spicola had served as a
Senator until his appointment to the bench.
Beard was then
appointed to fill Spicola's vacant Senate seat.)
The Reform Coalition
The same liberal forces which supported the 1980 changes
once again coalesced and planned to fight any subsequent change
to broaden the detention criteria (or any other change which
would make the state's juvenile justice system more punitive.)
NASW and FCCY were especially active in coordinating lobbying
efforts and organizing expert witnesses to speak against proposed changes in committee hearings.
The New Juvenile Code Proposal
The new bill, HB1095, not only sought to broaden detention
criteria, but it also included several other "punitive" features
which NASW and FCCY viewed as a backlash from the forces of
law-and-order conservatism.
It also included changes regarding:
1) the processing of juvenile traffic offenders, 2) the placement
of
juveniles
in
jail
as a sentencing alternative,
3)
the
judicial determination of post-disposition treatment plans, 4)
parental restitution requirements, 5) the publication of names
of alleged juvenile offenders, and 6) provisions for processing
16-or-17-year-old juveniles in adult courts at the discretion of
the state attorney.
This was one of fifteen
"get tough"
juvenile bills filed in the 1981 legislature ("Juvenile Justice",

1981).
The 1981 Legislative Process
HB1095 was developed by the House Select Committee on Juvenile Justice, a newly created committee, which was heavily
weighted with law-and-order advocates.
(Normally such a bill
would have been referred to the Committee on Health and Rehabilitative Services a relatively friendly committee.)
The senate
counterpart was referred to the Senate Judiciary-Criminal Justice
Committee, a committee not ordinarily given jurisdiction over
juvenile justice legislation.
During the hearings most of the committee members spoke of
the "many concerns" expressed by their constituents regarding the
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lax treatment of juvenile offenders.
committee stated that:

The

Chair of the

Senate

"I've gotten more letters on this subject than
anything since I've been here.
People are afraid
of children. There's a certain rationality with
an adult (criminal), but not with a child" ("Juvenile
Justice", 1981)
Senator Beard and other members of the Senate Committee
arranged for a carefully selected group of "victims" to testify
at committee hearings regarding the harm which had personally
befallen them because of the 1980 revisions in the detention
criteria ("Who Protects Us", 1981). Opponents of HB1095 attended
these hearings, but most of those persons wishing to speak
against the bill were never called. Most of the time for taking
testimony was devoted to advocates of the bill.
(Note:
Both
authors were in attendance at the Senate committee meeting,
wishing to speak against the bill.)
Opponents of the bill planned to make one last attempt to
modify some of its more punitive aspects at an expected HouseSenate Conference Committee meeting, but several prior "secret"
meetings took place between the major participants and their
staff in order to avoid bargaining and decision-making in another highly-charged public meeting.
A secret compromise was
reached and no joint conference committee was named.
Only one
punitive feature of the final bill was totally eliminated before
passage, the section which specifically allowed courts to use
detention as a sentencing alternative. The Senate had passed the
bill by a 30 to 1 vote, and the House version passed by a 113 to
10 margin ("Get-Tough Juvenile Bill", 1981).
It was obviously a
very popular piece of legislation.
Opponents also attempted to influence the governor to veto
HB1095, some pointing only to the state's regression to an
earlier, more punitive use of detention, others citing the certainty of additional expenses accruing from an anticipated growth
of detention.
Nevertheless, the governor had already publicly
voiced his support for "tougher" juvenile laws, and he signed the
bill without hesitation.

CONCLUSIONS
Impact of the 1981 Changes
Just as the opponents of HB1095 had expected, the broader
detention criteria implemented in July, 1981 resulted in in-

-252-

creased use of detention.
During the first six months, the new
criteria resulted in:
1) a 47% increase in admissions to secure
detention, 2) a 62% increase in the average daily population in
non-secure
detention,
and
3) a
dramatic increase in
the
proportion of youth screened and detained.
Once again there was
no significant change in the non-appearance or re-arrest rate
(DHRS, 1982). Those rates did not increase with the 1980 reform,
nor did they improve with the 1981 broadened detention criteria.
Those behaviors are apparently not related to the matter of
detention.
Politics and Symbolism in Juvenile Justice
Perhaps more important to the law-and-order groups lobbying
for the 1981 changes, and perhaps even to the public at large,
was the restoration of the symbolic function of punishment
through pre-trial detention.
It has been pointed out quite
clearly in the context of other political issues that the
symbolic rewards which emanate from political action are frequently more important than any tangible results (Edelman, 1964).
The 1980 reform was pushed through the legislature by a
liberal-minded coalition of social workers and youth advocates at
a time when the
"law-and-order" forces were paying little
attention. In fact, some of the more conservative members of the
legislature had supported the 1980 changes because they incorrectly perceived SB409 only as a way of separating adult and
juvenile offenders, reducing overcrowding, thus removing the
threat of various lawsuits and the threat of a loss of federal
funding for juvenile programs.
When they learned of the limitations in the power of local
officials to use the symbolic function of pre-trial detention,
there was a groundswell of opposition. Organizations of judges,
law enforcement officials, state prosecuting attorneys, and
others coordinated grass-roots lobbying efforts to negate the
reform only one year later. The use of detention as a symbol of
the local court and police ability to protect the community from
the threat of juvenile crime was a function overlooked by the
liberal reform groups. It made no difference that juvenile crime
had not increased with the 1980 reform (Florida Department of
Law Enforcement, 1981),
or that re-arrests and non-appearance
did not significantly change.
What mattered was the missing
symbol of the power of state and local authorities to immediately
punish
accused
juveniles,
thus
ritualistically
reinforcing
community norms against delinquent behavior and giving the
impression of protecting the community against subsequent delinquent behavior.
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Regional Differences in Political Symbolism
Most scholars of public social policy agree that it is much
easier to achieve agreement on programs than on objectives, and
that when agreement on values underlying programs is necessary,
policy compromise is more difficult to reach (Banfield, 1961;
Gil, 1976; Wildavsky, 1979; Dluhy, 1981).
The basic problem is that agreement on a particular policy is more difficult
to achieve whenever there are value conflicts among the participants in the policy process.
"Liberal" reform efforts are
likely to lead to such value conflicts under certain fairly
predictable conditions.
For example, issues that touch on such
matters as the treatment of criminals (or delinquents), gay
rights, and abortion, provide more potential for conflict on
the basis of values than do highway construction or teacher
education requirements.
Another important factor is the geographic context of the
policy development process. Elazar has thoroughly described the
geographic distribution of political cultures in the settlement
of America, and the subsequent migration patterns of those
cultures throughout the continent (Elazar, 1966).
Within the
southern states the dominant political culture is identified as
"traditional"; it grew out of a conservative, plantation-centered
agricultural system.
This culture tends to perpetuate the
dominance of an elite-oriented political order, and political
leaders play conservative and custodial rather than initiatory
roles (Elazar, 1966, pp. 79-116).
In contrast the upper Midwest
is dominated by a "moralistic" political culture in which "both
the general public and the politicians conceive of politics as a
public activity.. .properly devoted to the advancement of the
public interests" (Elazar, 1966, p. 90).
Although the mobility of our citizens has undoubtedly led to
the erosion and displacement of dominant political cultures in
every state in recent years, there is no doubt that generally
Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota have a different approach to
politics than do Virginia, Arkansas, and Florida.
Despite the
steady flow of Northeasterners into South Florida and the movement of "hillbillies" into Southern Michigan, these two states
are vastly different in their politics. Although one might find
it impossible to precisely calculate the effects of differences
in political cultures on policy outcomes, one could get a rough
idea of those differences by examining a limited number of common
policies in each state and/or region.
The political culture in Florida is still predominantly
"traditional", and was not conducive to a liberal reform effort
in the late 1970's.
As evidence of the conservative political
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climate, one could cite the failure of the legislature to pass
the Equal Rights Amendment, the overwhelming rejection by voters
of a referendum to allow casino gambling, the rejection of a gay
rights ordinance in Miami (one of the state's most liberal
communities), and the continued use of capital punishment.
Advocacy Strategies for Unpopular Causes in a Traditional
Political Culture
Reformers interested in liberalizing social policies in a
state should consider how other relevant social issues have been
resolved before developing a strategy for reform. Such issues
might include state legislative action concerning the Equal
Rights Amendment,
the legal
rights
of homosexuals,
the
incarceration of juvenile and adult offenders, and the provision
of services to disadvantaged, handicapped, and minority groups.
Public opinion polls are also very useful in determining whether
the right climate for policy reform is present.
If the policy in question is one which is likely to encounter opposition from a dominant political elite because of a
clash in values, then it is obviously in the reformers' best
interests to avoid raising a question of values (or program/
policy objectives) if at all possible.
A reform of a state's
juvenile detention criteria could be pressed on the basis of its
practicality
(allowing intake workers
to be
shifted to
supervising probationers) or cost-efficiency (cutting perhaps by
one-half the number of youths detained in a regional facility at
$35.00 each per day).
Avoiding publicity and media coverage is also a wise strategy if the policy change raises questions which could push
policy-makers into a position of opposing the change. The new
detention criteria would probably have encountered less criticism if it had not been for the widespread coverage in the press.
As indicated earlier, most of this coverage was biased and
one-sided, giving the citizens an impression that "juvenile
killers" were being whimsically turned loose on the community.
Members of the reform coalition even held meetings with editorial boards throughout the state in an attempt to obtain fair
and accurate reporting of the consequences of the revised code.
Unfortunately, it is easier to sell newspapers with headlines
such as "Who Protects Us? Asks Mother of Raped Son" than with
editorials noting the success of the new policy in reducing
costs, increasing individual liberties, maintaining a low "noshow" rate for court appearances, etc.
Where a great potential for value conflict exists, reformers should consider the possibility of a policy change
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through bureaucratic rather than legislative means.
This technique is particularly appealing if there is an enlightened
professional bureaucracy which
exercises discretion in the
administration of the policy. Unfortunately, such a bureaucracy
seems less likely to be found in states with a traditional
political culture.
Even in the deep South, however, one
occasionally finds small enclaves of professional social workers
within a large unprofessional bureaucracy.
If the values of
these small groups of professionals are congruent with the reform
efforts, than perhaps a bureaucratic manipulation of the policy
is possible.
A closely related strategy is possible whenever policy
decisions are highly decentralized.
For example if each county
is responsible for developing and enforcing criteria for juvenile
detention, one might attempt to locate a progressive county in
which officials could be persuaded to consider a policy change.
By working closely with local officials and making every attempt
to insure the success of the reform effort at that level (along
with fair and accurate reporting in the local press), an appeal
could be made later to other counties, using the first county as
a model for policy change.
If all attempts to reform policy fail using concilliatory
methods such as these, reformers can fall back on the possibility of accomplishing change through adversarial means such as
litigation. Such efforts have been more-or-less successful in
states like Texas (Morales vs. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166 (1973))
and Alabama (Pugh vs. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (1976)), especially
in the area of correctional policy.

Strategies involving cooperation and public education are
still in order, of course, in those situations in which a strong
conflict of values between reformers and decision-makers is not
likely to occur. The methods outlined above may be of more use
in a traditional political culture such as Florida has, especially when the reform involves value-laden policies such as corrections.
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ABSTRACT
Program review has increased substantially in recent years.
There has been
concern that the upsurge in policy evaluation would be detrimental to social welfare
programs, where data is often unavailable, little agreement exists concerning
specific goals and documenting success is often virtually impossible.
In this analysis we compared the program evaluation of social welfare programs
with non-social welfare programs. The review process differed substantially as did
the recommendation made as a result of the review. Social welfare programs faced
more criticisms than non-social welfare programs. However, the criticisms were less
serious. Changes prior to the publication of the evaluation report were more common
for social welfare programs. They were also considerably more likely to make
significant administrative changes--action that helps then avoid legislative
involvement.
lon-social welfare programs were more than twice as likely to face
changes mandated by the legislature. Those findings indicate that social welfare
programs are not experiencing adverse consequences as a result of mandatory reviews.

The evaluation of public policies has increased substantially in the past
decade. In the early 1970s, about two hundred new evaluation studies were begun each
year with average budgets of about $100,000 each. By now the number of policy and
program evaluation studies started each year has probably doubled, and costs risen
substantially. (Freeman, 1977: 19) Another indication of the growing interest in
program evaluation is the fact that federal and state legislation involving public
programs increasingly includes formal evaluation of the policy's impact as part of
the bill. (Nachmias, 1979: 2) Finally, and having the greatest impact, is the dramatic increase taking place in the states in the exercise of legislative oversight
and the expertise with which it is conducted. Program review and policy evaluation
have become a part of the legislature's workload.
(Keefe and Ogul, 1981: 385-408)
The greater involvement with program evaluation among legislators can be attributed to several factors. There have been considerable improvements in staff, facilities and technical hardware in most state legislatures in the past two decades which
have facilitated the conduct of policy evaluation. (Hamm and Robertson, 1981) Also
important is the increased emphasis on legislative independence and legislative activity that accompanied the move toward professionalization of state legislatures.
The national mood, which had been resentful and distrustful of government in general,
and bureaucracy in particular, during the 1960s and 1970s, has encouraged the development of program review and other forms of evaluation. Finally, committees have
been developed in a majority of states whose primary mission is oversight.
*
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Thus the mechanisms have been established for policy evaluation and program
review and legislators are committed to increased activity in this area; from all
indications legislatures will become increasingly involved in policy evaluation.
Significant questions that have received little or no attention are one, how
these evaluations are to be conducted and secondly, the types of changes that are
recommended and enacted into law as a result of these program evaluations.
These questions are of particular relevance for those interested in the future
of social welfare programs.
For several reasons, the problems inherent in the evaluation of any program are magnified when the policy is in this area. First, most
programs are adopted without a clear statement of purpose. Indeed, ambiguity was
necessary to build a coalition large enough to win policy adoption. Ambiguity is
particularly a characteristic of social welfare policies, which involve a redistribution of income and are therefore highly controversial.
(Ripley and Franklin, 1982:
158)
Second, the art of program evaluation is not well developed. It is difficult
enough to determine the effectiveness of a new weapon, much more problematic is determining whether the goals of a social welfare program are being met. How does one
determine the extent to which a juvenile correction program has reduced recidivism,
or whether a program for teenagers has raised self esteem?
So many factors are influential in these areas it is extremely difficult to establish cause and effect
relationships.
(Dubnick and Bardes, 1983: 227)
This paper examines the program evaluation process through an analysis of the
reviews conducted under sunset, a law mandating periodic review of agencies by the
legislature. We will focus on one state, Tennessee, to determine the impact of comprehensive legislative review on social welfare programs.
SUNSET LEGISLATION
Sunset legislation, which is directed towards improving fiscal control and accountability through a periodic review of agencies by the legislature has received
considerable attention since 1976, when Colorado became the first state to adopt a
sunset law; thirty-four other states have also enacted sunset legislation. Sunset
has three goals:
to force accountability to the legislature, to curtail unnecessary
bureaucratic activity and to formalize long neglected oversight activity. These
goals have garnered support from a wide variety of sources, with different
expectations. However, the distinguishing feature of sunset, and the factor which
has received the most attention, is the termination of agencies on established dates
unless recreated by law.
Sunset statutes grant no additional authority to legislatures for performing
their oversight task. Many of the checks on bureaucratic growth can be accomplished
by existing review mechanisms. However, the wide-spread adoption of sunset reflected
a recognition among lawmakers that traditional oversight procedures were not working.
In most states legislative review is largely discretionary. Since little personal
pay-off is perceived for stringent oversight activities, the process, at best, is
characterized as hit or miss supervision. Many hoped that sunset would provide the
tools and create the incentive for periodic and comprehensive evaluation.
Despite the popularity of the sunset concept, not everyone was an enthusiastic
supporter.
Several reasons for this skepticism of this highly publicized "reform"
have been cited. First, many questioned whether states would be willing to invest
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the time and staff necessary to perform an adequate evaluation. Critics were convinced that there would be very little review. (Behn, 1977)
Some voiced concern
that the difficulties in establishing uniform evaluation criteria would create substantial problems for agencies which have difficulty documenting output. There were
fears that the threat of termination would lead to an increased bureaucracy as agencies fought to prove themselves productive. Finally, there was apprehension, which
has proven well founded in at least some states (e.g., Texas), that sunset review
would serve as a "marvelous generator of legislative campaign funds" as interest
groups sought a favorable evaluation.
(Azama, 1977) Those fears were particularly
prevalent with regard to social welfare issues, where improvements are very difficult
to document. Because of the problems in documenting output, there was concern that
more time would be spent justifying the agency, taking away from service to clients.
Social welfare programs usually lack the number of lobbyists that regulated agencies
depend on. In short, many felt that social welfare programs would be highly vulnerable to substantial criticisms and some of the smaller programs would face termination under the sunset law.
Because this study involves only one state, as with any case study caution must
be exercised in generalizing from this study to the experiences that other states
have had with sunset review. Tennessee has a comprehensive rather than selective
sunset law. Under a comprehensive law, all agencies are evaluated while under selective review only certain agencies (primarily regulatory bodies and occupational
licensing boards) come under review. However, because it has more adequately coordinated sunset activities (review is performed in stages rather than simultaneously), Tennessee has not been in the position in which so many entities were to be
reviewed there was little more than routine re-authorization. 1 As in most states,
Tennessee was confronted with a significant, but not overwhelming number of entities
to evaluate. Thus, its experience is compatible with that of most other states. A
discussion of the data used in this study follows a brief description of the law.
The Tennessee Experience
The Tennessee sunset statute, known as the 1977 Government Entity Review Law, is
a comprehensive law mandating review of all agencies, departments and compacts to
which the state is a party. The responsibility for conducting reviews of each entity
was assigned to the Division of State Audit under the office of the Comptroller of
the Treasury. The division was already involved in program reviews and key officials
were consulted in regard to provisions of the Tennessee law. Termination dates for
every agency of state government were established over a six-year cycle with over 220
agencies being cited. A sunset review staff in the Division of State Audit was established who reports to the joint committee on Government Operations. After a
public hearing, the committee forwards legislation to the entire general assembly.
This legislation can mandate the continued existence of an entity, its alteration or
its cancellation. Without any action, the entity will automatically terminate after
a year.
Because the amount of time and money that can be spent on sunset review is
limited, more resources are allocated to major agencies, or programs where the
IThis was the situation in Alabama, Arkansas, and Louisiana.
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potential savings are greater, and the services provided are of greater significance.
For example, less than 350 hours were charged to the Board of Cosmetology, while almost 4,000 hours were spent on the evaluation of the Department of Insurance. For
each review, the Joint Government Operations Committee is presented with a written
report of the evaluation. This is followed by a public hearing after which the committee makes a decision regarding the action that will be recommended to the
legislature. The sunset staff is to be present throughout the deliberations to explain the options available with regard to the entity under review.
DATA AND METHODS
The sunset evaluation process was examined through an analysis of the written
reports conducted between 1978-1980. For the content analysis, information was collected regarding the number and the type of evaluation methods used, the objectives
of the evaluation, the number and type of criticisms made in the evaluation reports,
and managements' response to the criticisms. An analysis of legislative records and
interviews with staff provided information regarding the action taken by the legislature and the agency staff in response to the report.
The responses were categorized as follows:
(a) no action, (b) administrative change, (c) legislative change,
and (d) termination. An administrative response consisted of a significant change in
the program's administration, either a change in structure or in its operation. Any
change mandated by the legislature constituted a legislative response. Forty-seven
reports were analyzed, seventeen of these involved social welfare issues, thirty Were
non-social welfare programs. Social welfare policies were defined as those which
transfer benefits or social resources to individuals or groups. The definition was
not restricted to programs assisting the financially needy (seventeen percent); criminal justice (thirty-seven percent), mental health (seventeen percent), alcohol and
drug abuse programs (twelve percent), and policies providing assistance for select
2
groups in the state (e.g., the elderly--seventeen percent) were also included.
To insure that any differences between the reviews of social welfare programs
and non-social welfare programs were not due to factors such as size or revenue, a
matching procedure was used. The two groups of programs were compared on the basis
of expenditures, size (number of staff), and type of entity. Non-social welfare
programs were selected that matched the characteristics of the social welfare
programs. The percentage of each group falling into each category was as follows:
SIZE
Non Social Welfare

(n = 30)
Number of staff
over 100
51-100
under 50

Social Welfare

(n = 17)
Percentages*

26
31
43

24
29
47

*figures are rounded to nearest tenth
2A list of the programs evaluated is available from the authors upon request.
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over $3,000,000

EXPENDITURES
Non Social Welfare
Social Welfare
(n = 30)
(n = 17)
Percentages*
07
06

$2,000,001 to $3,000,000

10

12

$1,000,001 to $2,000,000

07

06

$500,001 to $1,000,000

10

12

$100,001 to $500,000

10

06

$75,001 to $100,000

17

17

$50,000 to $75,000

22

24

under $50,000

17

17

Advisory commission

TYPE OF ENTITY
Social Welfare
Non Social Welfare
(n = 30)
(n = 17)
Percentages*
13
12

Hearing board, commission, corporration, authority, association

13

24

Institute, advisory board

22

17

Department, division, agency

26

24

Compact, regulatory board, commission

26

24

*figures are rounded to the nearest tenth
The fact that the two groups of programs are highly similar to each other on these
characteristics increases our confidence that any difference found between the social
welfare and non-social welfare programs can be attributed to the different kinds of
services provided.
There were fifteen review methods used in the sunset evaluations. To simplify
comparisons of the methods a varimax rotated factor analysis was used. Three factors
emerged. One encompassed methods involving staff and other "advocates" of the entity
under evaluation. Advocates were defined as those benefiting from the entity's
existence--staff, interest groups and those regulated. We expect staff to present as
favorable a view as possible to evaluators. Among the most intense criticisms of

-263-

government agencies, regulatory agencies in particular, is that they are unduly influenced by the industries they are supposed to regulate or moniter. Thus, we also
expect interest groups and those regulated to be positive towards the entity. Of
course, not all individuals falling into these categories will be highly supportive.
It is likely that some will raise significant issues to the reviewers with a few
being highly critical. Nevertheless, the literature on interest groups and bureaucracy indicate that the staff, the clientele, and the interest groups involved with a
program generally serve as advocates for that program (McCurdy, 1977: 118-121). The
second factor consisted of more "objective" evaluation methods--contact with nonadvocates of the entity. The third factor was comprised of review methods involving
the examination of records. The following items fell into each factor.
Evaluation Methods Using Advocates:
(1) interviews with entity staff, (2) surveys of
entity staff, (3) interviews with clientele, (4) surveys of clientele, (5) surveys of
interest groups.
Evaluation Methods Using Non-Advocates:
the legislative staff conducting the review
(1) corresponded with other states, (2) corresponded with professional organizations,
(3) observed administration and operation, (4) analyzed existing data.
Examination of Records:
the examination of (1) minutes, records, documents, (2)
material related to the entitys' operation--publications, articles, reports, (3)
minutes, files, employee qualifications.
All items had loadings of at least .40 on the factor on which it was listed.
There was no significant overlap across factors as no item had a loading greater than
.15 on any of the other factors.
The first question examined was whether the evaluation methods used in the
review of social welfare agencies differed from the methods used with non-social welfare entities. This issue was addressed by comparing the variety and type of evaluation methods used with each. The first step was to identify the sunset reports in
which there was a high use of one of the three types of evaluation methods--use of
advocates, non-advocates, and record examination. A score was assigned to each report for the number of research components used within each of the three dimensions
produced by the factor analysis. A report was designed as having an "extensive"
number of evaluation methods used in its compilation if the score was at least one
standard deviation above the mean of all reports on that research dimension.
Approximately one-third of the total reports fell into the high category for each
dimension (use of advocates--28 percent; use of non-advocates--34 percent; examination of records--38 percent).
FINDINGS
The Review Process
Table 1 shows the percentage of reports in which there was "extensive" use of
each type of evaluation method, comparing social welfare programs with non-social
welfare programs. There are marked differences between the two types of programs in
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the kind of evaluation process that predominates, sixty-five percent of the social
welfare programs involved advocates compared to fifty-seven percent of the nonwelfare programs. Although a majority of social welfare evaluations also relied
heavily on methods involving non-advocates of the entity (fifty-two percent), somewhat more extensive use of non-advocates was made in the review of non-social welfare
programs (seventy-three percent).
Non-social welfare program reviews also made more
extensive use of records.
The types of review methods were broken down through time to determine if the
evaluation techniques have changed since sunset reviews first began. Table 1 also
presents the figures for the three years (1978 to 1980) in the percentage of sunset
reports containing "extensive" use of each of the evaluation methods. As the number
of cases is not large when viewing each year separately, particularly for the socialwelfare programs, any difference appearing from year to year should not be
overemphasized. Nevertheless, the data provide information regarding trends. An
examination of Table 1 indicates that similar types of changes are occurring in the
review of social welfare and non-social welfare programs.
Both types of programs
show greater use of all three types of evaluation methods. However, the use of advocates show a particularly sharp increase. It appears that reviews of social welfare
programs will continue to rely more heavily on "subjective" data--interviews with
"advocates"--than more objective data. However, evaluations of non-social welfare
programs are also increasingly involving agency staff and others who primarily serve
as advocates of the program.
The second question examined was the objectives of the report, that is, what
factor(s) did the evaluation center on? As Table 2 shows, the non-social welfare
evaluations focused primarily on the effectiveness and efficiency of the operation.
In contrast, most reviews of social welfare agencies centered (1) on the type of personnel used, the extent to which they were qualified and whether affirmative action
requirements were met, (2) public disclosure questions, and (3) whether there were
alternative ways of providing the service. Over seventy-five percent of the sunset
evaluations of non-social welfare agencies made extensive use of review factors related to efficiency and effectiveness while less than thirty percent of the welfare

Methods

Advocates

Table 1
"EXTENSIVE USE" OF EVALUATION METHODS IN SUNSET REPORTS
SOCIAL WELFARE AND NON-WELFARE PROGRAMS
(figures are %s)
Average during 3-year period
Change from 1978 to 1980
(1978 - 80)
(1978 - 80)
Social Welfare
Other
Social Welfare
Other
1978 1979
1980 1978 1979
1980
(n = 17)
(n = 30)
(n=4) (n=6) (n=7) (n=9) (n=12)(n=9)
44
58
66
50
66
71
57
65

Non-advocates

52

73

50

50

57

66

75

77

Examination of
records

24

37

25

17

29

33

33

44
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Objectives

TABLE 2
OBJECTIVES OF SUNSET EVALUATION
CITED IN REPORT
(figures are %s)
Average during 3-year period
Cha nge from 1978 to 1980
(1978 - 80)
(1978 - 80)
Social Welfare
Other
Social Welfare
Other

(n = 17)

(n = 30)

1978 19 79 1980 1978 1979 1980
(n=4) (n=6) (n=7) (n-9) (n=12)(n-9)

Efficiency/
effectiveness

25

33

Personnel
qualifications

50

50

Public disclosure

58

50

66

Alternative ways of
providing the
service

53

50

50

29

77

75

77

57

33

25

33

57

22

25

22

33

41

44

57

programs were reviewed using that criteria. By contrast, in less than one-third of
the non-welfare programs was it reported that extensive use was made of review
methods involving personnel or public disclosure issues.
The general pattern is that
social welfare programs were reviewed with a focus on the extent to which procedures
were followed correctly while the output of the program and the efficiency with which
the program operated was the focus of the reviews of non-social welfare agencies.
The pattern has changed little through time. Thus, in terms of the review process, a
different type of review was made of social welfare programs. Probably because of
the difficulties discussed above in evaluating program success, the reviews centered
on procedural questions.
Another interesting difference that appeared when comparing the sunset reviews
of social welfare programs with other types of programs is that evaluations of welfare programs were more apt to involve advocates of the agency--those benefitting
from the program and staff while the evaluations of non-welfare programs relied more
heavily on information gained from more "objective" sources--observation, interviews
with those not directly benefiting and the evaluation of records. The obvious question is whether the recommendations made from the evaluation staff and the subsequent
action taken in response to the review differ for social welfare and other types of
programs.
THE SUNSET REPORT:
Criticisms and Recommendations
Table 3 shows the frequency with which social welfare and non-social welfare
programs received various types of criticisms from the sunset review team. Social
welfare agencies were most likely to be criticized for their administration and for
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the type of personnel employed. The types of criticisms leveled against non-social
welfare programs relate to their purpose--whether the function they serve is still
necessary, the extent to which the legislature's mandate is met, and the entity's
financial management. This finding is what we would expect, given the fact that the
evaluation of social welfare agencies centered on procedural questions rather than an
analysis of output. With regard to the changes occurring through time, social welfare agencies received more criticisms in later years questioning whether various
programs were necessary. Non-social welfare programs have received slightly more
criticisms for not following the legislative mandate. Criticisms regarding administration and financial management increased for both social welfare and non-social
welfare programs.
The average number of criticisms per report and the severity of the criticisms
are shown in Table 4 along with the response, by the management of the entity, to the
review. We distinguished between major and non-major criticisms. A major criticism
was defined as any criticism involving a significant change in administration, staff,
hiring procedures (the change recommended requires hiring different types of people
or involving different actors in the decision making) or any challenge made to the
program's purpose or effectiveness. On the average, social welfare agencies received
twice as many criticisms per report (eight) as other types of programs (four).
However, while seventy-seven percent of the criticisms made of non-social welfare
TABLE 3
TYPE OF CRITICISM IN SUNSET REPORT
(figures are %s)
Change from 1978 to 1980
Average during 3-year period
(1978 - 80)
(1978 - 80)
Other
Social Welfare
Other
Social Welfare
Criticisms
1980
1980 1978 1979
1978 1979
(n=4) (n=6) (n=7) (nf9) (n=12)(nff9)
(n = 30)
(n = 17)
Administrative treatment of clients, dis25
33
50
71
22
50
tribution criteria 58
Program purpose--not
12
following mandate
Program not
necessary
Financial management

0

17

13

33

42

44

35

25

33

42

55

50

55

6

0

0

13

33

42

44

50

50

57

33

33

33

Personnel
qualifications

programs were major, this was true of only fifty-two percent of the criticisms made
of social welfare programs. Finally, the management of social welfare programs was
at least twice as apt to accept the criticisms made in the report (sixty-five percent
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to twenty-seven percent). There were no great differences between the two types of
programs in the changes occurring through time. The management of both social welfare and non-social welfare programs were increasingly more apt to accept the recommendations of the sunset report.
The final and most important issue addressed is the final action taken in response to the sunset reports. Is the fact that different evaluation methods and
objectives were used in the evaluation of social welfare and non-social welfare programs reflected in the changes made in the entities?
The action taken as a result of the sunset evaluations is shown in Table 5. A
comparison of the two types of programs shows considerable differences in the response made to the sunset evaluation of social welfare and non-social welfare
TABLE 4
CRITICISMS AND RESPONSES TO REPORT
Average during 3-year period
(1978 - 80)
Social Welfare
Other
(n = 17)

(n = 30)

Average number of
criticisms
Percent of criticisms
that are major
52
Average number of
changes made prior
to report

Change from 1978 to 1980
(1978 - 80)
Social Welfare
Other
1978
1979 1980
1978 1979 1980
(n=4) (n-6) (n=7) (n=9) (n=12)(n=9)

7

8

9

3

4

4

50

50

57

77

75

77

2

3

0

1

1

66

71

22

1

2

Management's response
to report-percent
agree
65

50

25

33

programs. The evaluation of non-social welfare programs was more apt to invoke no
response (twenty-three percent compared to twelve percent for social welfare
programs).
However, non-social welfare programs were more apt to be the focus of
legislative action, and non-social welfare programs were more than twice as likely to
be terminated (thirty percent of non-social welfare programs were terminated compared
to twelve percent of welfare programs).
The changes made as a result of sunset evaluations of social welfare agencies
were made by the entity's management. The fact that fewer social welfare programs
were terminated within this time period should not be construed as evidence that
these programs are more "safe" than are other types of programs of comparable size.
The higher termination rate of non-social welfare programs occurred because there
were several programs falling into this category which no longer served any purpose
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and had little or no funding. We can offer a couple of explanations for the differences between the programs in the amount of changes made in administration. One,
since administration is the focus of review for social welfare programs, the criticisms they receive are mostly in this area. It might also be the case that because
social welfare administrators face more serious criticisms, they make the changes
because of a fear of what the legislature will do. If this is what is happening,
administrative action is taken with the purpose of pre-empting legislative involvement, it appears to be successful.
The changes through time vary little for social welfare and non-social welfare
programs.
Among non-social welfare programs there is a slight increase in the number
of agencies making administrative changes, it is, of course, too early to determine
Table 5
ACTION TAKEN TO SUNSET REPORT
(figures are in percentages)
Average during 3-year period
(1978 - 80)
Social Welfare
Other

Change from 1978 to 1980
(1978 - 80)
Social Welfare
Other
1978 1979
1980 1978 1979
1980
(n=4) (n=6) (n=7) (n=9) (n=12)(n=9)

(n = 17)

(n = 30)

None

12

23

0

17

14

22

25

22

Administrative

65

17

50

66

71

11

17

22

Legislative

18

33

25

17

14

33

33

33

Termination

12

30

0

17

14

33

25

33

whether the increase will be significant. The management of social welfare programs
are increasingly making administrative changes and there has been somewhat of a drop
in significant legislative action with regard to these programs.
Given the small
number of cases, however, the amount of change is not large and thus, its significance is questionable. Finally, the termination of social-welfare programs increased
in the last two years of the years examined. This may indicate higher termination
rates as sunset evaluations continue.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The evaluation of any public policy is very complex. The problems are magnified
when the programs under review are social welfare programs, where data is often unavailable, there is little agreement regarding the programs' goals and establishing
cause and effect relationships is exceedingly difficult. For this reason, there has
been concern that the recent upsurge in program evaluation would lead to significant
reductions in social welfare programs since the policies' benefits could not be
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easily documented. At the very least, many felt it would be necessary for staff to
spend time trying to prove the significance of the policy taking time away from their
service to clients.
We note that the significance of these findings Is limited by the fact that the
evaluations examined all occurred in one state and were all part of sunset review.
This analysis does, however, offer some evidence regarding a question that has yet to
receive much attention. Our findings show differences between the evaluation process
of social welfare and non-social welfare programs.
Although all evaluation methods
were used for social welfare and non-welfare entities, staff and advocates of the
agency were more likely to provide information for the evaluation of social welfare
entities where more objective sources of information--observation, analysis of
records--were the primary methods used for non-welfare programs. The goals of the
evaluation also differed for the two types of programs. The extent to which administrative procedures were followed and the type of personnel employed constituted the
focus of social welfare evaluations. Non-welfare programs, on the other hand, were
primarily evaluated in terms of efficiency and effectiveness criteria. In other
words, the focus of the review of non-social welfare programs was whether the program
was accomplishing what it was supposed to and whether it was doing it as well as possible where the less challenging procedural questions dominated in the review of
social welfare entities.
Social welfare programs faced more criticisms than non-welfare programs.
However, the criticisms were less serious. There was also a difference in the response to the evaluation. Social welfare personnel were more apt to make changes
prior to publication of the report of the sunset evaluation team, perhaps because
they were fearful of action that the legislature would take if the report was highly
critical. Additional evidence for the fact that social welfare personnel try to
avoid legislative action comes from the fact that sixty-five percent of the sunset
reports covering social welfare programs resulted in an administrative response by
the entity's staff, only seventeen percent of the non-welfare programs experienced
administrative change. Non-social welfare programs were almost twice as likely to
face change mandated by the legislature.
Thus, the evaluation of social welfare programs has differed from the review
that occurs of non-welfare programs. A number of changes have been made in social
welfare programs as a result of the review. However, it does not seem to be the case
the social welfare programs are faring badly in the review. Indeed, their adminstration appears better able to make changes in response to the evaluation that satisfy
the legislature and thus, it would appear, probably exert slightly more control over
the changes invoked as a result of sunset review.
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ABSTRACT
In this study multivariate analysis is applied to the allocation of staff time
among members of the Texas House of Representatives. Ideology of the representative
is found to be an important factor in explaining differences in staff behavior.
Chief staffers serving liberal Democrats and Republicans report spending less time
on constituency service, and more time on policy research, than do staffers serving
conservative Democrats. There are differences between the parties, but not between
the ideologies, on time spent with lobbyists. Other variables, such as urban population of the district, and the years a legislator has served in the House, show
slight relationships with staff activities.

The study of the attitudes and behavior of legislators has long been one of the
staples of political science. In recent years, attention has also begun to focus
on the staffs of representatives and committees. In the 1970s, some investigators
went so far as to suggest that the activities of the personal staffs of members of
Congress are fully as important politically as the behavior of representatives
themselves (Fox and Hammond, 1977, pp. 1-2; Malbin, 1980, pp. 4, 27). If this is
true, the awakening interest in legislative staffs is justified, and should be
expanded.
The research which has so far been conducted on legislative staffs, however,
tends to have four weaknesses. First, earlier explorations of legislative staffs,
usually showed little concern for the use of quantitative evidence. Until recently,
the typical discussion of staff activities included statements about their functions
without much effort to measure them (Kofmehl, 1962, pp. 171-179; Price, 1972, pp.
197, 329-331; Redman, 1973, passim).
Second, where discussion of staff activity has been quantitative, it has tended
That is,
the
to assume the form of what might be termed a "one-variable equation."
amount of time that staffs spend on various tasks has been listed, but not related
to outside, independent variables which may account for differences in the observed
*James Burshtyn was an undergraduate research assistant at the University of Texas
at Austin in 1979.
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behavior. John Saloma, for example, found that more time was given by Congressional
representatives' personal staffs to correspondence than to constituency service,
and more time to constituency service than to legislative support, but he did not
investigate the background variables that might explain these variations (Saloma,
1969, p. 185).
Do the staffs of conserva-tive Republicans pay more attention to
constituency service than those of liberal Democrats? Do Northern staffs engage in
more policy research than their Southern counterparts?
Such variations would
provide a clue to patterns of political behavior as important as roll-call voting,
but their compilation was not attempted by Saloma. Other studies of staff activity
also suffer from this problem (Fox and Hammond, 1977, pp. 186-187; Fenno, 1978, pp.
40-49; Johannes, 1979, pp. 327-344).
One exception to this generalization appears to be an unpublished manuscript by
Norman Ornstein, as quoted in a textbook by Lawrence Dodd. Ornstein correlated the
amount of time that Congressional staff members spent on legislative activities with
background variable of their representatives. He discovered that the more junior,
ideologically liberal, and urban-based members used more of their staff resources
for legislative purposes (Orstein, 1974, p. 3; Dodd, 1975, p. 25).
Another exception is a study in which Bennett and Johnson concluded that liberal United States
Senators tend to spend higher percentages of their staff allotment than do conserrvative Senators (Benett and Johnson, 1981, p. 56).
Unfortunately, the authors did
not pursue their investigation to determine what sorts of activities the greater
allowances are used to fund.
Third, almost all research into legislative staffs has so far been conducted on
the United States Congress. If staffs are important in the federal government, they
are also important in the states.
Such attention that has been focussed on state
legislative staffs, however, has been even less systematic than that directed at
Congress. That is, scholars have been concerned only with, say, total staffing
available to legislators (Robinson, 1970, p. 386), or the activities of staff in a
highly general way (Jewell and Patterson, 1977, p. 229), without providing specific
information on their behavior.
The fourth difficulty of staff research presents not so much a problem as an
opportunity. Clearly, one of the major incentives for studying legislative staffs
is to provide us with a method of indirectly observing legislative behavior.
Over the last generation, many scholars hae investigated the self-concept
(often called "role") of American legislators (Wahlke, et al, 1962, pp. 8-32;
Davidson, 1969, pp. 72-142; Jewell and Patterson, 1977; pp. 369-373). In these
studies, investigators have attempted to discover whether representatives see themselves as "tribunes," "inventors," or "brokers," as "trustees" or "delegates," in
other words, whether they define their functions and purposes in different, identifiable ways. These studies have been rich with data about the attitudes of legislators, and about background variables, but they have, with few exceptions (Jones,
1973), paid little attention to what representatives actually do.
If the role
assumed by a legislator is important, however, it is because different subjective
roles simply different activity within the political system, and hence, different
outcomes from the legisltive process.
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Perhaps one of the reasons that little research has been done on the actual
behavior of legislators is that, except for the acquisition of roll-call records,
keeping track of so large and active a group of people would require a huge,
expensive and obtrusive research project. Much of this difficulty could be avoided,
however, by recording the activity of staff members, rather than the representatives
themselves. The staff exists to further the aims of the representative. It therefore seems plausible to suppose that a compilation of the amount of time that staff
members devote to various categories of activity is a good indication of the
quantity of resources the representative wishes to expend on different tasks. We
do not argue that the staff is a perfect substitute for the legislator in terms of
activity. Individuals representatives may wish to divide labor with their staffs,
delegating some tasks and reserving others for themselves. Still, the staff is the
chief instrument of the representative, and as such presents us with a good proxy
for his or her own behavior.
Such, at any rate, is the assumption here.
With the acquisition of records of staff time and background variables on the
representative, the opportunity arises to explore the links between the social
forces impinging on the legislator, and his or her response in terms of staff
activity.
The present investigation is an attempt to advance the study of legislative
staffs by applying multivariate analysis to the behavior of personal staff members
of the Texas House of Representatives. Estimates by chief staff members of the
amount of time they spend daily on legislative support activities are related to
background variables pertaining to legislators' personal characteristics and
constituencies. Although the variations uncovered are not large, some independent
variables do have an effect on reported staff activities, and to an extent large
enough to suggest the desirability of further researach. Notably, the ideology
of representatives seems to play a significant part in determining the behavior of
the chief staffer.
Methodology
During the course of the regular session of the 66th Texas legislature in 1979,
all of the chief personal staffers to House members were contacted. One hundred
eleven of the one hundred fifty agreed to be interviewed, and to fill out a "diary"
of the average amount of time they spent each day on legislative support activities.
Printed on the diary form were instructions designed to clarify the categories
into which each activity fell. During the interview, care was given to making each
respondent aware of the requirements of the questionnaire. Categories of activity
were the following.
1. Helping people in the district (constituency service). We made clear to them
that this category included casework and correspondence, but not contact with
representatives from interest groups, even if those were from the legislator's
district.
2. Policy research. The activities that fell under this category were listed as
"checking on the status of bills, researching and drafting legislation."
It was
defined so as not to include time spent in committee hearings.
3. Time spent with members of other staffs. We specified that this could be either
by phone or through personal contact.
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4.

Time with lobbyists. So as to avoid the pejorative connotations of the word
"lobbyist," on the diaries these were called "representatives from interest
groups."
Respondents were instructed to include both office visits from
lobbyists, and attendance at evening functions sponsored by the various groups.
5. Time with the legislator.
6. The average length of the staff member's day.
This information is of course not completely reliable, because it consists of
estimations. We attempted to impress upon our respondents the need for accuracy in
filling out the questionnaires, but we could not supply an independent check on the
results. Self-report is of course a common and accepted form of social research,
but the reader would be aware of the "recall" nature of our data anyway.
Additionally, we obtained information on the legislator for whom each chief
staffer worked.
Each representative was assigned an "ideology" rating, based on data supplied
by the Texas Conservative Union. Like the ratings of more nationally-oriented
groups such as the Americans for Democratic Action and the Americans for Constitutional Action, these were based on the conformity of a representative's vote on
twenty-two selected bills to TCU recommendations. Three examples of such bills are
those to establish pilot service centers for displaced homemakers (TCU: no), reduce
state welfare appropriations for A. F. D. C. (TCU: yes), and create a state agency
to implement affirmative action (TCU: no).
Moreover, information was gathered as to the representative's party, length
of service in the House, the rural, urban, or metropolitan character of his or her
district, and the region of the state in which it was found.
Coding information on
all these variable can be found in the appendix.
The analysis to follow consists of a discussion of the relationship between
variations in reported chief staff behavior, as measured by our diaries, and
variations in characteristics of the representatives who employed them.
The one hundred eleven chief staffers who supplied usable data serve seventyfour percent of the representatives in the Texas House. Republicans, conservatives,
and representatives from metropolitan districts are slightly over-represented in our
sample, legislators from districts in the western half of the state somewhat underrepresented. None of the differences are great enough to skew our results
seriously.
A Note On Politics In Texas
Although we believe that the political process in Texas is sufficiently similar
to that in other states to make comparison useful, it does have its unrepresentative
aspects. Two facts are particularly relevant to the present study:
Texas'
"Southern" tradition of domination by the Democratic party, and its relative lack of
a professional, well-equipped state legislature.
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Although Texas has in recent years emerged from one-party domination at the
level of national offices, it is still overwhelmingly Democratic at the local level.
It is not uncommon for the state's voters to elect Republican members of Congress,
or to vote for the Republican candidate in Presidential contests. But Bill
Clements, elected in 1978 (and defeated in 1982) was the first Republican governor
since Reconstruction, and during the course of our study the state legislature was a
Democratic domain. In the 1979 House, only fifteen percent of the members
represented the minority party.
The traditional pattern of local democratic dominance has meant a balance of
political forces within the state that is common in the South but somewhat anomalous
elsewhere. The small Republican party is based predominantly in the suburbs of the
larger cities. Virtually all Republicans are very conservative. The majority
Democratic party is split into two clearly recognizable factions. Democrats from
the central portions of the cities tend to be liberal, while their fellow partisans
who represent rural, suburban, and small-city districts are conservative (Kraemer
and Newell, 1979, pp. 25-41).
The relative position of the parties has consequences for the present analysis. It should be borne in mind that, as members of a marginal party Repubicans
might not be integrated with Texas' economic/political power the way they would be
in a state where they were a viable opposition vehicle. Much of the battling
between say, consumer and producer interests, that in another state occurs between
the parties, in Texas probably takes place between liberal and conservative wings
of the Democrats. The Republican party seems to function more as an ideological
gadfly than as a spokesman for a strong and stable coalition of interests.
This interpretation of the position of the Republican party in the legislature
is of course a testable proposition, and one purpose of a large-scale study might be
to measure differences between the parties. Such a project, however, is made
extremely difficult in the present instance by the very fact that makes the
Repubican party marginal: its small size. Of the one hundred eleven chief staff
members who completed our diaries, only twenty served Republicans. This total is
too small to permit much meaningful statistical manipulation. We will look for
differences between the parties, and, in particular, for differences between the
Republicans and conservative Democrats, but the reader should not expect much in the
way of statistically significant relationships.
Besides its party composition, the Texas legislature as an institution has
aspects worth noting. It is limited Constitutionally to meeting for 140-day
sessions, during odd-numbered years only. A legislator's annual salary of $7200
in 1979 was the least renumerative of any in the ten most populous states, and
insured that representatives had to spend such of their time when the House was not
in session making a living instead of thinking abut public policy (Crain, et al,
1980, pp. 186-187).
An inadequate salary was complemented by inadequate staff allowances. House
members received $3750 per month between sessions and $4800 per month during
sessions for staff salaries and expenses (Crain, p. 190). As a result, there were
few educated, experienced staffers in the Texas House. They tended to be young, and
many representatives relied on undergraduate volunteers from the nearby University
of Texas campus for part-time help. We avoided these part-time workers when
conducting our research.
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Constituency Service
Furnishing help to constituents has for decades been recognized as one of the
principal activities of American legislators and their staff (Matthews, 1960, pp.
224-228; Olson, 1980, pp. 135-139). Recently there has been speculation in both
the political science literature and in the press that the more recently-elected
members of Congress tend to concentrate on constituency service to an even greater
extent than their predecessors, with balefull results for the political system
(Fiorina, 1977, 1977; Alpern and Hubbard, 1977, pp. 26-27). It would be interesting
to see if background variables account for any of the differences in the amount of
time invested in constituency service by the staffs of the Texas House. If so, it
would suggest hypotheses for research about Congressional behavior.

Table One
Constituency Service By Ideology
Less

More

Liberal

17
36.2

20
42.6

10
21.3

Conservative

15
23.4

25
39.1

24
37.5

32
28.8

45
40.5

gamma = .30

34
30.6

111

Chi square p - .14

r = .19

Ai Table One illustrates, there is indeed a relationship between some background variables and reported constituency service. Conservatives tend to give
more time to "Helping people in your district" than do liberals. The conservative
advantage is even more marked when only Democratic representatives are evaluated,
as in Table Two.
This relationship is somewhat diminished, but not eliminated, when length of
service and urban/rural variations are controlled. More liberal legislators tend
to have served in the House fewer years than their conservative colleagues; they
also tend to represent center-city districts. It is therefore possible that the
greater tendency of conservatives to assign their chief staff members to work on
constituency service is a result not of their ideology but of other factors.
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Table Two
Constituency Service By Ideology
Democrats Only
Less
Liberal

Conservative

More

17
36.2
8

18.2

20
42.6

10
21.3

47
51.6

16

20

36.4

45.5

44
48.4
91

25

36

36

27.5

39.6

33.0

gamma = .43

Chi square p < .05

r = .27

The data, however, do not support such an interpretation. Among all levels of
experience, conservative staffers report spending more time working on constituency
service than do liberal staffers. Conservatives from three of the four categories
of urban constituency (those representing rural, urban, and metropolitan/center
city districts) tend to have their staffs spend more time on constituency service.
Those from the fourth category (metropolitan/suburban) show no clear pattern.
The ideology interpretation is reinforced by the data in the stepwise multiple
regression of Table Three. Using Democrats only, and eliminating one outlier,
ideology alone explains fifteen percent of the variance in constituency service,
with a steep Beta slope of 1.4. Length of service and urbanity of district add an
additional three percent of explanatory power. When Republicans are retained in
the equation, the pattern continues, but is weakened.
These relationships are by no means spectacular, but they are steady and
consistent. Districts in the more traditional, conservative areas of Texas are
represented by more experienced legislators, whose chief staff aides concentrate to
a somewhat greater extent than those of other members on servicing the constituents.
Regardless of the length of service or type of constituency, however, conserative
Democrats tend to concentrate more of their resources on personally serving the
people in their districts than do Republicans or liberal Democrats.
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Table Three
Stepwise Multiple Regression: Constituency Service With
Ideology, Length of Service and Urbanity; Democrats Only
(One Outlier Eliminated)
Dependent Variable:

Constituency Service

Independent Variable:
2

Multiple r

- .15

Independent Variable:
Multiple r

2

Multiple r

B -

1.4

Length of Service

- .1774

Independent Variable:
2

Ideology

B - 2.75
Percent urban of district

- .1776

B = -.60

Significance of equation: p < .001
It is clear from this analysis that Republicans and liberal Democrats share
important characteristics. Both expend fewer staff resources on constituency
service. This is partly, but by no means wholly, attributable to the fact that they
both tend to represent metropolitan districts, and have a shorter tenure in the
House. It poses a question as to whether it is their more explicitly ideologcal
orientation, or perhaps their position as -outsiders" in Texas politics, that leads
them to a lesser concentration on "Helping people in your district." Such a
question is beyond the scope of this study, but its answer does not seem impossible
with the right research design.
Policy Research
If the staffs of liberal representatives tend to do less constituency service,
of what do they do more? A partial answer is that they spend slightly more time
researching policy issues. Our findings on this subject complement Ornstein's
conclusions about Congressional staffs.
There is no distinction between the parties per se in the amouzit of time that
chief staffers report they spend conducting policy research. Once again, the
difference is attributable to ideology, as illustrated in Table Four. And again,
the difference is most striking within the Democrats, as illustrated by Table Five.
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Table Four
Policy Research By Ideology
Less

More

Liberal

5
10.6

16
34.0

26
55.3

47
42.3

Conservative

24
37.5

17
26.6

23
35.9

64
57.7

29
26.1

33
29.7

gamma = -.44
r = -.28

49
44.1
Chi square p < .01

Table Five
Policy Research By Ideology
Democrats Only
Less

More

Liberal

5
10.6

16
34.0

26
55.3

47
51.6

Conservative

19
43.2

12
27.3

13
29.5

44
48.4

24
26.4

28
30.8

gamma - -.54
r - -. 36

39
42.9
Chi square p < .01

Some of this relationship washes out when length of service is controlled;
conservatives tend to have served longer and do less research. There remains a
considerable difference between the ideologies, however, especially among those with
fewer years experience. As Table Six illustrates, liberals of four years or fewer
years experience are more likely to devote staff time to policy research, a
relationship that is hightened dramatically if Democrats are examined separately,
as in Table Seven. Once again, it appears that Republicans, all of whom are
conservative, allocate staff resources in a manner more similar to liberal than to
conservative Democrats.
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Table Six
Policy Research By Ideology Among
Representatives With Four or Fewer
Years of Service
More

Less
Liberal

1
3.4

9
31.0

19
65.5

29
51.6

Conservative

10
37.0

7
25.9

10
31.0

27
48.2

29
51.8

56

11
19.6

16
28.6

gamma - -.59
r - -.40

Chi square p < .01

Table Seven
Policy Research By Ideology Among
Representatives With Four or Fewer
Years of Service; Democrats Only
More

Less
Liberal

1
3.4

9
31.0

19
65.5

29
64.4

Conservative

7
43.8

5
31.3

4
25.0

16
35.6

23
51.1

45

8
17.8

14
31.1

gamma - -.73
r m -.51
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Chi square p < .01

Time With Lobbyists
The hypothesis about the general irrelevance of the Republicans in the Texas
legislature is underscored by our findings on the amount of time spent with
representatives from interest groups. As shown in Table Eight, Democrats tend to
devote slightly more time to such activities than do Republicans, which is what we
would expect if the minority party is peripheral to the structure of power within
the state.
Table Eight
Time With Lobbyists By Party
More

Less
Demo

46
50.5

16
17.6

29
31.9

91
82.0

Repub

14
70.0

4
20.0

2
10.0

20
18.0

31
27.9

ill

60
54.1

20
18.0

gamma = -.42

Chi square p < .13

r = -.18

Perhaps surprisingly, however, there is no difference between liberal and
conservative representatives on the subject of time with lobbyists when party is
controlled. Democratic staffers serving liberals and conservative report spending
virtually identical amounts of time meeting with representatives from interest
groups. It is possible and even probable, that members of the two ideological camps
spend time with lobbyists from different kinds of interests, but our data are not
sufficiently subtle to detect such variations.
Residual Variables
There are no important differences in the relationships between background
variables and the time that chief staffers report they spend with members of other
staffs and with their own legislator, or in the length of their day. Staffers from
rural districts spend slightly more time with other staffs than do staffers from
urban or metropolitan districts. Democrats spend slightly more time with their
bosses than do Republicans, and report a somewhat longer day. These relationships,
however, are not strong enough to justify an extension of the analysis.
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Some Possible Objections
As with all research, the present study may be vulnerable to methodological
criticisms, but we wish to forestall some of them by pointing out some potential
objections that do not apply.
There is first the possibility that the existence of district offices skews the
results. Some Texas legislators keep offices in their districts, as well as in
Austin. If requests from constituents for aid are handled in the districts, it
could free the Austin staff from such activity, thereby distorting our data.
This fear appears to be groundless, however. During the interviews with staff
members, we paid special attention to those whose representatives maintained
district offices.
They unanimously agreed that constituency service was handled
entirely from Austin. Most requests for aid came directly to the capitol anyway,
because, while citizens often do not know the location of a local office, most know
that the representative works in the state capital.
In addition, the standard
practice is that even those constituency requests which are made at the local level
are immediately channeled to Austin, where they are processed. The local offices
are used as campaign information centers. We are therefore confident that the
existence of district offices does not weaken our findings.
Second, it is possible that the quantity of resources under the control of a
representative may affect the total amount of effort available to his or her staff,
and hence the percentage of time devoted to specific activities. Suppose, for
example, that liberal legislators had more money, with which they hired more staff.
The staff underlings might then be assigned to, say, constituency service, leaving
the chief staffer free to concentrate on policy research. Under these conditions
the chief staff member of a conservative legislator, with a smaller staff, would
have less time to spend on research. Given these circumstances, our findings would
be an artifact of having forgotten to include an intervening variable in our
analysis.
Such does not appear to be the case, however. We included staff payroll
figures from the Texas House's Annual Financial Report in our analysis. The
correlation (Pearson r) between constituency service and staff payroll i -.06. The
correlation between policy research and staff payroll is .10. The correlations
between the two staff activity variables and the total staff budget (payroll plus
phone bills, mailing costs, etc.) are no more impressive. We think these
correlations are so low as to allow us to dismiss the possibility that the
relationships we found are spurious.
A third potential objection is that our analysis extends only to staff time
expended during the 140-day biennial session, and that we ignore staff activities
between sessions. We acknowledge this to be true, but we are not claiming to study
all possible staff activities at all times. We maintain that an accounting of the
way a representative employs his or her staff during the session is of considerable
interest. No doubt a much larger investigation of the Texas legislature would
include an exhaustive discussion of staffing, but our own goals are modest.
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Conclusion
As with much research, this investigation has raised more questions than it
has answered. It is clear that in one session of the Texas legislature, chief staff
members for representatives from the House varied their activities systematically in
conjuction with the political situation of the legislator. Ideology was the most
important variable associated with these differences. Republicans and liberal
democrats were relatively more likely to spend time on policy research, and less
likely to spend time on constituency service, than were conservative Democrats.
None of these associations were particularly robust, but the fact that they
existed at all suggests other avenues of investigation. It would, for example, be
interesting to see if similar patterns prevail the United States Congress. In a
recent study of marginal districts, Richard Born found that incumbents elected to
that body since 1966 have fortified their electoral margins more efficiently than
those elected prior to that year; he avoided investigating whether that fact might
be due to their greater emphasis on constituency service (Born, 1979, p. 816). Such
would be an interesting topic of investigation. It would also be interesting to see
if variations within patterns of constituency service on the part of new members
could be attributed to their ideologies.
Secondly, it might prove illuminating to replicate this study in other state
legislatures. Other states have different party systems and constitutional settings
and different blends of constituency and ideology, but that does not mean that the
patterns evident here could not occur elsewhere, perhaps even in sharpened form.
Additionally, this study has implications for thinking about the place of
legislators in the American political system. If some of these findings should be
generalized, they would present students of the legislative process with problems
of interpretation. The reason why a representative's ideological position on policy
issues should be associated with his or her allocation of staff time is not
immediately clear. We cannot answer the questions raised by the data, only suggest
further research to help the thinking about them.
Appendix:

Coding the Data

I.

Staff time
Most members of the Texas House have several full-time and part-time personal
staff employees. Some members employed only one staff person; such a situation
presented no problems about whose workload to record. When there were several staff
employees, an effort was made to identify the "chief of staff," and that person was
asked to fill out the diaries. No part-time employees were used in this study.
The diaries consisted of a short, clear set of directions followed by spaces
for the staffers to estimate the number of hours and minutes that they spent on
various activities per day. Of the 150 members of the House, staff employees of
111 supplied usable data.
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Compilation of the diaries yielded the following summary statistics:
Category of activity
Mean minutes/day
Standard Deviation
Helping people in district
158.3
98.2
Policy research
137.2
76.5
Time with other staffs
59.1
49.7
Time with lobbyists
82.8
53.4
Time with representative
113.4
79
Length of Day
630.4
156.7
The total number of minutes in the average day, as determined by summing the
categories of activity (550.8), does not equal the category "length of day" because
one category--miscellaneous activity-has been ommitted. Categories of time were
recoded into approximate thirds. For "time with lobbyists," for example, 0 through
60 minutes was coded "low," 61 through 119 coded "moderate," and 120 through 240
coded "high."
II. Background variables
A. Ideology
The Texas Conservative Union publishes ratings of House and Senate members
based on its compilation of "key" roll-call votes. During the 66th legislature,
there were twenty-two of these key votes. The mean rating for representatives, on
a scale in which zero equals perfect liberalism and one-hundred equals perfect
conservatism, was 52.7, with a standard deviation of 28. We recoded so that a TCU
score of 0 to 49 made a representative a "liberal," and a score of 50 to 100 made
him or her a "conservative."
B. Years of service
Unlike the U.S. Congress, the Texas House of Representatives is not a
place where people typically stay a long time. Mean years of service was 5, with a
standard deviation of 4.2. We recoded the data so that 0 to 4 equalled "lowest," 5
to 8 "moderate," and 9 to 27 "highest."
C. Rural/urban/metropolitan
Most districts were heavily urban. The mean urban percent of population
was 82.3, with a standard deviation of 25.6. Recoding was accomplished in the
following manner: 0 to 49 percent urban was classified as "rural," and 50 to 99
percent "urban." The numerous districts that were 100 percent urban were located
on maps and classified as either "metropolitan/center-city" or "metropolitan/
suburban." Since not all the districts fell neatly into an obvious geographic
category, this coding is inexact.
D. Region
Districts were placed into one of four regions of the state based on
geography and the historical/cultural background of the area. No regional
variations are discussed in the analysis because such differences were too small
to warrant serious attention.
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THE IMPACT OF WOMEN LEGISLATORS ON INTRODUCTION OF SOCIAL LEGISLATION INTO A
SOUTHERN STATE HOUSE
Marjorie A. Baney, Executive Director
North Carolina Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers

ABSTRACT
The study investigated the interest of male and female legislators in social
legislation as measured by the number of bills each group introduced. Legislators
included in the study were the entire female population of the North Carolina
General Assembly House of Representatives serving between January and July 1981,
and an equal number of their male colleagues randomly selected. Comparisons of the
female and male legislators in the study criteria such as number of legislative
terms served, relative power of committees on which they served, number of
committee chairpersonships and independent rankings and effectiveness by
colleagues, lobbyists and the media revealed that the male legislators lead by
significant margins on all criteria. Results of the study were that the women
introduced more bills and more social legislation. Of the 159 bills introduced by
the women, 64 percent were identified as social legislation, while of the 111 bills
introduced by the men, only 37 percent were identified as social legislation. The
designations of social legislation or non-social legislation were submitted to a
jury of experts for validation. Recommendations were made for further study of the
interests of male and female legislators in more specific content areas.

Introduction
Women have been increasingly active in many decision making areas of society
and are more visible in state legislatures across the nation. The number of women
elected to state legislatures has tripled just in the last ten years until there is
at least one woman serving in each state house and only four states failing to have
1
a woman serving in the state senate. When the first Conference of Women State
Legislators was held in 1972, there were 344 women legislators in the country
representing only 5.5 percent of state legislators. By the second Conference of
Women Legislators in 1982, their numbers had increased to 908 or 12.1 percent of
all state legislators.
Yet it has been reported that the political
participation
3
of women has had little impact on the formulation of policy.

Background and Significance
Increasing numbers of middle-aged women are becoming involved in politics
resulting from earlier trends toward marrying and bearing children at a
comparatively younger age than present which enables significant numbers of women
now reaching middle age to pursue activities outside the home with increasing
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frequency. Newer trends toward later marriages and fewer children, combined with
the increasing numbers of women with advanced education, are creating greater
numbers of bright, creative and energetic younger women committed to political
careers. This overall growth in the political activity of women is enhanced by
changing attitudes about families and relationships and about the acceptability of
4
political activity by women.
Little serious political analysis of women's attitudes and behaviors had been
published prior to the mid 1970's. 5 A 1977 study involving local representatives in
Connecticut did reveal some significant differences in self-expressed expertise
between male and female participants on "Social Problems" with 53.3 of the women
expressing the belief that they had expertise in that area as compared to only 18.2
6
percent of the men. This finding of increased self-expressed expertise on social
problems by local women representatives as compared with their male colleagues
would seem to indicate that increasing numbers of women in political office would
have an impact in that area. To investigate this potential impact, a study was
conducted comparing the number of pieces of social legislation (bills) introduced
by a group of female legislators and an equal number of their male counterparts.
Research Setting
North Carolina is one of the seven states governed by a legislature which meets
only in odd-numbered years, except for a brief session each even-numbered year to
make minor budget adjustments to maintain the state's constitutionally required
balanced budget.
The North Carolina General Assembly is composed of a fifty member
Senate and a hundred and twenty member House of Representatives. Due to a limited
number of female senators during the 1981 General Assembly (only three) when the
study was conducted, the study was limited to the House where there were 19 female
representatives. This is in line with studies that show women are twice as likely
to serve in a state House of Representatives than in a State Senate.7
Since House
districts are smaller in size and greater in number, it is fairly common for state
legislators to begin their legislative careers in the House. It seems common for
state legislators to begin their legislative careers in the House. It seems
logical that women, who are new as a force in the political arena, are presently
represented here in greater numbers.
Procedures
The entire population of nineteen female House members (16%) were included in
the study with an equal number of their male colleagues selected in a random
drawing from the 101 male legislators (84%) using a non-replacement sampling
technique. The Daily Bulletin, a digest of actions by the N. C. General Assembly
published by the Institute of Government of the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill, was used to make the initial determination of bills relevant to the
study.
Any bill introduced by a legislator included in the study was labeled social
legislation if it was initially assigned to one of the following committees:
Aging, Appropriations - Human Resources, Commissions and Institutions for the Deaf
and Blind, Corrections, Education, Health, Higher Education, Human Resources or
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Mental Health.
Additional bills were identified as social legislation by a three person panel
of experts, consisting of two registered lobbyists and one volunteer (citizen)
lobbyist representing human service professional and employee associations.
Panelists received all the bills introduced by legislators in the study which were
not assigned to a designated committee. All bills included in the study were
unanimously labeled "social legislation" by this expert jury. All bills included
in the study were Public Bills which have statewide impact.
Results
There were 270 public bills included in the study of these 111 or 41% were
introduced by the female legislators. The total number of public bills introduced
by a single legislator ranged from one to 31 for the male legislators and from one
to 19 for the female legislators. The males introduced an average of just under
five bills (4.7), while the females introduced an average of just over eight bills
(8.3).
With regard to social legislation, there were 102 public bills introduced by
female legislators which were identified as social legislation and 41 public bills
introduced by male legislators identified as social legislation. For female
legislators, 64 percent of the public bills they introduced were identified as
social legislation. The male legislators in the study introduced public bills of
which 37 percent were identified as being social legislation. (See Table 1).
TABLE 1
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGES OF BILLS INTRODUCED BY LEGISLATORS
IN THE STUDY BY SEX

Group

Public Bills

Percent of Public Bills
Social Legislation

Female

159

64%

Male

111

37%

Total

270

101%

Discussion, Implications and Recommendations
The results clearly suggest that the
significantly more active in introducing
colleagues.
Further comparison of the female and
tenure, committee assignments, committee

women in the N. C. House were
social legislation (bills) than their male
male legislators studied as to their
chairpersonships and vice-
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chairpersonships and overall effectiveness revealed nothing to contraindicate the
significance of gender as a key factor in their introduction of bills labeled
'
"social legislation. 6
(See Table 2)

TABLE 2

Average
Overall Effectiveness
Rating

Average Number
Terms Served
In N.C. House

Number of Times
Represented on
Committees

Number of
Chair and ViceChairpersonships

Female
Legislators

54

2.9

17

23

Male
Legislators

56

3.4

22

24

While the male legislators lead in every category, the gaps are relatively
narrow and in no case approach the disparity in the number of social legislative
bills introduced by the two groups. This contradicts some reported evidence that
women are not distinct from men in their policy preferences, simply on the basis of
9
'
sex.
The results of the study are in line with other research
suqgesting
that
t
s
issues with "moral overtones.
women are more responsive to policy
More research is needed in regard to the contributions of women legislators,
but it must be designed to investigate areas other than those conventionally
considered women's issues. Do female and male legislators differ in specific
policy issues in areas such as health, consumer protection, banking or agriculture?
The study of expertise among male and female local representatives in Connecticut
implies that perhaps they might.llDoes the interest of female legislators in social
legislation, as indicated by the present study, remain constant or alter with
increased experience and tenure? Finally, a most compelling need is for
investigation of the success rates between female and male legislators as
determined, not by the introduction of bills as was investigated in this study, but
by the frequency with which the bills they introduce become law.
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AN ADVOCACY APPROACH FOR
MORE EFFECTIVE PROGRAM DELIVERY AND COORDINATION:
A CASE STUDY OF MAINE'S HOUSING REHAB TECHS
Kenneth K. Ahn
James F. Horan
G. Thomas Taylor
University of Maine at Orono
Political Science Department

A detailed case analysis of the Maine Housing Rehabilitation Project
provides an exploratory observation of the innovative use of human resources at the
federal, state and regional levels through an evolutionary development process of
housing rehabilitation technicians. Functioning largely as advocate planners and
human service delivery administrators through self-expanded roles, these individuals
were able to promote change in the context of this intergovernmental environment.
The analysis presented here reveals findings of intrastate regional differences
between the urban and rural areas. Low income citizens appear to be the main beneficiaries of a proactive style of leadership that was performed by the most productive
rehab techs. The autonomy of their roles afforded all technicians a degree of freedom to produce different results through experimentation.

Current proposals of the Reagan Administration's "New Federalism" are
illustrative of the need for state and local governments to reassess their own
public service delivery capabilities. Viable alternatives for program delivery at
the state and local levels often involve, in part, innovative approaches for more
efficient and effective coordination of several different agencies and institutions.
Charles H. Levine, in his text devoted to this problem entitled, Managing Fiscal
Stress, elaborates on the implications of the drastic change in domestic spending
policy:
Indeed, almost all our public management strategies are predicated on assumptions of the continuing enlargements of
public revenues and expenditures. Recent events and gloomy
forecasts, however, have called into question the validity
and generality of these assumptions, and have created a need
to reopen inquiry into the effects of resources scarcity on

The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions
of the anonymous referees of this journal. This study was supported in part by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and
Research, under subcontract to the Urban Institute.

-293-

public organizations and their management systems (Levine,
1980, p. 13)..
This study will examine the Maine Housing Rehabilitation Project (MHRP)
and its utilization of the innovative human resources of the housing rehabilitation
technicians. The "rehab techs" were essential to the success of the MHRP by serving
as the instruments through which a variety of federal, state and private resources
were effectively linked to facilitate a high degree of cooperation in achieving .1HRP
goals. There have been select arenas where administrators have identified service
delivery problems and taken corrective action that traditional human services'
administrators and planners would consider rather drastic. This study analyzes such
an experience with the Maine Housing Rehabilitation Project within the contextual
framework of an advocacy planning and service delivery approach. By stressing the
advocacy planning and service delivery approach utilized in the pr6ject, this study
will consider intrastate regional differences and their impact on project performance
and professional roles involved in the project implementation.
An Advocacy Approach to Planning and Service Delivery
It seems clear from the Maine case that the key actors, rehabilitation
technicians, did not play what would be considered typical roles for social planners
and human services'administrators. Their desire to bring the maximum amount of
assistance to their clients put them in a position of (1) promoting organizational
changes, (2) advocating their client's positions before other bureaucracies, (3)
participating in a regional approach to service delivery and (4) breaking down traditional barriers to intergovernmental and interagency cooperation.
In a selective literature review we will consider the contributions of the
early proponents of political action and neighborhood organization; the related
concepts for those who examined organizational change, and especially the change
agent role; and the advocacy approach. All three of the above stems of the literature prove to be useful in analyzing the evolutionary process of the role of Maine's
rehab techs.
There has been a long tradition in the reform spirit that conceived solutions to social problems in largely political action terms. Many of these nineteenth
century traditions can be found in the work of the late Saul Alinsky and his disciples
(Alinsky, 1946 and 1972 and Specht, 1975). Social problems for these political
activists represented a clear conflict betweenthe haves and have nots, and social
action was largely a struggle for power and resources.
Little in the way of structured analysis was undertaken, since adherents to this approach believed that ideology
"explained" the origin of social problems (Etizoni, 1976).
However, Alinsky believed
that the power that community organizations possess is the power to disrupt normal
activity through social protest. Snecific protest tactics (i.e., pickets, boycotts,
marches, rent strikes, harassment of local officials) are carefully matched to the
type of issue (Bailey, 1972).
During the 1960's some of these activists were to become converted participants through newly created bureaucratic roles, sponsored largely by federal
investments. Moreover, the achievements and many failures of the federal government
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to broker competing delivery systems with traditional local government and foster
new power structures at the community level through such initiatives as the community action and Model Cities programs have been well documented (Marris and Rein,
1973).
Another stem of the literature that relates to the development of a more
proactive bureaucratic style for social problem solving is that of organizational
change.
One common technique has been derived from Lewin's field theory, where the
change agent, together with the client group, analyzes the forces available which
These approaches
may support and resist change (Lippit, Watson, and Westley, 1958).
have stressed such topics as the need for change and the levels of change, methods
for developing the goals of change and the overcoming of resistance to change
(French and Bell, 1973 and Zaltman and Duncan, 1977). These techniques have tended
to utilize trained professional change agents, but some administrators have found
the application of these methods to the planning and implementation of human services
Since the delivery system for human services has become so complex,
to be essential.
greater control has been needed, which requires skills in social change; its implementation will significantly affect the existing patterns of rewards, statuses, and
roles (Mayer, 1972 and Bolan, 1979).
Finally, the call for theoretical importation and further development of
the concept of advocacy, which has been utilized by social welfare and legal professions, to the planning profession provides another salient stem in the direction
As Paul Davidoff explains in his classic article "Advocacy and
of the literature.
Pluralism in Planning":
Where plural planning is practiced, advocacy becomes the means
of professional support for competing claims about how the
In addition to carrying out these
community should develop.
necessary parts of planning, he would be a proponent of specific
substantive solutions (Davidoff, 1965, p. 333).
Thus, the advocate would be responsible to his or her client and seek to express
that person's viewpoint; but this would occur within the confines of pluralism.
Davidoff contends that planners should no longer approach their work strictly as a value-free exercise. Traditionally, an accepted decision-making rule for
bureaucrats was to find the most efficient way to achieve the ends prescribed by the
controlling legislative body. However, the new decision-making rule for social
planners, working as advocates, would be to promote policy alternatives that would
bring about a more equitable distribution or redistribution of society's economic
production.
Thus, advocacy planning becomes a form of community decision-making
that would enhance a wider breadth of social benefit in a pluralistic setting
(Blecher, 1972).
Others have cautioned about the limitations of the advocacy approach.
Catanese warns:
. . .advocacy planning has had a mixed success and incredibly
strong reaction against it. . . Much of the movement was decidedly radical and perhaps naive, which resulted in an almost
direct relationship between the advocate role and the assistance
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As

offered to those special interest groups which had the least
ability to formulate their demands and supports in a clear
manner (Catanese, 1978, p. 41).
The concept of a public employee acting as an advocate for low income, disadvantaged
clients was easier said than done.
Advocate planners had insisted on working within the political system like
lawyers for their clients of the judicial system. Moreover, advocacy concept coincided with the 1960's period of general rejection of many traditional values and a
growing demand for such innovations as citizen participation in government programs.
Davidoff had been relatively neutral as to whose interests planners should represent;
yet advocacy planning was generally equated with advocacy for the poor. Further
study and debate of the concept of advocacy planning did not end with the decade of
the 1960's. According to A. D. Heskin:
". . .advocacy planning still
exists. There
are those who have not lost the faith, and others who employ advocacy as a tactic
particularly when a community is under attack. . ." (Heskin, 1980, p. 61).
Likewise,
within the field of public administrationthe need for administrators to realign
their thinking around achieving the goal of social equity was called for:
Pluralistic government systematically discriminates in favor
of established stable lbureaucracies and their specialized
minority clientele (the Department of Agriculture and large
farmers as an example) and against those minorities (farm
laborers, both migrant and permanent as an example) who lack
political and economic resources. . .Social equity, then,
includes activities designed to enhance the political power
and economic well-being of these minorities (Frederickson,
1971, p. 311).
Although it is apparent that the Maine rehabilitation technicians did not
view themselves as social visionaries, it is important to note that their actions
were of major social significance whether they realized it or not. Given the recent
emphasis by the national government on the philosophic view that individuals can take
care of themselves without public intervention, the moral imperative to assist the
politically and economically deprived may be even more crucial as a driving force
for program managers at the state and local levels.
Maine Housing Rehabilitation Project: An Application
within the Framework of the Advocacy Planning and Service Delivery
An Innovative Projects Program (IPP) grant from the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development funded the MHRP on a demonstration basis. State and
local governments were awarded grants on a competitive basis to develop innovative
approaches to the solution of long-standing urban area problems.
The Urban Institute selected the Maine Housing Rehabilitation Project as one of six demonstration
projects to be evaluated for any insights the project might offer to similar ventures in other states and localities(Goedert and Blake, 1980).
The data for this study was collected primarily in two stages. The initial
stage consisted of written, self-administered questionnaires transmitted to all

major project participants, including the current and former project directors,
rehab techs, the Community Action Program directors, FmHA Rural Housing Specialists
and FmHA county supervisors. The second stage of data collection involved site
visitations, following a preliminary analysis of the responses received through the
On-site interviews were conducted with most of the key project partquestionnaires.
The interviews proved to be extremely valuable in providing clarifications
icipants.
and refinements with respect to the information received through the questionnaires
and also in providing insights into the implementation of the project at the grass
roots level.
The impetus behind the MHRP was the Community Action Agency's CCAA) weatherization program in Maine, which could not address the needs of approximately forty
percent of applicants whose housing units were in substandard condition and thus were
not suited for minimum standards of weatherization. As has been argued (Morris and
Binstock, 1966), the socially responsive planner needs to provide specific definitions
of his or her goals with explicit statements of what will replace unsatisfactory conditions. The State of Maine applied for the IPP grant, through its Division of
Community Services (DCS), to develop a program which would take advantage of the
Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) 504 rehabilitation program, a suitable funding
The result was the MHRP, which utilsource which initially had been underutilized.
ized the rehabilitation technicians as links between the CAAs and the county offices
of the FmHA.

Thirteen rehabilitation technicians were housed in the state's CAAs, which
provided basic administrative support for the project. FmHA county supervisors
familiarized the rehabilitation technicians with required procedures, referred clients
to rehabilitation technicians and eventually became more involved with the grantsmanThe function of direct client contact was assumed by the rehabiliship paperwork.
The role of the rehabilitation technicians was intended to be
tation technicians.
one of identifying low-income homeowners who needed housing rehabilitation assistance
In seeking
and might qualify for funding through the 504 grant and loan program.
potentially eligible households, rehabilitation technicians relied upon such referral sources as CAA outreach programs, winterization programs, public officials, local
Through these sources significant numbers of
newspapers and radio announcements.
were identified.
low-income residents of substandard homes
The rehabilitation technician's first visit to potential clients' homes
was very informal in"order to develop the trust of many individuals who traditionally
had tended to be distrustful of a government contract (fearing, for example, that
When the loan or grant prothey might be signing away the rights to their homes).
cess was initiated, the rehabilitation technician (1) carefully explained the process
to the client who was required to sign the application, explaining the various
conditions such as not selling the home for a minimum of three years if grant monies
were received, under penalty of returning the money; (2) drafted a Development Plan
which described the work to be done, after completing a required inspection of the
home; (3) secured credit references from the client; (4) conducted credit checks;
(5) reviewed the application (but did not determine eligibility); (6) obtained a
copy of the deed and a sketch of the property; (7) verified employment status and
income of all of the client's family members; and (8) assisted in the preparation of
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a "family budget", thereby aiding the client in the management of income toward the
eventual repayment of the loan.
The role of the rehabilitation technicians expanded as the project evolved.
Their initial concern with only one federal program (the FmHA 504) soon was broadened
to general involvement in several federal programs such as the FmHA 502 program, the
HUD Community Development Block Grant program and the HEW Title XX program. The
rehabilitation technicians also became instrumental in enhancing the accessibility
of clients to other social service programs such as food stamps, fuel assistance and
meals for the elderly. The rehabilitation technicians clearly had come to see themselves as advocates for the needs of low-income persons, and viewed the county FmHA
supervisors as persons before whom they needed to plead their case on behalf of their
clients.
Thus, the concept of social equity, which represents a major pillar within
the intellectual reform of the theory of public administration, took on special
meaning to the rehabilitation technicians.
Acting as advocates for their low-income
clients, they performed a role envisioned by both the planning and public administration theorists, while serving at the same time as agents of social change.
Although the rehabilitation technicians were officially responsible to the
CAA housing directors or the CAA directors, in reality they had a great deal of autonomy and operated with considerable independence on a day-to-day basis. In fact,
most rehabilitation technicians established their own priorities for the best use of
their time and resources. The program subsequently took on a slightly different
form under each rehabilitation technician. It appears that differences in personal
characteristics among rehab techs and intrastate regional differences could have
major impacts on project performance and professional roles involved in the implementation of the program. Interview data suggest that while most of the rehab techs
could be classified as "proactive" in their behavior patterns, some were more or
less "reactive" types. For example, in responding to the depletion of 504 funds,
some reacted with "anger" or "pandemonium"; some became "more resourceful," "looking
for other sources," or "corresponding with Maine's congressional delegation"; others
were simply "disappointed" or indifferent. The personality differences also could
have a significant impact on their relationship with clients and other key participants of the program such as FmHA county supervisors and CAA directors. It is
interesting to note that the rehab techs spent from less than one month to about
nine months to establish a good working relationship with local FmHA officials.
Establishing such relationships was a crucial factor in successfully seeking 504
loans and grants from FmHA county offices. The rehab tech who spent less than a
month to establish a good working relationship proved to be most successful in that
the rehab tech had fourteen 504 loans and nineteen 504 grants approved and funded
during the first year of operation whereas other rehab techs averaged only five
loans and six grants each.
The flexibility of the experimental program also made possible for rehab
techs to mold the implementation of rehabilitation programs according to differences
in regional needs and resources. As one rehab tech stated, "the biggest strength is
that the program is flexible. Each CAA serves a different public. . .Each rehab
tech can develop the program to fit community needs." A tendency toward regional
responsiveness in rehab tech strategies and project performance is clearly illust-
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trated in Table 1. The Southern Region, which is characterized by the highest
population density, the highest percentage of urban population and the highest per
capita income in Maine, showed the lowest project performance. Each of the four
rehab techs operating in this region processed less than six 504 loans and grants and
served cnly eighteen clients on average during the first year of program implementation. Other rehab techs worked in the Midcoast Region and particularly those in
the North-central Region performed far much better than the ones in the Southern
Region. The four rehab techs in the Midcoast Region successfully generated an average
of almost seventeen 504 grants and loans and served more than thirty-two clients each.
The five rehab techs who worked in the North-central Region fared even better in terms
of the total number of clients served and the number of grants and loans processed
other than 504, e.g., Title XX and HUD Community Development grants. However, their
performance in processing 504 grants and loans was less successful as compared to
those in the Midcoast Region. Perhaps this was due to the fact that these rehab
techs who worked in the North-central Region had to cover vast geographic areas and
each technician had to deal with several FmHA county offices dispersed around the
region. For example, the rehab tech in the Aroostook County Action Program had to
negotiate with seven FmHA county offices located throughout the county encompassing
6,453 square miles.
A clear inverse relationship between socio-economic conditions of the
region and project performance of the rehab techs indicate that the FmHA programs
were not as popular with economically better-off urban areas as with more impoverished rural regions. Many people who resided in economically better-off urban areas
were found to be either uninterested or ineligible to receive the 504 programs. A
statement by the rehab tech who worked in the county with the highest per capita
income attests to this:
. had trouble with publicity and outreach.
I mailed approximately 200 letters to previous recipients of Project FUEL,
and received only 4 responses. Of these 4 responses 2 were
ineligible, one was potentially eligible but changed her mind,
and was processed but found ineligible.
This situation led the rehab techs to believe that their roles should be expanded
to include the administration of other or all housing programs in the region and
that this would improve the individual rehab tech's overall effectiveness in providing a more diverse housing service. The CAA directors in the Southern Region
had a similar attitude that the rehab tech's responsibilities should include the
administration of other housing programs and they believed that an expansion would
not necessarily conflict with the current responsibilities of the CAAs. On the other
hand, the rehab techs and CAA directors in the other two regions were generally opposed
to the idea of expanding the rehab tech's responsibilities because this certainly
would reduce the rehab tech's flexibility.
However, according to project data, rehabilitation technicians were unanimous in their belief that someone employed within FmHA could not have accomplished
as much as they had been able to accomplish, even if provided the same amount of time
to concentrate solely on housing rehabilitation. The rehab techs believed that they
could lobby FmHA for funds more effectively from outside rather than from inside the
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Table 1
Regional Differences and Project Performance

Socio-Economic Indicators

Performance Indicators

Persons
per
Square
Mile
(1980)

Percent
of
Urban
Pop.
(1980)

114.2

56.4%

108%

4

5.75

15.75

18.75

89.6

47.0

100

4

16.75

28.50

32.25

17.3

37.0

89

5

13.00

46.20

44.40

36.3

47.5%

100%
($7,868)

13

11.92
(156)

31.87
(408)

32.77
(433)

Per Cap.
Personal
Income
as % of
State
(19821

Average
No. No. of
of
504 G.&.
R.Ts. L. by
Each RT

Average
Average
No. of
No. of
Other G. Clients
& L. by
Served by
Each RT* Each RT

Southern Region
(York, Oxford,
Cumberland,
Androscoggin)
Midcoast Region
(Sagadahoc,
Lincoln, Kennebec, Knox,
Waldo)
North-central Region
(Franklin, Somerset,
Piscataquis, Penobscot, Hancock, Washington, Aroostook)
Total

* Those loans and grants which were less than $100.00 in the amount were deleted.

Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Population, Volume 1. Characteristics of the Population, Chapter A. Number of Inhabitants,
Part 21. Maine; Maine Department of Labor, Division of Economic Analysis and
Research, Annual Planning Information: Maine Statewide, Fiscal 1983; Mary Ellen
Twombly, "A Report on and a Request for Extension of the Maine Housing Rehabilitation Project to the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Washington, D.C.", 1978.
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organization due to the close relationship that developed between them and their
clients. Thus, the rehab techs served as the buffers between their clients and the
FmHA administrators, contributing to the avoidance for the former of many of the
problems that they frequently associated with the bureaucracy, such as perceived
remoteness (Downs, 1967). Viewing themselves in many cases as social activists,
they sought not only to carry out legislative mandates as efficiently and economically as possible, but also to both influence and execute policies which more generally improve the "quality of life" for all.
The rehab techs proved to be quite effective in gaining the cooperation of
key project participants. Initially, the FmHA county supervisors had been given
almost no role in the design of the MHRP and, according to interview data, they
actually tended to be rather skeptical of the project. Although some rehab techs,
particularly those in the Southern Region, believed their relationship with the FmHA
supervisors was not as desirable as it should be, most rehab techs reported that
after demonstrating their sincere interest in grant application procedures, the
relationship between themselves and the supervisors improved considerably. Here the
promotion of organizational change and the role of the rehab techs as change agents
were clearly manifested. The rehab techs sought to modify certain bureaucratic
service delivery patterns or develop new ones to achieve solutions. Instead of merely serving as a link between the CAAs and the FmHA, the rehab techs also were concerned with the comprehensive needs of their low-income clients, to the extent of attempting to influence the outcome of service delivery in their clients' favor. The
determination and resourcefulness of the the rehab techs, according to the Urban
Institute evaluation, overcame a variety of problems that could have negatively
altered the project (Goedert and Blake, 1980).
Not only were the relationships between the rehab techs, the clients and
other project participants positively affected by the advocacy role assumed by the
rehab techs, but the achievement of specific project objectives also was enhanced.
Each rehab tech had been expected to process an average of two loans per month over
the fourteen month demonstration period, which collectively represented a target of
upgrading approximately 365 homes. The target was exceeded by an impressive margin.
During the fourteen month demonstration period, 433 homes were substantially upgraded.
In addition, there was remarkable improvement in FmHA 504 grant and loan activity
and in the coordination of other means of housing rehabilitation. Moreover, other
assistance to the low-income clients, not necessarily in the form of housing rehabilitation, was significantly increased. Through all these various efforts, a higher
standard of living was promoted for many of the clients.
Some significant secondary benefits also were realized. An improvement in
intergovernmental cooperation exemplified by a memorandum of understanding, the
Rural Development Cooperation Agreement, signed by FmHA and the State of Maine,
targeted funds for housing and economic and industrial development to rural areas
throughout the state.
Thusthe success of the MHRP is significant in that program goals were
achieved with high productivity and low administrative costs. These successes were
often the result of the rehab techs' ability to process multiple request packages
and to utilize the same labor force to do repair work funded under different aid
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programs.
For example, seventy-five 504 loans were approved and funded and eightyone 504 grants were approved and funded. Four out of every ten clients received
assistance in upgrading their dwellings. Nearly 300 of the 497 Maine municipalities
were represented by these clients. The end result was a very cost effective, yet
viable and comprehensive, approach to the basic needs of low-income homeowners.
Although the strong commitment of the rehab techs played a major role in
the delivery of the MHRP, the project also required strong support from state FmHA
administrators, the Maine Housing Rehabilitation Project Director and the Director
of the Division of Community Services. The role of individual leaders can not be
underestimated here. The proactive style of a dynamic woman administrator serving
as the MHR Project Director initiated many of the changes in the CAAs' relationship
with FmHA.
Secondly, the important political support in the state capital and the
Governor's Office was gained from a respected black activist, who served as the
Director of the Division of Community Services.
In addition, MHRP success may have
been enhanced by factors somewhat unique to Maine such as the high visibility of
FmHA and the lack of specialization in and the relatively autonomous nature of the
CAAs. These factors may well have encouraged the rehabilitation technicians to seek
several sources of funding beyond the 504 program.
Conclusions
During the process of obtaining resources for the successful implementation
of their program, the Maine rehabilitation technicians were able to evoke a new
spirit of cooperation among some very unlikely partners in the Farmer's Home Administration, the local Community Action Agencies and the state's Division of Community
Services. This type of bureaucratic response could be more pervasive should the
present trend of devolution of responsibility to state and local governments continue. President Reagan is offering less in total dollars to the states and municipalities and is parceling it out in the form of increased usage of block grants,
rather than categorical grants. Under President Nixon, the original brand of "New
Federalism" articulated one of the goals of the block grants as being the return of
program design and delivery of services to sub-national governments. The alleged
intention was to involve a greater degree of intergovernmental cooperation so that

state, regional and local agencies could best determine the priorities for the
federal dollars flowing down to them. During the Nixon administration, this concept
was termed "Creative.Federalism", and it was to be largely achieved with an influx
of no-strings attached funds to general purpose state, county and local governments.
In light of the fact that the Reagan version of the "New Federalism" involves funding cuts, and not increases, to state and local governments, there may be an added
impetus to better coordinate the limited federal grants at the state and local levels.
This type of coordination has been described as orchestration by jurisdictional
leaders, self-linking among functional specialists and meshing by community-based
organizations (Lovell, 1979).
Efforts at the integration of services and the use of
such techniques as case management and client advocacy function have also attempted
to address the issue of fragmentation (Kaplan, Cans, and Kahn, 1972).

The rehabilitation technicians in Maine operationalized Lovell's concept
of coordinating federal grants from below in their efforts to help their low-income
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clientele. In essence, the rehab techs were able to combine the spirit and normative
flavor of the advocacy planning with an innovative approach to regional service delivery which involved a patchwork of different funding sources and delivery agencies.
Significant intra-state regional differences were found that suggested an inverse
relationship between the socio-economic conditions of the regions and the performance
levels of the rehab techs, which in turn seemed related to different needs and resources
of the thirteen CAA geographic areas. While the Community Action Agencies served as
the home base for the rehab techs in their efforts at increasing the utilization of
the Home Weatherization program, the latter did not limit themselves merely to the
resources provided through those agencies. One could even assume that they acted on
some perceived moral imperative when they went to such great lengths to obtain funding and services for their clientele. It may be that in this next decade, which
probably will be characterized by shrinking, or, at best, stable federal resources,
conventional means of service delivery and funding will no longer suffice for administrators seeking to achieve the goal of social equity in public resource allocation.
If this should prove to be the case, then state and local program administrators may
want to look carefully at the Maine experience--an experience which combined the role
of the local grants coordinator with that of the public servant as an advocate. A
catalytic resource such as the rehab tech could be applied to other functional areas
at the state and local levels where there exists a need for initiating change in the
direction of more effective program delivery in the public sector. This case analysis
does suggest that the role of the advocate is a legitimate role for administrators
in planning, in housing rehabilitation or in other social service areas.
The pattern of the rehab tech's performance could have been illustrated by
many of the same negative features epitomized by Rainwater's (1967) "dirty workers"
and Lipsky's (1980) "street level bureaucrats", if it were not for the experimental
nature of the program, their somewhat autonomous roles (which allowed for regional
differences) and the possibility of a regional, rather than a purely local frame of
reference. This Maine prototype reduced the inequities and fragmentation implicit
in a delivery system that otherwise would have tended to rely on its 497 minicipalities,
most of whom are very small towns, for essentially a local response. The desired
bureaucratic concepts of responsiveness, effectiveness and the pursuit of social
equity were enhanced by the state's involvement in the experimental program through
an inter-regional network, held together by the rehabilitation technicians.
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REGIONAL PLANNING OF MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES:
AN ILLINOIS CASE EXAMPLE
Wynne Sandra Korr*
Jane Addams College of Social Work
University of Illinois at Chicago

ABSTRACT
Now that Reagan has ended a twenty-year pattern of federal involvement in setting
mental health policy priorities, states must develop models for implementing and maintaining
services to the mentally ill. The Illinois model of regional offices which plan and monitor
programs is described. A case example showing how one such office developed services in a
minority community is given. Examples of the work of other offices illustrate the flexibility
of this model in meeting special community needs.

With the Reagan administration's shift of the federal mental health funding to a block
grant to each state, we need to look more closely at models for state roles in the mental
health delivery system. Illinois provides a timely example because of its history of funding
mental health services in the community and because of its relative lack of reliance on federal
dollars. By 1980 half of the mental health catchment areas in the United States received
federal funds (Neigher, et al., 1982). Only a third of the catchment areas in Illinois received
federal funding, but all had some state-funded mental health services.
This paper will briefly review the structure of services in Illinois from the 1960s to 1983.
Illinois used a model of regional state offices to promote continuity of care between stateoperated hospitals and voluntary community services and to facilitate monitoring and
accountability of state funds. The work of one such regional office in developing the delivery
system in a minority community will be considered as a case study. To highlight how regional
offices can tailor their work to the specific needs of the community, examples will be given of
the work of two other offices. The changes instituted in early 1983 will be described and their
potential limitations discussed.
Finally, the applicability of the Illinois regional model for the current national situation
will be discussed. Under Reagan's new federalism, the states have assumed responsibility for
federal mental health, health and social service block grants, all at reduced funding. States
should be considering models that can take into account the differing needs of various regions
and communities and confront competition among various service providers for decreasing
resources.
Federal vs. State Roles
Recent analyses of mental health policy (e.g. Mechanic, 1980; Levine, 1981) have focused
on the role of the federal government while largely ignoring the role of state government and
*The author draws on her five years' experience as a program evaluator in the Illinois
Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities. Special thanks are given to
Ruth Williams who directed the office described here.
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state agencies. During the 1960's and 1970's states were characterized as the owners and
operators of over-crowded, under-staffed hospitals. States were sued for abrogating clients'
rights, (e.g. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563 (1975)) and for lack of adequate treatment facilities (e.g. Wyatt v. Stickney,
344 F.Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972)). By contrast the federal government was seen as fostering
de-institutionalization, promoting prevention and early intervention, and funding community
mental health centers as the major alternative to hospitals.
These examples should not lead one to the conclusion that the federal government
encouraged reform in mental health policy while the states did not. Dorothea Dix and other
reformers went to state legislatures for help and received it. In response to their pleas the
first state hospital in Illinois was opened in 3acksonville in 1851. In contrast, President Pierce
vetoed legislation in 1854 which sought federal land grants for the construction of asylums for
the mentally ill, because he believed care of the needy was the responsibility of the states, not
the national government.
As hospitals became over-crowded at the turn of the century, suggestions for reform
came from within. Adolf Meyer, who came to the United States in 1903 to head the asylum in
Kankakee, Illinois, was one of the leading mental health reformers of the Progressive Era. His
innovations included the psychopathic hospital and its outpatient clinic, outreach, aftercare,
and the promotion of "civic medicine" (Rothman, 1980).
States have affirmed their response to citizens in need by enacting statutes that
establish agencies under the executive branch of government to serve the needy. The
statutory base for such services has been established, amended, and expanded throughout the
twentieth century. In Illinois a large public welfare department was created in 1920 which had
responsibility for mental health, corrections, vocational services, public assistance, and child
welfare. In the 1920s and 1930s most state legislatures were concerned with the existing
hospitals, but a few states also began to develop outpatient programs (Rothman, 1980). Today
all states have statutes that specify their responsibility for mental health functions.
Illinois' Role
While the federal government was developing its response to the report of the Joint
Commission on Mental Illness and Health (1961), Illinois was devising its own innovative plans
for responding to the needs of the mentally ill. In 1960 voters approved a bond issue to provide
$150 million for capital improvements for state hospitals. Under the leadership of Dr. Francis
3. Gerty these funds were used for the construction of "zone centers" -- modern hospital and
outpatient facilities located in each of eight regions of the state to make mental health
services accessible to all citizens (Reidy, 1964). In 1961 a new state Department was
established with responsibility for mental health, developmental disabilities, and alcoholism
services. Legislation passed in 1963 authorized the state agency to make grants-in-aid to
community groups to provide services. Subsequent legislation enabled counties and townships
to raise money for mental health services by adding additional taxes. However, many areas,
most notably Chicago, did not utilize this legislation.
By the time the first federal community mental health legislation (PL 88-164) was
announced in 1963, Illinois was well on the way to modernizing its mental health system. The
major push for deinstitutionalization in many states including Illinois came in the late 1960's
when changes in Medicaid regulations enabled the states to save money by discharging patients
to nursing homes (Levine, 1981). By the early 701s, fostered by a grant-in-aid system,
community mental health programs were available in all of Illinois' eighty-two catchment
areas. About a third of these centers ever received federal monies appropriated for

-307-

comprehensive mental health centers. In most areas local funding covered outpatient and
early intervention services and state funds covered after-care for patients discharged from the
hospitals. These programs were operated by voluntary agencies or units of local government,
e.g. city or county health departments.
The Role of the Regional Offices
Regional offices of the Department of Mental Health were developed concommitantly
with the zone centers and the community programs. Each region was to have a zone center.
The larger regions were further divided into sub-regions to facilitate planning and increase
accessibility. For example, the region serving the greater Chicago area was originally divided
into fifteen sub-regions, each of which was a group of catchment areas that generated about
1,000 admissions per year to the state hospitals. The region and sub-region offices were
responsible for the development of community programs, continuity of care between hospital
and community, and the monitoring of expenditure of grant-in-aid monies.
Case Example: An Urban Minority Sub-Region
Not all areas had been able to develop adequate community programs. One area on the
south side of Chicago in which a zone center had not been developed had special difficulties.
In the late 60's and early 70's while most areas developed and consolidated their community
mental health programs, this area was experiencing extreme population changes.
The
movement of blacks and the resulting white flight led to a near-total racial change making it
difficult to find community groups to provide mental health services. The sectarian agencies
that had served the white religious and ethnic communities had moved out. The total amount
of state mental health funds going into this community of 700,000 was the same as the budget
of an area in another part of the city with 1/10 the population which was receiving federal
CMHC funds.
In 1975 a leadership change in the sub-region office serving this area led to a variety of
new efforts to develop services. In order to carry out the mission of developing programs in
this under-served area, the new director hired four new staff for a total of 12. All had
experience in mental health services or administration, and the majority had graduate training
in social work, nursing, psychology, or sociology. This author's role was program evaluation,
including conducting needs assessments, identifying gaps and duplications in services, and
evaluating specific programs (Korr and Beech, 1983). In keeping with the demography of the
community, the majority of the staff and the director were black. The new director of the
sub-region retained the goals of community development, continuity of care, and
accountability and monitoring.
One of the first tasks was to collect and analyze data about the six catchment areas,
the sub-region and the existing community services. The major findings were: increasing
public assistance caseloads (in some areas, 100% increases in a year), large numbers of young
black men between 18 and 35 going in and out of the state hospital, outpatient caseloads
composed primarily of older women.
The sub-region office began to work toward change.
In the area of community
development staff worked closely with community groups to explain mental health needs and
to train the boards of the few existing voluntary mental health agencies. The board of a small
day treatment center worked with sub-region staff and obtained a planning grant for a
federally-funded CMHC for their catchment area.
Cooperation with a group of black
businessmen and professionals led to their incorporating as a not-for-profit agency and
receiving a grant for the first transitional living facility and another day treatment center.
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In one catchment area of the sub-region a staff member started a network of providers
including mental health programs, the area hospital, a family service agency, the public
assistance and social security offices, and area churches. These groups worked together to
meet the needs of mental health clients and their families.
Staff also focused on continuity of care. An intake-aftercare coordinator reviewed state
hospital admissions and facilitated discharge planning. Sub-region staff coordinated weekly
discharge planning meetings in which community agency representatives came to the hospital
more than twenty miles away.
Staff previously limited to planning for patients being
discharged to nursing homes were able to develop other alternatives including family homes
and boarding homes. A contract with the police department led to screening of clients in the
emergency room of a community hospital and more deflection from hospitalization. State
funds for purchase of care helped support this program.
Because newer agencies have more difficulty in meeting accountability standards than
established agencies, sub-region staff provided ongoing training in management by objectives,
accounting techniques, filling out fiscal and programmatic monitoring forms, and program
evaluation.
In order to continue to develop innovative programs, other funding sources were
exploited. Federal monies given to the states under section 314d of the 1966 Partnership'for
Health Act went to a community agency to open an emergency living facility as an alternate
to hospitalization. Title XX funds from the state's donated funds initiative went to a clinic in
an isolated public housing project to provide outpatient services to high risk young women.
The late 1970's and early 1980's were a period of consolidation and stabilization. The
state grant-in-aid funds for community mental health programs in this area had grown from
$1.7 million in FY75 to $3.1 million in FY82. In 1980-81, $1.7 million of federal funds was
awarded to establish a comprehensive CMHC in one catchment area. Its funds now come
through the mental health block grant to the state. The boards of two small voluntary
community agencies merged to insure fiscal stability and programmatic strength. The Title
XX program closed because it could not raise its matching funds. The community hospital felt
it wasn't adequately reimbursed for its services and began to cut back its programs.
In 1982 as part of a regional reorganization two sub-region offices were combined. That
office was responsible for a geographic area of over 1 million people and planned and
monitored services to the developmentally disabled in addition to the alcoholic and the
mentally ill. In May of 1983 a fiscal crisis in Illinois led to another re-organization. Twothirds of the staff in the regional and sub-regional offices were laid off. The city of Chicago,
served by twelve sub-regional offices in 1975, now has one office with a staff of eighteen to
monitor over 400 programs. The goals and priorities for this staff have yet to be clarified.
However, the scope of their work will certainly be narrower.
Use of the Model in Other Communities
Other sub-regions and regions had different priorities, depending on the needs of the
particular communities served. While all offices were responsible for the same major
functions -- program development, continuity of care, and monitoring -- each could develop
plans tailored to the needs of the service area.
For example, one sub-region identified high readmission rates as a major problem in a
racially and economically heterogeneous urban catchment area "where nomadic, socially
deprived individuals congregate" including a large number of former mental patients
(Witheridge, Dincin, and Appleby, 1982, p.9).

-309-

The sub-region staff worked to obtain a Hospital Improvement Program grant from
NIMH. The grant allowed the sub-region and voluntary agency staff to identify and study the
chronic recidivists in this community. The study led to the development of a successful
assertive outreach program (Witheridge, et al., p. 11).
One sub-region had to work with a white ethnic urban community which was one of the
last catchment areas in the state to develop an outpatient mental health program. In the
Illinois model the State mental health department has deliberately chosen not to operate
outpatient programs in the community, but rather to give grants to voluntary agencies or local
governments to provide services. One approach the State used to develop community services
was the "spin-off." When a new service was needed, State staff operated the program in the
community until a grantee could be found, then the grantee assumed control of the program.
In this case the sub-region staff worked closely with citizens' groups in the community to find
a group to take over the state-operated outpatient program (Smith and Beech, 1983). The subregion staff worked unsuccessfully with mental health advocates in the community to form an
independent, not-for-profit mental health agency. Eventually the staff, with input from
community advocates, decided that the most qualified agency was a sectarian social service
agency. They were given a grant, State staff operating the program either went to work for
the new agency or returned to other state jobs, and the program was successfully spun-off.
Some region offices have the additional role of working with local planning authorities.
These authorities are established in the counties and townships which passed referenda to raise
taxes for mental health services. They set priorities and distribute the local funds. These
communities, because of their stronger local funding base, are more able to plan for their own
needs than are the urban communities described above.
State legislation in 1980 (PA81-919) provided funds for demonstration projects to develop
a continuum of community-based supportive services for the chronic mentally ill. This state
initiative paralleled the federally-sponsored Community Support Program (Turner and
TenHoor, 1978) implemented in other states. Again, region and sub-region staff worked with
community agencies to plan and develop the demonstration project. The fact that the projects
begun are all different is an indication of the state's concern for individualized planning for its
varied communities.
Current Issues; Future Trends
A sharp decrease in state revenue income has led to a fiscal crisis in Illinois. The
legislature granted the Governor power to make 2% cuts in state agency operating budgets for
fiscal 1983 and more cuts are expected. Community mental health programs have been cut up
to 4%. The Governor has also stated that if the state's flat-rate income tax is not increased
for FY84 the General Assistance benefit of $144 per month will be eliminated. Such a cut,
combined with the recent increase in denials of SSI applications, will make it increasingly
difficult for the mentally ill to find adequate places to live in the community. As the federal
and state priority continues to be development of community support services for the chronic
mentally ill, Illinois may have lost the staff most qualified to develop these services and see
that they become effective parts of the mental health system.
The most pressing issue is providing adequate services in the face of decreasing
revenues. All states face similar problems. The block grant led to a net loss in federal
monies. State and local funds for outpatient and early intervention programs have decreased
(e.g. Schelkun and Cooper, 1982). Increasing unemployment has created an at-risk population
which is no longer eligible for third party reimbursement for services. Minority communities,
hard-hit by unemployment, frequently have fewer services.
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The model described here of region offices responsible for the development of
community programs, continuity of care, and accountability is both effective and flexible. It
can serve as a means of developing the continuity of care systems that match the needs of
clients, families and communities as Bachrach (1981) recommends. In an era when funding is
decreasing and private community mental health agencies may be competing with one another
and with state hospitals for scarce resources, some group of people must be responsible for the
development and monitoring of the the delivery system as a whole. The region office can
serve that function.
Now, when the federal government has withdrawn from a leadership role in mental
health services and adequate community support services for the mentally ill still need to be
developed, the states must fill in the gap. Using the model described here, State staff can
work to maximize the use of limited resources to provide services in all communities.
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ABSTRACT
The black family in Aerica has been subjected to social change
more than the family of any other racial or ethnic group. An
overview of its adjustment through successive crises of African
transplantation, slavery, sudden emancipation, migration to cities
and the vicissitudes of second-class citizenship help in
understanding the black family's contemporary forms. The black
family of Appalachia faces yet another problem - (INVISIBILITY)

Introduction
The black family in America has been subjected to social
change more than the family of any other racial or ethnic group.
An overview of its adjustments through successive crises of
African transplantation, slavery, sudden emancipation, migration
to cities and the vicissitudes of second-class citizenship help in
understanding the Black Family's contemporary forms.
The Black family of Appalachia faces yet another problem invisibility. Appalachian Blacks are a neglected minority within
a neglected minority. There are few studies on the existence and
plight of Blacks in the hills, mmtains and valleys of
Appalachia. The most basic kinds of socio-eonnamic and
demographic data on this segment of Appalachia's population is
difficult to obtain or is non-existant. Statistics and other
published materials are scarce and the media frequently ignores
the experiences of blacks in the Appalachian region.
A major purpose of this paper is to bring into the literature
vital information and data about Appalachia and its Black family.
A general historical perspective provides for understanding
the evolution of and the maintenance of the Black family in
Appalachia.
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Evolution of the Black Family in America:
While there is controversy over the patterns of social
interaction between the African family systems and the Black
family in America, nevertheless, some generalizations can be made.
It is generally acknowledged that the kinship group formed the
basis of African Family life and thai all other societal functions
were organized and controlled by it.
Radcliffe-Brown and Forde
indicate that African families were guided by certain
philosophical rinciples of htuanitarianism, mutual and cmumnity
participation. Herskovit's anthropological study of the
Dahoey Tribe located at the center of the slave trade area, found
that polygany was the favored form of marriage , yet the family
system was highly organized and characterized by unity, stability
and segurity. All evidence indicated that sexual behaviors
before and after marriage were under strict family and
community control.
Staples collaborates Herskovit's study by
noting,
Marriage was not just a matter between
individual's but was the concern of all family
meber...as a result of this, there was community
control of marriages, the dissolution of a
marriage was a severe action and only used as a
last resort-the authority pattern in the family
was patriarchial. This male control in the family
was based not so much on being dominant, but on
the reverence attached to his role as the
protector and provider of the family. Only if he
successfully carried aut these Noles would respect
and admiration be accorded him.
Blacks brought to America as slaves found their way of family
life destroyed. Blacks lost most ties and cultural bonds as a
result of the institution of slavery. The slaveowner put himself
in the position of sanctioning behavior on his plantation
including matters of religion, moral order, mate selection, sex,
marriage and family life. Under more favorable conditions (and
there w re some) slaves did in fact develop and maintain families
resembling that of the slave owner (parents and their offspring).
It should be noted, however, that this occurred in significant
numters only after 1835, then the gap between the number of male
and female slaves closed.
The slave mother remained the most stable and dependable
elements during the entire period of slavery. Due to pressures by
slave owners, the economic value of Black children and the slave
mothers' devotion to their children, the Black woman was generally
recognized as the head of the family group. As Dr. Frazier
pointed out, "she was the mistress of the cabin, to which the
husband or father often made only weekly visits;" under such
circumstances a maternal group took form and the tradi~icn of the
Negro woman's responsibility for her family took root.

Even among free Blacks, many of whan were mulatto and had
been given freedom with a sound econmoic base by their white
fathers, the mother or grandmother was placed in a special
position. Staples disagrees with the Frazier thesis regarding the
role of the father. He (Staples) argues that although the slave
father could not perform many of the functions traditional
assigned to fathers, there were other ways he would acquire
respect from his family.. .he could add to the family's meager
rations of8 food by hunting and fishing, or by making furniture for
the cabin.
There is also much evidence to dispel the notion that
marriage and family ties were loosely held by Black families.
After the Emancipation Proclamation, many slave marriages were
recorded in local county offices, and previously sold family
members were sought by their relatives throughout the South. Many
former slaves and those who became free through their cwn efforts,
ccpied the majority view of marriage - i.e., mother/father and
their offspring.
No greater rate of mobility occurred within any ethnic group
than among Blacks in the early 1900s. The "great migration" of
Blacks fran the South to the North which occurred just prior to,
during and immediately after World War I illustrates this point.
During the decade of the l00s, 450,000 Blacks migrated North and
West for the 1930 decades.
These families left the South for
many reasons, but most inportant were potential econoaic benefits,
avoidance of overt racial injustices, segregation and
discrimination. The three major paths of migration were: 1)
Florida, Georgia, the Carolinas, and East Alabama to Washington,
D.C., Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York City, Hartford and Boston;
2) West Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Tennessee to Chicago,
Detroit, Cleveland, Dayton, Columbus, and Buffalo; and 3)
Louisiana, Texas, and Oklahona to Los Angeles, San Diego, San
Francisco, Portland, and Seattle. Appalachia was partially on the
route of two major pathways North.
This nobility resulted in major problems for Black families.
Probably the most noted was the absence of strong sense of
community (kinship) and control exercised by rural omuunity
organizations, primarily the church, on family members in the more
inpersonal, urban settings of the North.
The Black family differs from other families because of its
unique history of slavery, mass migration, and extreme
discrimination. The history continues today in society's
maintenance of a caste-like system which tends to relegate Blacks
to inferior status and keeps them in the lower socio-econmic
classes in America.
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The Black Appalachian Family: An Historical Perspective
The number of blacks living in the Appalachian region is
approximately 7.1%of the total population. One out of every
fourteen Appalachians is Black; the majority of these live in
urban areas. As in other parts of the nation, Appalachian blacks
have a special history and a special heritage.
Fron the time of slavery, the region was in some ways a place
of relative refuge. The mountainous terrain provided same safety
to runaway slaves and many underground railroad stations were
known in Appalachia. Additionally, the terrain was unsuitable for
a plantation-oriented economy and many small, independent farmers
were opposed to planters who tried to control the economy and to
the insti
on of slavery which gave those planters their wealth
and power.
Some general renarks regarding the development of the
Appalachian region are in order. The East Coast of the United
States was primarily settled by Aristocrats fron Western Europe.
The western area was settled by the more rugged Europeans, i.e.,
Germans, Scotch, Irish, Hugenots, Quakers and poor Whites who had
served their tine as indentured servants. The Shenandoah Valley
became a familiar thoroughfare for a continuous movement of these
immigrants across the mountains of the Carolinas, Georgia,
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Alabama. These immigrants were best
described as poor and every man and woman believed heavily in the
"work ethic."
Economically speaking, the natural endowment of the west was
so different fron that of the East Coast that the former did not
attract the people who settled along the Eastern Seaboard. The
mountaineers were in the midst of natural meadows, steep hills,
narrow valleys and inexhaustible forests.
In the East, tobacco and corn were the stable commodities.
Cattle and hog raising became profitable west of the mountains,
while various other occupations which did not require so much
vacant land were more popular near the sea. While the settlers
near the East Coast sought the cheap labor which the slave
furnished, the mountaineers encouraged the influx of free men. It
is not strange then that there is no record of an eqjly
flourishing slave plantation west of the mountains.
Pockets of moumtaineers along the Shenandoah and Appalachian
mountain ranges resisted slavery. These Appalachians resisted in
a number of ways including participation in the underground
railroad and providing education to runaways. Runaways were among
the first blacks in Appalachia. The major routes of the
underground railroad by which more runaways secured their freedon
ran thoug2the mountains to Ohio, Illinois, Indiana and
Michigan.

Immediately after the emancipation of Blacks in 1863, many
moved to Appalachia to work on the railroad, in the coal mines and
later in industries. But the majority of the earlier runaways and
later freedmen did not find the terrain hospitable to the skills
learned on the plantation and continued on through Appalachia to
the Midwest.
Despite the opposition to slavery, institutional racism as we
currently know and understand it does exist in Appalachia. Many
of the attributes which characterized the early eastern seacoast
settlers, such as a privileged class and caste-like system factors
can be found in the region. This is especially true outside of
the urban areas of the region, such as Knoxville, Chattanooga,
Roanoke, and Pittsburgh. Yet these cities have had their racial
problems, too. Many counties in Appalachia have few or no Black
families primarily because at some time or another, Blacks met
with violence when they tried to move there.
Another key factor to the understanding of the condition of
Black Appalachian Families is migration and reverse migration. As
Brcwn/Hillery points out:
Appalachian people desiring higher levels of living
have had few alternatives to migration. The prospects
for commercial farming have not been bright, industry had
in the past been reluctant to settle in the region and
coal mining has proved to be an undependable and
inadequate source S employment even in the areas richest
in coal resources.
In addition, Southern Appalachia has been surrounded by more
highly developed economic areas with major cities and metropolitan
areas offering many jobs suitable for relatively unskilled and
inadequately educated persons. Consequently, for the past several
decades Appalachia has been the major labor pool for industrial
metropoli.
And, of course, the majority of migrants have been individuals
in their productive years (20-44). Pickard notes that in the
1960s, 38% of all net out-migration was concentrated in a single
five year age group (20-24) twice as high for males as females with
1/3rd of all Appalachian males leaving the region by 1970.
Ninety-five percent (95%) of all net %gration out of the region
consisted of people under 45 in 1970.
As a result of the above, the average age of the population
left behind increased, there was a drop in birth rates and the
replacement of young people slowed. Therefore, we find extended
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Black families, with many very young and old members and few
members in their most prodygtive years.
In an earlier study,
Black families in Appalachia were
described as facing triple jeopardy, i.e., poverty being Black and
being invisible. While the Black population is of significant
number, basic socio-economic and demographic data are difficult to
obtain or is non-existant. Statistical data and published
materials are scarce and the media frequently ignores the
experience of Black Appalachians. While this kind of data is more
readily available on Blacks in other parts of the country, what is
available on Black Appalachian tends to be clouded in too many
myths and too little reality. Blacks generally appear to be
virtually invisible in Appalachia. In nost instances, when
Appalachia is cmpared with the rest of America, it lags behind,
and when Blacks are cotpared to White Appalachians, they lag
behind.
The following demographic data describes black Southern
Appalachian families as recorded in 1980 census data.

TSble I
Total

Black
I

Other

1,831,790
79.90%

449,033
19.59

11,687
.51%

2,292,510

Georgia

871,652
92.78%

63,906
6.80%

3,885
.42%

939,443

Mississippi

340,534
71.36

130,962
27.44%

5,695
1.20%

477,191

1,094,541

117,597

10,877

1,223,015

89.50%

9.62%

.88%

654,335
82.63%

133,281
16.83%

4,279
.54%

791,895

1,547,780
92.16%

112,164
6.68%

19,470
1.16%

1,679,414

533,902
97.09%

14,302
2.60%

1,705
.31%

549,909

6,874,534
86.44%

1,021,245
12.84%

57,598
.72%

7,953,377

White
Alaba

North Carolina
Scuth Carolina
Tennessee
Virginia
T0T7RL

-317-

a

The Southern Appalachian region consists of portions of seven
states: Virginia, Tennessee, The Carolinas, Georgia, Alabama, and
Mississippi: Fourteen southwest Virginia counties, thirty east
Tennessee counties, twenty-nine Western North Carolina Counties,
six Western South Carolina counties, thirty-six North Georgia
counties, thirty North Alabama counties and twenty Northeast
Mississippi counties. Major cities included are Roanoke, Virginia,
Knoxville, Tennessee, Asheville and Charlotte, North Carolina,
Greenville, South Carolina, Chattanooga, Tennessee and Birningham,
Alabama.
There are substantial numrbers of black middle class families
in and around South Appalachian Cities, i.e., Roanoke, Knoxville,
Asheville, Charlotte, Greenville, Chattanooga and Birmingham. In
many ways these cities do not identify with Appalachia except in
political and funding consideration - Appalachian Regional
Ccniission - (see Tables II and III), in fact, residents in
surrounding counties reject the lifestyles of the city.

Large m=et

Table II

litan Populatiaon

Southern Appalachia by Pace

Metropolitan
Counties or
metrpolitan

White

Black

Other Pop.

Total

Charlotte
N.C.

182,647
74.95%

59,403
24.38%

1,633
.67%

243,683

Greenville
S.C.

235,210
81.69%

50,842
17.66%

1,861
.65%

287,913

Spartanburg
S.C.

159,872
79.20%

40,870
20.25%

1,119
.55%

201,861

Hamilton County
City ofc htt
TN

229,976

55,840

4,047

289,863

79.34%

19.26%

1.4%

Knox County
City of Knxville
TN

288,675

28,006

4,986

89.74%

8.71%

1.55%

234,961
17.47%

13,646
1.01%

Cities

TOTAL

1,096,380
81.52%
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321,667

1,344,987

Table In

States

SouternApplacianReg cn
White

th Metrpolitan Area Cities
Other
Black

Total

Nurth
Carolina

911,894
93.62%

52,902
5.43%

9,244
.95%

974,040

South
Carolina

259,253
85.81%

41,569
13.76%

1,299
.43%

302,121

Tennessee

1,029,129
96.37%

28,318
2.65%

10,437
.98%

1,067,884

TOL

2,200,276
93.87%

122,789
5.23%

20,980
.90%

2,344,045

Socio-Econamic Characteristics of Black Families:
Nearly twice as many Blacks as Whites live on incomes below
the poverty level. Of Appalachians with low educational level
(defined as lack of high school diploma) there is little difference
between Blacks and Whites with more Whites having high school
diplomas. Black employment rates outnumber White uneployment
rates by at least 50%; with Black teenagers rate having nearly 70%
more unemployment than White teenagers. This is particularly
interesting finding since there is little difference in the number
of Whites and Blacks who have high school diplomas.
In terms of housing, the data is more revealing. Housing in
Appalachian is generally smaller and more cheaply onstructed than
housing in other areas of the country. Additionally, the houses
are nore crowded in this area of the country than one would expect.
However, in terms of basic amenities including such important
elements as central heat and hot water, three tines as many Black
Appalachian families live without central heat and hot water as do
White Appalachians. This data suggests that Black Appalachians are
worse off than Whites in terns of these social indicators. Yet,
this region continues to be one considered as a land of poor White
hillbillies solely with White problems and without the color
problems that plague the rest of America. For instance, in the
southern Appalachian region which lies between Kncoville, Tennessee
and Roanoke, Virginia, apprcsimately 250 miles east along the
Appalachian range, there is only one Black dentist, one medical
doctor, one Black with a terminal college degree, five Black
registered nurses, and sixty-six Black teachers. There are few
Blacks who are considered middle incme in this region.
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Family Stability:
Family stability is measured in American Society by the extent
to which families are able to meet the needs of their members and
the demands made on them by outside social systems.
Utilizing Otto's framework for determining gmily stability,
the following five attributes can be identified:
A.
A concern for family unity, loyalty, and inter-family
cooperation.
B.
An ability for self-help and the ability to accept help
when appropriate.
C.
An ability to perform family roles flexibly.
D. An ability to establish and maintain growth-producing
relationships - within and without the family.
E. The ability to provide for the physical, emotional and
spiritual needs of a family.
These attributes are not limited to Black Appalachian
families. These can be found among Black families in other parts
of America as well as in White families. What is different,
however, is the way in which these attributes are manifested in an
Appalachian setting - a minority within a minority.
A Concern for Family Unity, Loyalty, and Inter-family Cooperation:
The literature strongly supports the idea that the Appalachian
family (both Black and White) has stronger kinship ties than
families in other parts of the coun y, including middle and
upper-class families. In Gazaway's
study of East Kentucky
families, her quote of an Appalachian mother illustrates this point
dramatically. "My children will never live any farther from me
than I can spit." While a large number of Black Appalachian young
adults have left the area, many their children are being reared by
family members left behind; they make frequent visits back to the
area and are also joijing in the reverse migration trend.
Further, as Hill
reports, when the census reports are
reviewed we find more Black families with no children of their own
under 18 at hame. Black families are more likely to take in other
young related members; Black families headed by females have an
even greater tendency to absorb other related children; Black
families tend to take in elderly family menbers, but not
significantly more so than White families. More absorption of
family units has occurred within Black families until very
recently. High interest rates caused a slump in new housing which
resulted in more competition for available rentals, causing rents
to skyrocket. As a result, many families, both White and Black, in
and outside Appalachia, are absorbing families more than ever
before.
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Availability for Self-Help and the Ability to Accept Help When
Appropriate:
Appalachians are known Nr their rugged individualim.
reveal Appalachians have a strong
Various sociological studies
work orientation V tend not to accept help except as a last
resort. Gazaway's study on Eastern Kentucky contradicts this
data in one respect. She found that poor White Appalachians lived
to get on "the draw" - i.e., any income maintenance program. My
social services experiences in the region reveal many Appalachians
refused social services as they view professional helpers as
intruders. More importantly, they feel they can resolve their own
problem. They go to their families for help.
Appalachian families possess a strong work orientation.
Hill 2 lack
notes that this strength is characteristic of most Black
families. Contrary to popular belief, Black families place a
strong emphasis on work and anbition. Note: Black poor families
are more likely to work than White poor families - 3/5ths of the
Black poor work compared to 1/2 of the White poor. Despite this
statistic, the economic plight of the Appalachian Black family is
dismal. They tend to work at the most menial jobs earning the
lowest wage.
Appropriate use of social and welfare services is limited by
Black/White Appalachian families alike. This appears to be
culturally determined. There is a general rejection of outside
intervention into the family by those other than close family
members or local extended groups. Also, outside use of societal
resource systems is considered a weakness and used only as a last
resort.
Ability to Perform Family Roles Flexibly:
Appalachian family menters (both Black and White) have
difficulty performing various family roles. Most Appalachian
families are traditional in nature - sex roles and functions of
members are clearly defined. However, due to economic constraints,
Black Appalachian families lean in the direction of performing
various roles. For example, the substantial number of Black
working wives has caused older siblings to act as "parents" and
many Black youngsters have entered the job market (though without
much luck).
Ability to Establish and Maintain Grcwth-producing Relationships
Within and Without the Family:
Black Appalachian families have a strong achievement
orientation although in same in2ances, it is unrealistic. In a
longitudinal study of Southwork
- White Appalachian children
tended to have lower achievement orientation campared with the rest
of White America - for example, girls choose traditional female
occupations with a very high number choosing marriage. Blacks,
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however, tended to choose high occupations while avenues to these
contain may barriers. These aspirations generated in the family
then, not in the Appalachian culture.
As a result of not being able to reach goals we note
frustration emerging in antisocial and other dysfunctional
behaviors, this being no different form the Black majority group.
Ability to Provide for the Physical, Emotional and Spiritual Needs
of a Family:
Religion in Appalachia, no matter the faith, plays a
significant roles in the lives of Appalachians, both White and
Black. Blacks have been adept as using religion as a mechaniff for
survival and advancement throughout their history in America.
Yet the role of religion in Appalachia appeag to be used less for
native Appalachian
survival and advancement. In a recent study
Black families placed heavy .erphasis on the church as a community
organization that sought cmmunity change. A review of the Black
palachia suggest the opposite.
churches in
Frazier
noted - it was through the Negro Church, one of
the most independent institutions in the Black commuity, that
Blacks learned to use religion as a survival mechanism. Black
ministers frequently used their sermons to transmit coded messages
to the congregation. Negro spirituals were often used for similar
purposes, particularly in assisting runaway slaves.
However, the Black church in Appalachia tends to be
conservative and most resistive to change. The church's primary
membership is composed by older and very young persons. Its
missionary role revolves around "lost souls" and refuses to see
justice, adequate housing, equal opportunity for jobs, health, and
social services as necessary prerequisites to finding lost souls.
This attitude is quite different from Blacks in other areas of the
country. The most ambitions - in the age range of 22-45 - tended
to migrate out of the region and those who remained cbtMn anbition
It
for their children, but not necessarily for themselves.
would appear from Black's involvement and control of its religious
institutions, efforts could be generated to further enhance their
abilities to provide for the physical, emotional and spiritual
needs of family members.
The future of the Black family in Appalachia is integrally
tied to the economics of the region, the political sophistication
of Black Appalachians and a change in its fatalistic view of the
world.
Eccnumic viability is a major factor which enables a family to
meet the needs of its family members as well as societal
expectations. Economic growth of the region has and still is
occurring. A consequence, among others, has been the influx of
Blacks from other areas of the country who have brought the plight
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of native Black Appalachia to the attention of community
decision-makers. Better paying jobs and promotions are slowly
becoming available to Native Black Appalachia. If the econcmics of
the region continues to expand, Blacks will benefit if they
continue to exert constant pressure for higher paying jobs.
Black political participation must emerge and take shape in
the region. Blacks must identify appropriate Black/White potential
officeholders and actively engage in the political process. Due to
their small percentage of the population in semi-rural and rural
areas, Blacks have tended not to participate in major political
parties or even vote, thinking their participation will not make a
difference. This lack of political sophistication appears to be
tied to the fatalistic outlook held by most Appalachians. Black
families tend to accept their plight as fate, resist assistance to
change their environment leaving their lives in the hands of the
Lord.
It is true sae progress has been made re-thinking this
fatalistic view of life. Nonetheless, only a few groups and
organizations within the Black Camiuty are atteupting to reverse
the trend. Perhaps this is why so many Appalachians feel they are
entrapped.
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ABSTRACT
This article focuses on the range of choices and factors affecting state
level decision making about how human services are to be delivered. In
light of the dual thrusts of decentralization and privatization, the
viability of public-private partnerships through contracting for services
is explored. Among the significant factors affecting decisions about alternative forms of service delivery are: political and fiscal preferences; the
strength of organized labor; the role and availability of the private service sector and history with purchase of service. The advantages and disadvantages attributed to a contracting model for delivering services are
unlikely to be argued from an empirical base. Rather, the relative influence
of various actors, ideologies and practices will affect states' decisions
about the scope and range of contracting and the degree to which there will
be reliance on the private sector.

With the passage of the Ominbus Reconciliation Act of 1981 (P.L. 95-35),
states and localities now have substantially increased authority and flexibility
to design their human service programs. Among the choices facing states is the
determination of how and to whom services will be delivered, methods of financing
services in light of decreased federal dollars, and the extent to which publicprivate partnerships in service delivery can and should be fostered. Although
the option to select among alternative service delivery arrangements is not new,
such issues have, heretofore, most frequently been debated at the federal level.
This paper explores some of the relevant issues and factors affecting state
decision making about strategies for delivering services, with particular attention to the viability of a contracting model between public and private organizations.
For this discussion, public agencies are defined as governmental, tax
supported agencies whose powers and duties are determined by statute and
administrative regulation.
Such agencies include state and local welfare
departments, youth and family service agencies, departments of mental health
and retardation, health departments, and other units of government often now
administered through an "umbrella" state human services agency and staffed
largely by civil service employees.

Private organizations are either for-profit or not-for-profit.
Those
of concern in this paper provide human services as a primary function under
the direction of a board of directors and are financed through profits, endowments, fees, direct or United Way contributions, and, to varying degrees, third
party payments, and government contracts and grants.
Non-profit organizations
include affiliates
of the Family Service Association of America and sectarian
agencies such as Catholic Charities.
Private for-profit organizations follow
the customary corporate or other proprietary provisions and are becoming increasingly invested in human services.
Activity areas include the nursing
home, general hospital, day care center,
and homemaker service provider.
There are several exchange routes between the public and private sectors.
In this paper we will focus on purchase of services which is one sub-heading
of a larger spectrum of arrangements pertaining to the transmission of public
funds to private bodies.
More precisely, purchase of service (POS) refers to
a set of organized procedures to bring public and private entities into
partnership for the acquisition of goods or services in the public interest.
Typically, a contract mechanism is used to actuate this arrangement between
two organizations.
Changing Policy Directions
The issue of choice about the manner in which services are delivered and
by whom (public or private) occurs within the context of evolving relationships
between the federal and state and local governments. President Reagan's
"New Federalism" has as its thrust the decentralization of decision making and
the dimunition of the federal government's role in determining the allocation
and use of funds at the state and local level. The proposition is that by
permitting states to choose their methods of delivering services, services can
be planned and implemented in a way that meets specific state circumstances and
needs.
The Reagan initiatives are, however, evolutionary rather than revolutionary.
Revenue sharing, for example, was created during the Nixon Administration to
give localities broader discretion in speding federal funds than had previously
characterized federal social service programs.
In a 10 year period beginning
in 1972, $64.8 billion has been channeled to help pay for goods and services
(Pear, 1982).
What is different under the Reagan plan is the planned withdrawal of federal agencies from such fields as welfare, the reduction or
elimination of regulations governing the nature of human service programs,
and decreased federal responsibility for funding such programs,
These changes
significantly affect the magnitude of decisions to be debated at the state
and local level.
There is, however, only a limited menu from which states can select in
deciding on a service delivery strategy. States may elect to directly deliver
services under public auspices, purchase services from private sources, rely
on private sector initiatives, or combine direct and private delivery.
Ultimately, the selection of a service delivery plan will reflect the particular political
context affecting a state's
decision making process, and the
perceived feasibility of one approach over the others in terms of the organizational and fiscal resources available. Although ideologies of the left and
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right occasionally bear witness to some cause most public policy decisions
are made on a more pragmatic basis. The search is less for the ultimate
truth than for the decision which will help the elected official the most
and cost the least.
Decisions regarding methods of service delivery are very much influenced
by and interrelated with changing federal policy directions, including the
priority placed upon the use of the private marketplace and the reduced level
of government funding available for human services. This Administration would
like to see philanthropic and voluntary organizations assume major responsibility
for social welfare, an occurence most consider unlikely. For example, the
Independent Sector, a coalition of national voluntary organizations, corporations
and foundations, cautions that the Administration has "unrealistic expectations
for what private philanthropy can do "(Schmidt, 1982). To the extent possible,
state governments are compensating, at least in part, for some of the reduced
federal dollars, but states are experiencing their own, often severe, financial
problems.
A likely scenario is a continued public role (federal, state and
local) in financing services, with contracts and grants serving as the major
mechanism for the transfer of government funds to private organizations.
Private
organizations, in turn, will be expected to meet, in cash or kind, a proportion
of the administrative and operating social welfare costs.
The current emphasis on finding alternatives to purely public systems of
human services is consistent with the philosophy expounded by Drucker and Savas
who believe that virtually all governmental program functions should be "reprivatized" through delegating or contracting them out to autonomous private
or quasi-private institutions (Drucker, 1968: Savas, 1982). Partnerships between
the public and private sectors have also been stressed. President Reagan has
appointed a President's Task Force on Private Sector Initiatives to help meet
the social and economic needs of communities. According to Chairman C. William
Verity, Jr., local public-private partnerships will be encouraged to identify
important community needs, followed by a marshalling of human and financial
resources from the public and private sectors to meet those needs (Schmidt, 1982).
Fiscally, as well as philosophically, the use of purchase of service arrangements
fits
with recent alterations in government roles and priorities
and provides an
important option for states in patterning their service delivery systems.

Service Delivery Options
The extent to which state and local governments or private bodies should
be reponsible for human services delivery has varied within the larger
philosophical and political
shifts affecting American domestic policy.
Traditionally, the private sector has been the provider of choice, if not
always in practice, in large part due to the residual nature of government
services and the laissez-faire philosophy which has dominated government's
approach to human services policies and practice.
Long-standing perceptions
that the public agency is a "weak" service provider have encouraged the
formation of a "partnership" with the "more competent" private sector. The
use of purchase of service arrangements has also been affected by general social
forces which vary over time, including decentralization, subsidiarity, the growth
of government and associated costs, public employee unions, legthargy and
tradition, conflict of interest, and increased concern about productivity and
accountability.
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Wedel suggests the evolving practice of purchase of service has not relied
upon an organized body of theory, but has instead followed normative guidelines (Wedel, 1974).
As such, the availability of alternatives from which
units of government can select how services are to be delivered rests on
a series of interrelated propositions about the inadequacies of public
services and perceived improvements needed in human services policies and
programs.
The strength of these propositions will vary depending upon state
experiences, inter-organizational dynamics, and political preference. The
degree of influence and power wielded by the private sector will also affect
state decision making about service delivery mechanisms.
A number of factors have, in combination, encouraged states to opt for
purchase of service with for-profit and voluntary providers. Not all of these
factors are based on rational, considered processes, but financial considerations
are likely to be a powerful influence favoring POS (Tatara and Pettiford, 198h}.
Under the 1967 Amendment to the Social Security Act, public welfare agencies were
authorized to receive 75 percent federal reimbursement for service purchased
from private agencies, with the private sector often supplying the matching
25 percent. As a result, the scope of social service contracting at the State
level grew enormeusly, with estimates that over 50 percent of all public
services are now purchased (Pacific Consultants, 1979).
With the elimination
of many of the federal regulations governing purchase of service contracting,
states may now require that private agencies provide even a higher percent of
the match.
This "contribution" on the part of private agencies can be a powerful inducement to states to encourage the use of purchase source of purchase
of service arrangements.
Likewise, relying on the private sector as a primary
source of service meets public demands to limit the size of government bureaucracies and their expenditures. With the introduction of new treatment concepts,
the private sector has also been seen as more capable of responding to problems
of deinstitutionalization, normalization, and mainstreaming. And of course,
as always, interest group politics continues to operate.
The delegation of responsibilities and functions to the private sector
does, however, poses anew a series of political questions regarding the relationship between government and non-public systems. These issues are now being
debated in state capitols and the resolutions achieved will determine the extent
to which purchase of service maintains or increases its
status as a primary
method of service delivery. Such questions include:
-In what proportion should
public and private agencies have responsibility
for providing services?
-What systems of accountability can be instituted to insure the proper use
of public funds and the targeting of services to specific client populations?
-What method of service delivery is most cost effective?
-What sector can more effectively and efficiently deliver services?
,What role do public employee unions play in influencing a continued public
sector role?
-Do the advantages of contracting outweigh the liabilities of these
arrangements?
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Factors Influencing State Decision Making
Despite its long standing history, purchase of service continues to
stimulate debate. Theoretical, empirical and pragmatic themes and questions
about the efficacy and efficiency of P0S continued to be posed, frequently
couched in contrasting beliefs about the general role of government and its
specific responsibilities. To a lesser degree, concern also arises about
the impact of contracting on the voluntary, not-for-profit sector; here,
too, varying points of view are reflected. Fear of, and occasionally
antagonism to the private, for-profit sector are also at issue. Contrariwise there is another view which views the total organized not-for-profit
sector, public and private as equally incompetent. To varying degrees,
these historical issues regarding the use of P0S are stimulating discussion
in state legislatures and administrative agencies as decisions are made about
the best means to deliver services.
For the most part, both advocates and opponents of purchase of service
tend to be speculative, seldom arguing from an empirical base. Theory is tenuous. An advantage to one observer may be a disadvantage to another. The debate
about contracting centers on such themes as efficiency and effectiveness of
alternative service delivery approaches, accountability, client impact, cost,
appropriate auspices, standards and professionalism. Diagram I outlines some
of the frequently identified arguments for and against contracting. It should
be noted that, although the advantage seem to numerically outweigh the disadvantages, the cogency of each argument will vary. The numbers are not
relevant.
Some of the advantages and disadvantages are empirical, others are ideological.
Even some of the more pragmatic criteria
can be debated on value
based terms. For example, most studies come roughly to the same conclusion:
it is generally more efficient and productive for government to purchase goods
and services than to provide them on its own.
Thus, from the perspective of
state legislators and public administrators, the logical decision in a majority
of cases would be to purchase. Realities, however, often dictate otherwise.
In some jurisdictions, status, size of office, and even the quality of
furnishings for senior officials are tied directly to the number of employees
supervised.
Fewer employees could mean a smaller office, poorer furniture and
vinyl tile rather than carpeting. For elected officials, a reduction in
patronage is anticipated. Public employee unions fear loss of positions and
members. Such unions may be major financial contributors to state legislative
campaigns as well as some legislators' most loyal volunteers.
Similarly, they
or their family members may be politically active in local government.
Or,
vendors may be in short supply or may not desire a government contract.
Space does not permit an in-depth discussion of all of the arguments which
may enter the equation as to whether states and localities will purchase services
(Capoccia, 1978).
Instead, this discussion is limited to some of the more significant factors currently, or likely, to affect state and local decisions
about the manner in which human services will be delivered.
Cash/Vouchers. Conspicuously absent from most of the continuing arguments
posed about alternative service delivery mechanisms is the use of vouchers as a
responsible option to provide consumers the financial resources to buy needed
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services on the open market. (In recent decades each Federal administration
has explored the voucher philosophy. Since these initiatives are seldom
implemented voucher alternatives are seldom integrated into mainstream
debates about purchase of services). Vouchers can take the form of a coupon,
chip, or credit to be reimbursed for consumer expenditures.
Tuition tax
credits and deductions can also be applied.
These devices are all
instrumentalities to make government assistance individual centered rather than
institutionally based, thus effectively by passing the major human service
agencies as required "brokers." An appeal of this individually oriented form
of purchase of service is that it vastly reduces administrative and operating
expenditures, while optimizing "freedom of choice" for clients.
Experience with the use of vouchers is limited and observations are not
always grounded in empirical investigations. An attributed advantage of vouchers
is that they allow the application of private market remedies to serve public
policy objectives. They may have a beneficial impact on cost, efficiency and
economy, widen choice and diversity, and enhance accountability to the consumer.
On the other hand, drawbacks to voucher schemes include the limitation on
consumers' ability to make informed judgements, the reliance on marketplace
mechanisms in an environment of incomplete information, and the abdication of
reliance on professionalism and expert knowledge.
To date, most of the experience with vouchers has been in the field of
education, although third party reimbursement in the health industry has many
voucher characteristics.
Their enlarged use could stimulate the certification
of providers to maintain quality control, in which public and private agencies
could compete.
Voucher systems could probably not be easily applied to service
areas in which a regulatory/supervisory public justice function in involved,
such as child protective services, corrections and police protection.
In these
areas, the services delivered claim public uniqueness and could not be easily
left
to consumer choice.
Decentralization. The Federalist spirit
has abounded throughout our nation's
history, taking many forms.
More recently, President Johnson sometimes bypassed
state governments, going directly to local governments with funding and service
delivery responsibility. In addition, in 1966 block health grants to states
were enacted. Under the "Great Society", federal funds were allocated to
neighborhood groups which in turn organized themselves to influence governmental decision making.
Smith claims that this strategy was partly a response
to the societal conditions of the time, including a pervasive feeling of
estrangement from the powerful institutions of society and deep historic
tensions concerning race relations.
In his view, "the participatory contracts
are especially interesting because they illustrate
in extreme form the tendencies
implicit in the 'diffusion of sovereignty', the dispersion of power, the blurring
of the lines of authority, the breakdown of the public-private distinctions"
(Smith, 1971).
President Nixon explored decentralization by strengthening federal regional
offices and giving state and local governments more authority.
Revenue sharing
was enacted.
To President Reagan, the federal government was created by the
states.
Decision making, he believes, should occur at the local level where
He also talks about reinvigorating
officials best know local needs (Pear, 1982).
the private sector. Volunteerism has returned in spirit, if not in fact.
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Whatever the form for implementing a decentralized structure, the net
result of the combined rhetoric and actions by many presidents an4 echoed by
many governors is to reinforce pluralism and alternative structural models.
Revenue sharing and block grant programs have generally been received with
enthusiasm; governors and mayors welcome the reduced red tape and orders from
Washington.
Discontent at the state and local level with this structural mode
is aimed at the diminished federal dollars, not the concept. Purchase of
service is ideologically consistent with these preferences for decentralized
local decision making and has the added advantage of utilizing the expertise
of the local private sector.
Government Performance. Opinion polls, the source of much wisdom and
political action, document the increasing disenchantment of Americans with
their government.
The Harris Poll "Index of Alienation" asked a sample
population to respond to the statement: "The people running the country don't
really care what happens to you."
In 1966, 29 percent agreed with this statement, but by 1980 those in agreement reached 58 percent.
The comparable item
from the Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, found trend
figures of 19 percent in 1964 and 60 percent in 1980 (Time, Feb. 23, 1981).
Another Harris poll (1973) found that the majority of respondents viewed public
employees as the "least productive in the country " (Serrin, W., 1981).
These
negative opinions about the performance of governmental agencies has stimulated
elected and administrative officials to search for alternatives.
The options
may be limited to finding ways to improve government performance or to circumvent the use of public agencies by enlarging the role of the private sector.
Here, again, purchase of service enters the equation as a viable means of
reducing government's role.
Government Size. Another matter of continuing presence at the federal,
state and local level is the constant lament about the size and growth of
government.
Typically, it is more complicated than promulgated. In respect
to absolute numbers of civilian employees, the federal government has remained remarkably stable for about twenty years.
The growth has been in
state and local government; consequently, attention to decreasing the size
of public bureaucracies is now increasingly directed to state capitols. In
regard to expenditures, government at all levels has grown, generally in
excess of inflation and increases in the Gross National Product.
Whatever the facts or complications, the size of government is a serious
target for many significant segments of our society. The sixty year boom in
public employment may have finally gtabilized (The Economist, November 22, 19751.
Options are more legitimated. To the extent that public opinion continues to
favor a decrease in the size of public bureaucracies, pressure will be exerted
on elected and appointed officials to explore alternative ways of producing
goods and services.
Organized Labor.
The position of public employee unions is unequivocal.
They oppose contracting public services and are mounting increasingly strident
objections to such practices. Picketing of private contractors is not uncommon.
Despite the size and importance of public employee unions, it seems unlikely
that the AFL-CIO, for one, will take an aggressive continuing organizational
stance against public purchase of services.
Many of their members belong to
unions affiliated
with private sector organizations receiving these same contracts.
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Also, in many cases the public employees loosing their positions are hired
by private organizations, often joining another union. In additionj most
human service employees, in private or public organizations, are not members
of organized labor. Thus the positions assumed by both advocates and opponents
of contracting are sometimes contrary to their own self-interest.
Last, but
perhaps most important, many of the major critics of public services are themselves members of organized labor.
The opposition of public employee unions, tempered as it is by the needs
of members to secure jobs in contracted programs, may not always be a critical
variable in states' decision making about methods of service delivery. The
cogency of their arguments will, of course, vary with the strength of unionism
in a particular locale and the extent to which purchasing services is perceived
as hurting or helping union members. The realistic concern with maintaining
or securing employment for union members in a time of 10 plus percent national
unemployment is likely to affect the position assumed by unions,
Conflict of Interest. Conflict of interest is an increasing concern. Such
conflict may mean a loss in quality to the consuer, as well as increased costs.
Conflict of interest may occur when the organizations responsible for providing
services also monitor, evaluate and account for such services as is often the
case for many large state agencies. The organizations responsible for the
allocation of funds also may be in a conflict of interest position when the
alternative is to continue funding their own operations or disperse funds to
non-public service providers.
Self-monitoring attributes are inherently limited
by self-interest, and decisions may not be achieved on objective criteria.
Americans distrust private monopolies, and public monopolies are no less sacred
as they suffer the same structural faults. But even more than trust; monitoring
of public organizations is ridden by conflict of interest.
The editor of the distinguished British journal, The Economist, suggests
"...
it has become increasingly clear the ownership of means of production is
no longer a source of political and economic power and may indeed now be a
source of political or economic powerlessness"
(The Economist, Nov. 22, 1975).
The editor concludes that governments' may have limited day-to-day control
over themselves. Direct control over employees can only be secured by passing
down instructions and this doesn't work when people resent being regarded as
subordinates. The Economist notes, in contrast, that it is relatively easy to
take action against subcontractors, taxpayers, or other outsiders by cutting
off orders or raising charges (The Economist, 1975). Public organizations
responsible for planning, budgeting, staffing, programming and evaluation, when
viable competition is lacking, are highly vulnerable to conflict of interest
charges, as in all vertical organizations. A logical means of addressing this
issue is to create a service delivery structure more amenable to control and
accountability.
Procurement and Assistance Programs. A continuing force at the federal
level has been presidentially-promulgated policy since 1955, through the Office
of Management and Budget, that the government rely on private sector contractors
to provide goods and services needed to act on the public's behalf cComptroller
General, 1981).
Basically, the position as later postulated in Circular A-76
has several components:
-Agencies may use military personnel, civilian employees, and contract
services to perform Federal activities;
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-Activities whereby 10 percent or more in personal savings can be
identified should be contracted; and
*Exceptions are selected with discretion. Examples are core functions of
government such as national defense, program priority selection and
controlling monetary transactions.
It is noteworthy that Congress has not overruled the policy although it
could do it by legislative or political
action.
In 1980 the Office of Management and Budget estimated that about 14 percent of all Federal employees were
still providing services that could,be contracted out under the terms of this
policy. This pro-contracting stance serves as a model for states, and at least
to some degree is followed. The message from Washington seems to be that purchasing services is a more desirable alternative, and when this option is
present, it should be pursued.
Shepsley uses as a criterion for public operation those matters in which
there is an "insufficient supply of public gooods and externalities."
in such
instances, there would be a "... prima facie case for the consideration of public
provision or regulation " Shepsley, K.W., 1980).
As examples, he uses national
highways, interstate highways and lighthouses. By inference, the use of private
sources to provide goods and services is justified in all instances when such
external alternatives are available.
Cost Data.
Several findings seam to occur consistently in research on
governmental functioning; among them, cost data are inadequate and understated
and it is usually found to be less expensive to contract out than to operate
services directly.
A typical example of inadequate information Is shown in a
1978 study by Savas and Associates of 315- municipal refuse collection systems.
Savas found that accounting costs varied, many costs were never included in the
refuse budget and, in conclusion, the actual costs
could not be calculated
(Saves, E.S., Stevens, B.J., Berenyi, E.B., 1978).
In respect to costs, the Department of Defense, which conducted over 300
comparison.studies using the 10 percent personnel savings factor noted above,
found in about 60 percent of the studies activities that it was more economical
to convert in-housi activities to contracts (Comptroller General, 19811.
Reprivatization.
Given the many influences, theory building and language
innovation is often stimulated,
Peter-Drucker a noted economist filled
the
gap in 1968 with his development of the theory of "reprivatization" now more
often called privatization. He described the esteem attributed to government
in the developed countties from the 1890s to 19 6 0s. But international disenchantment set in, Drucker believes.
Government is big, not strong; it is
flabby and fat; costs a great deal but achieves little. He suggests that
governments have lost control of their bureaucracies.
"It
can do only two
things well.
It can wage war,
It can inflate the economy " (Drucker, 1968, p. 217).
Drucker traces the etiology of this change in perception of government.
Too much was expected and disillusionment set in.
It was believed that governmental redistribution of wealth would solve economic problems that are noted
in inadequate productivity.
Another illusion was that by giving a task to
government "... conflict of decisions would be made to go away"
(Drucker, p. 215).
Government would be rational and unselfish and economic self interest would
disappear.
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To Drucker, government should be making the basic decisions. To govern
effectively, political energies need to be focused and issues identified and
dramatized. Fundamental choices must be clarified. But governing and doing
may be incompatible. Drucker urges decentralized functions, separating doing
from governing. Doing should be accomplished by non-governmental institutions
who would perform the operations. Government would serve as society's resource
for determining major objectives, and be a "conductor" of social diversity.
This need not mean "return to private ownership"
(Drucker, p. 234).
In Drucker's conception, government would be the logical body to make
choices about what services are to be delivered, who can best provide them, and
to whom they should be targeted. But government would not be the service
delivery source. Such functions would be left to private, autonomous institutions either of a for-profit or on occasion, the not-for-profit nature.
Drucker sees a society which allows institutions to do what they are best
equipped to do, including governing by government.
Future Directions
It is highly unlikely that state and local decisions about which needs are
most important, how services can best be delivered, and under whose auspices,
will be made as the result of a straight-forward need analysis and empirical
analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of purchase of service as contrasted
with direct public delivery. Forecasting in this political environment is
replete with complexities. Many of the factors influencing decision making
about service delivery options have already been listed and some of the forces
at work described.
The major pressures to purchase include stimuli which will not easily
subside. It is usually less expensive and allows for more effective quality
control. Purchase is compatible with the desire to decentralize, which feeds
on large scale and increasing public discontent with governmental functioning
and performance and hostility to the bureaucracy. It reduces the public
monopolistic vertical organizational structure and is reinforced by the periodic
thrusts to "reprivatize" public functions. Changes in the 1981 Federal tax
laws are also favorable to selected new relations between governments and the
private sector. And each successful implementation facilitates additional
exchanges.
Those forces opposing the use of the private market, through purchase of
service, are also very powerful. Within the human services, recent dramatic
reductions in available federal and state dollars mean curtailment of some
services. It may be easier to reduce contracted programs than to decrease
governmental operations. Public service employee unions fear loss of members
and, depending on their strength, may engage in vigorous counter attack. Their
opposition is reinforced by the way Federal and some state and local governments
managed their reductions in force in 1981 and 1982. It was often inept,
extraordinarily complex, created organizational choas and so disrupted morale
that few senior bureaucrats want an early replay.
Also in opposition to purchase of service are concerned people in significant
positions in and out of government who hold strongly held ideological positions
about the proper role of government.
The gradual transfer of selected governmental
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operating programs
standing beliefs.
self interest.

to the private sector is not compatible with their longThese matters reflect honest matters of judgement, not

Perhaps most important in determining how states' human services will
be structured and delivered are factors of inertia, caution and self-interest.
These factors have long restrained major change in government and there is
no reason to believe that they are less powerful today.
Our governments are
not designed to accomodate to rapid social change or to deal effectively with
entrenched opposition. Despite the increased decision making powers of the
states within the human services realm, tradition and long standing practices
may play a particularly powerful role in determining the degree to which
patterns of service will be altered.
The net balance suggests selective growth in purchase of human service,
but at a slower rate than in the 1970s due to both increased resistance and
a decreased public investment in the human services. In the face of conflicting demands, choice will be difficult. Nevertheless, the decision to
purchase services from private vendors is consistent with the thrust to
redefine governmental functions and operations and form partnerships with
the non-public sector. No one doubts the government will continue to play
the important planning, development, financing and accountability roles,
but increasingly as an overseer rather than a doer likely through the
remainder of this century and into the next one.
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The Policy

THE SUNSET REVIEW OF A SOCIAL WORK BOARD OF EXAMINERS:
A CASE EXAMPLE
STEPHEN R. BLOCK
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS,
COLORADO CHAPTER

ABSTRACT
The author reviews the events following the passage of Colorado's pioneer
Sunset Review Legislation in 1976.
The experiences of the 36 states which
passed Sunset Legislation have been varied. Lobbying efforts in addition to
costs have played a significant role in the review process and outcome. A case
analysis of the Sunset Review of the Colorado Social Work Board of Examiners
illustrates the tenacity of a group of professionals determined to maintain
legal regulation of the social work field. The group's success was a result of
political organization and the technical expertise required to influence policy
makers.

The scenario goes something like this: In 1976, just one year after the
enactment of a Colorado Social Work Practice Act and the establishment of a Social
Work Board of Examiners, the Colorado Legislature initiated the first Sunset
Review Law in the country.
The original concept of Sunset Review was conceived by the Colorado Chapter
of Common Cause. They envisioned it as a tool which would enable state government
to be more accountable through a process of joint executive and legislative evaluations of programs created by statute. In Colorado, the passage of House Bill No.
1088 of 1976 provided for the termination of the 39 boards and commissions in
Colorado's Department of Regulatory Agencies. Starting July 1, 1977, one-third of
the boards and commissions were scheduled for termination every other year. In
addition, any newly created agency, as well as those which survived the review
cycle, would be given a terminable life of six years. After six years, the agency
would be scrutinized through the Sunset Review process. In all cases, the boards
and commissions would be abolished unless they received a mandate from the
Colorado Legislature to continue existence. Legislative consideration would be
based on both a performance audit conducted by the executive branch and by
legislative hearings where the public could respond and give testimony. According
to statute, the agency under review must demonstrate a 'public need' for its
continuance. 1
Under the new Sunset Law, the first round of agency reviews concluded with
an array of changes. The Legislature continued nine boards. Three of the nine
were re-established with modifications--the Collection Agency Board, the Racing
Commission, and the Passenger Tramway Safety Board (which regulates ski lifts).
In addition, two other boards--the Cosmetologists Board and the Board of Barber
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Examiners--were consolidated. Also, three boards were abolished--the Board of
Shorthand Reporters, the State Athletic Commission, and the Board of Professional
Sanitarians.
During this same review period, the Colorado Legislature was unable to
complete a thorough review of six sizeable agencies. The Legislature postponed
review of the Public Utilities Commission, the Division of Insurance, the Board
of Life Care Institutions, the Board of Nursing Home Administrators, the
Electrical Board, and the Board of Mortuary Science. In the following legislative session all six boards were continued and
the Legislature created a new
2
oversight board for the Division of Insurance.
Colorado's initial experience appeared to have accomplished the sunset aim
of streamlining government.
In turn, the popularity of sunset grew like topsy.
Twenty-three additional states adopted Sunset Laws by 1977, and every state
legislature has since given consideration to a mandatory agency evaluation
mechanism. 3
Sunset Review appears to have an impressive track record. From 1976-1981,
approximately 1500 agencies were reviewed in all the sunset states: nearly 300
agencies have been terminated; approximately 500 were modified; and the balance,
re-established with very little or no change (Common Cause, 1982).
Despite its successful record, Sunset Review is not without its problems.
In fact, many states report difficulty with the review system including problems
of cost, limited public participation, limited program evaluation experience, and
the enormous amount of staff time that is required to complete an audit (Common
Cause, 1982). The costs of the reviews have been reported to run between $8,000
to $12,000 each, and the average 1982 state sunset budget was over $200,000
(Roederer and Palmer, 1981; Common Cause, 1982). In addition, eighty percent
of the sunset states have not been able to report any savings as a result of
the review process (Common Cause, 1982). Another major problem is the unwillingness of legislators to abolish boards in response to professional association
lobbying pressure (Mitzman, 1979).
Disenchantment with Sunset Review has grown significantly. Seven of the
sunset states have introduced bills calling for the repeal of their statute.
One state--North Carolina--repealed its Sunset Law in 1981, and replaced it with
an evaluation mechanism without the automatic termination authority found in
Sunset. Ironically, even the pioneer state--Colorado--considered proposed
legislation in 1981 to terminate the nation's first Sunset Law. Although this
bill failed in the Senate by a two-to-one margin, its existence marked the level
of frustration that legislators have experienced with sunset activity.
Since its beginning in 1976, legislators have gradually decreased their
support of Sunset Review as a reaction to the criticism they have emcountered.
For example, the Colorado Deputy State Auditor publicly reported disillusionment
over the Legislature's minimal efforts in the review process (Pierce and Hagstrom,
1977). Criticism was also assailed at the Texas Legislature where legislator
voting patterns on sunset audits were clearly a reflection of the amount of
campaign contributions they received during the election races (Common Cause,
1982). In North Carolina, the Legislature was accused of buckling under
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the pressure of lobbyists and interest groups leading to the repeal of the
North Carolina Sunset Law (Common Cause, 1982).
4
Back in Colorado, legislators came to their own defense. Some spoke of
repealing the Sunset Law, while others thought it should be modified so that the
review cycle was every ten years. Furthermore, some legislators held a more
extreme view which consisted of killing some regulatory boards in order to
demonstrate to the public that they were indeed serious about curbing government.
The crusade to kill
off regulatory agebcies came at an inopportune time for the
Colorado Social Work Board of Examiners.
They were scheduled for the next review!
PREPARATION FOR SUNSET REVIEW
The potential for a problematic review of the Colorado Social Work Board of
Examiners was recognized earlier
on.
Reports from the Kansas Chapter of the
National Association of Social Workers on the Sunset Review of the Kansas Board
of Social Work Examiners indicated legislator interest in the number of complaints
adjudicated by the Board. There was also strong interest in the idea of merging
5
the Psychology Board with the Social Work Board.
In Colorado, consumer complaints
against social workers numbered only fifteen in a six year period. Seven of those
cases, however, were against unlicensed social workers for which the Board did not
have any jurisdiction. Of the remaining eight cases, four were closed based on
findings of no violations; two cases were still
under investigation; and, two
cases were referred to a Board hearing.
By the beginning of the review period,
one of the two cases was still pending a decision. The other case resulted in a
licensee suspension. Thus, the argument that a Social Work Board of Examiners
was needed to protect the consumer was, like in Kansas, a weak position. In
addition, there was a desire among Colorado social workers to reject the amalgamated
board concept like the one that was developing in Kansas. In fact, the Kansas
experience prompted Colorado social workers to communicate their position on
the umbrella board issue in a letter
to the Executive Director of the Colorado
Department of Regulatory Agencies,6
In response to the potentially problematic review, a Surviving Sunset Review
Committee was appointed by the Colorado Chapter, National Association of Social
Workers' President. Ten Chapter members were selected to serve on the Committee
based on their substantial social work experience as well as their ability to
represent social workers from a variety of practice settings.
The Committee was
staffed by the Chapter Executive Director and assisted by a graduate social work
intern.
Committee activities
were financed by Chapter funds and contributions
from several sources including individual social workers, the Colorado Society
for Clinical Social Work, the Colorado School Social Work Association, and from
7
a National Association of Social Workers' Program Advancement Fund (PAF) Grant.
By September 1979, the Chapter Committee was meeting on a monthly basis.
Initial
meetings weredevoted to formulating a direction for the year.
These early
planning sessions also provided the Committee with an important opportunity to
educate each Committee member on the fine points of the Colorado Social Work
Practice Act in addition to reviewing the arguments for and against occupational
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regulation (Hardcastle, 1977; Johnson, 1977; Shimberg, 1976; NASW, 1976).
Other concerns that were examined included several issues that were raised by
the State Auditor's Office and the Department of Regulatory Agencies. Among
these concerns were the limited number of consumer complaints; the five year
eligibility requirement for the LSW II type of license;and, the inability to
enforce the reciprocation clause with other states. 9 Another concern that was
raised by the auditing groups was the limitation the Act had on regulating the
practice of social work. Both auditing agencies thought that the Act only served
to protect the title of "Licensed Social Worker."
LEGISLATIVE EVENTS AND THE LOBBYING EFFORT
The Chapter Committee secured a Senate sponsor and a House sponsor to introduce a bill calling for the continuation of the Social Work Practice Act of 1975.
The new bill contained some housecleaning measures to help clarify the boundaries
between the Registered Social Worker and the Licensed Social Worker I. While
the Committee recognized the benefit that the Sunset Review could have on cleaning up some difficult sections in the law, they felt the best strategy would be
to suggest few changes and be obliging when amendments were introduced in the
legislative hearings (Block et al, 1983).
On January 8, 1981, the second day of the new General Assembly year, the
bill to continue the Social Work Practice Act came before the Senate Health
Committee for its first legislative hearing. As in both their reports to the
Legislature, the State Auditor and the Executive Director of the Department of
Regulatory Agencies testified against the continuation of the Act. In addition,
the President of the Colorado Division of the American Association for Marriage
and Family Therapy spoke against the merits of the Act. He asked the Senators
to abolish the Social Work Board of Examiners and create in its place a
Behavioral Science Board which would include the counseling groups that were
not licensed, such as the guidance counselors, pastoral counselors, vocational
rehabilitation counselors, and the (non-M.S.W.) marriage counselors.
Although opposition arguments were strong, the biggest blow came from
the Colorado Social Work Board of Examiners--the group that the Chapter Committee
was attempting to'sustain. Testimony from members of the Board did not convey
much knowledge of the Act, nor did they display any zeal in support of it.
In fact, the Board members that were present in addition to the Board Administrator were not able to respond with exactness to legislator inquiries concerning the number and status of cases that were investigated and reviewed.
Consequently, Chapter Committee members whose testimony followed the Board's
presentation simply could not capture the interest of the Senators. A vote at
this juncture would have meant certain defeat for the bill. Fortunately, the
chief sponsor was also the Chairman of the Senate Committee. As Chairman,
bill's
he exercised his authority to postpone a vote on the bill.
In an attempt to turn around the sentiment against the social work bill
that prevailed during the January 8th hearing, the Chapter Committee diligently
lobbied Senators who served on the Health Committee. In addition, over two
hundred letters were generated by activating the Chapter Education Legislative
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Action Network's (ELAN Committee) telephone contact system. In February, the
Chapter Committee returned to the Senate Health Committee's chamber to discover
that the lobbying efforts paid off. That morning, the bill passed out of the
Senate Committee, although in an amended form. The amended bill reduced the
life of the bill from its six year cycle to onle one year. According to the
author of the amendment, the social work profession should return in one year
with a new bill which includes a provision for the regulatory control of the
behavioral science practitioners not currently covered by statute. Also, a
second amendment was adopted which would prohibit the Colorado Department of
Personnel from including licensed social workers in the sample population used
for the State's wage and salary survey. Apparently, the amendment's maker feared
that a licensed social worker's salary would be high, thus pushing the cost of
State salaries upward.
The next day, the full Senate approved the amended bill and sent it to the
Colorado State House of Representatives for their consideration of the bill.
With the assistance of the bill's House sponsor, it was appointed to the House
Health Committee which gave the psychologists an unfriendly reception during
an earlier Sunset Review.
The Chapter Committee spent a considerable amount of time preparing for the
House Committee hearing. The result was an improved range of testimony. Furthermore, a handout was created for this occassion which identified that social
workers saw more clients than both the combined caseloads of psychologists and
psychiatrists (Thompson et al, 1980; Grosser and Block, 1983). The handout also
reported that there are as many social workers that are engaged in private
practice as there are psychiatrists. Moreover, the Chapter Committee questioned
the logic of terminating the Social Work Board of Examiners while leaving the
Psychology Board and the Medical Examiners Board intact. The House Committee
agreed and they passed the bill on to the Rules Committee with an amendment
to restore the bill back to an extended life of six years.
Next, the bill was sent to the House Rules Committee which has the
responsibility for determining when a bill will be brought before the entire
Assembly for a vote. It was here that the Chapter Committee was stonewalled by
the Rules Committee Chairman who proclaimed that he was going to "kill" the
bill by not placing it on the House Calendar.
In response to this new crisis, the Chapter Committee spent the next
three days working earnestly to change the Chairman's staunch position. As
before, the Committee was aided by the Chapter ELAN Committee.
They were able
to generate sixty mailgrams from constituents of the Rules Chairman. Meanwhile,
the bill's two House sponsors pleaded its cause, and sympathetic lobbyists
from outside the human service field agreed to help at the request of the
Chapter's Lobbyist, President, and Executive Director. Within hours of the
deadline, at which time the bill would face its automatic death,
the Rules
10
Chairman decided to schedule the bill on the House Calendar.
The bill would now be examined-by the full House. However, the bill's
House sponsor used her charm and reputation to help move the bill successfully
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through the House without any debate. The House also agreed to assign the bill
to a Conference Committee since House and Senate versions differed. The
Conference Committee consisted of the bill's two major sponsors in addition to
two Senators and two Representatives. At the time of the Conference Committee
meeting, the Senate sponsor was absent (due to a death in his family). In his
absence, the House sponsor chaired the meeting and verbalized a strong probill position. The Chapter Executive Director was the only witness that was
called to testify. Afterwards, the Conference Committee reached a consensus
of opinion. They agreed to restore the bill to its original six year version,
and to strike the amendment concerning the wage and salary survey sample.
After Conference Committee, the bill was returned to the House for its
final consideration. After its passage, the bill was sent to the Senate. However, the Senate sponsor (from Colorado Springs) was still absent. In need of a
Senate advocate, several Colorado Springs social workers along with the Chapter
Lobbyist convinced another Colorado Springs Senator--who early in the process was
against the bill--to agree to speak in support of the bill. As it turned out,
the original Senate sponsor arrived back to the Senate Chambers just in time to
present the bill to a weary Assembly. The bill passed unanimously.

NOTES
1. State of ColoracbHouse Bill 1088 of 1976 requires a performance audit to take
into consideration: the extent in which the Board has permitted qualified
applicants to serve the public; affirmative action requirements complied with;
operated in the public interest; agency recommendations to serve the public
better versus the profession; impact of the rules and regulations; public
participation in the rules making; the efficiency by which complaints have
been handled.
2. In 1979, thirteen agencies were reviewed in Colorado, ten were continued
and three were terminated. In the 1980-81 legislative session, thirteen
agencies were reviewed, four were modified, four were continued for one
year, two were consolidated, and three were terminated.
3. The 36 sunset states and the year they adopted Sunset Legislation are as
follows: In 1976, Colorado, Alabama, Florida, Louisiana; in 1977, Alaska,
Arkansas, Conneticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington; in 1978, Arizona, Indiana, Kansas,
Maryland, South Carolina; in 1979, Illinois, Mississippi, Nevada, West
Virginia, Wyoming; in 1980, Delaware; in 1981, Pennsylvania.
4. For examole, on Saturday February 7, 1981, two legislators held a press
conference during which time Senator Hefley stated, "the Legislature lacks
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the backbone to do what needs to be done with agenceis up for review." One
week earlier, Senator Durham said he wanted to do away with the Sunset Law
because the Legislature lacked courage to take a stand against lobbyist
pressure.
5. Information regarding the Kansas sunset audit came from materials received from
the Kansas Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers. Additional
information was shared in conversation with the Kansas Chapter, NASW Executive
Director, Carl Myers. See, The Kansas Sunset Audit, Kansas Division of Post
Audit, released November, 1978.
6. A letter was sent to Gail Klapper, Executive Director of the Department of
Regulatory Agencies, from the Chapter Sunset Review Committee, on July 30,
1980.
7. The Program Advancement Fund Grant was awarded for two reasons: One, to help the
Chapter in its efforts to maintain legal regulation of the profession. The second
reason was to establish a set of guidelines that would be useful for other State
Chapters that would become involved in Sunset Reviews.
8. There are three levels of Social Work Regulation in Colorado. Eligibilty
requirements for the Registered Social worker include an M.S.W or B.S.W. plus
two years of supervised experience, and a fee. The Licensed Social Worker I,
requires two years of supervised experience, plus an M.S.W., an exam, and a fee.
The Licensed Social Worker II requires five years of supervised experience, plus
an M.S.W., an exam, and a fee. The Social Work Practice Act of 1975 also contains
a provision for privileged communication, public employee and not-for-profit
employee exemption, continuing education of 14 clock hours for renewal, and a
clause on reciprocity. However, reciprocity has not been honored to date since
applicants come from states with different eligibility requirements.
9. The official position of the State Auditor's Office was revealed in the
Sunset Audit of thr Board of Social Work Examiners, released July, 1980.
Information was also gleaned through conversation with Dan Hall, Program
Evaluator, Colorado Department of Regulatory Agencies, on January 25, 1980.
10. Although the Rules Chairman decision to place the bill on the House Calendar
may be attributed to the aggregate efforts of the Chapter Committee, the
sponsors, the lobbyists, and the CHapter membership, the Chairman stated his
reason for placing the bill on the Calendar was in oder to not interrupt the
Sunset Review process.
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SOCIAL WORK PAC'S AND STATE SOCIAL WORK ASSOCIATIONS
PURPOSE, HISTORY, AND ACTION STRATEGIES
Gary Mathews, Western Michigan University

ABSTRACT
Social work as a profession has only recently become politically active.
One consequence of this interest in the political process has been the proliferation of political action committees as creatures of the National Association of
Social Workers and its state chapters. Social work PAC's are a key ingredient
necessary to enable the profession to influence public policy. Perhaps because
political action committees are new to NASW, or perhaps because NASW is new to politics, very little has been written about the history, purpose or strategic implications of these committees.
This paper will trace the development and operation of PAC's and their relation to the state chapters of NASW. The Michigan Political Action for Candidate
Election Committee (PACE)l will be utilized to illustrate key points.
Purpose
What is a political action committee? It is a legal entity established for the
purpose of supporting political candidates and issues. PAC's are regulated by
the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA") and its 1976 amendments. The reasons
for establishing a PAC quickly explain their sudden proliferation.
FECA prohibits associations like NASW from making campaign contributions but
allows them to "establish, administer and solicit contributions to a 'separate segregated fund' whose sole purpose is to make political contributions and expenditures."
(Webster, 1979) There are tax advantages. There is the selling point
that all money contributed to candidates will go to candidates since the association can pay expenses. Another advantage is spending limitations. While individduals are limited to $1,000 per candidate, PAC's may spend up to $5,000 per candidate per election. Finally, according to the American Society of Association
Executives, "...the association which establishes a PAC may control the PAC completely with respect to its income and expenditures. For example, the association
may decide who will be solicited by the PAC and which candidates for public office
will be supported."
(Webster, 1979)
This is a persuasive list of advantages to an organization for operating a
PAC. There are other advantages in addition to the legal, tax and control issues.
The Michigan NASW PAC lists among its objectives, in addition to helping the election of candidates:
"-to promote the adoption of public policy that is in the interest of
the social work profession and those they serve.
-to promote political awareness and lawful political action among the
(Mi-Pace brochure, 1980)
members of the social work profession."
So it would seam that at least one state chapter of NASW is seizing the vehicle
of the PAC to serve as a locus for political activity beyond providing contributions to campaign coffers. What is behind this increased political activity by
state chapters of NASW, and how does it fit with the issue of social work and
political activity in general?
History
The debate over whether or not social workers have an obligation to be active
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politically is as old as the profession itself. Jane Addams made her opinion
known thusly: "When the ideas and measures we have long been advocating become
part of a political campaign, would we not be the victims of a curious self-consciousness if we failed to follow them there?" (Lasch, 1965) By the early 1960's
social workers had developed a reputation as political lightweights in stark contrast to the style of the social reformers like Jane Addams and her contemporaries.
Abraham Ribicoff, then Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare admonished the profession, saying: "I am sure that I am not the first to
tell you that you have not wielded your influence to anywhere near the degree
your unique fund of knowledge and your skill at working with people might warrant;
This truth ought to be a challenge to your profession to take an active part in
(Ribicoff, 1962) Research by Wolk indicated that,
shaping laws and policies."
in fact, "...social workers are political members of society..." (Wolk, 1981)
using well tested criteria.
If a gap has existed between Wolk's findings and the contemporary image of
the social worker as nonpolitical, one answer that suggests itself is that social
workers have been active as autonomous citizens "...while individual social workers are politically active, the profession as a whole does not have a record of
political efficacy. The problem then may be a lack of political influence rather
(Mathews 1982) This hypothesis was supported
than a lack of political activity."
when a group of state and federal legislators were asked to rate six professional
organizations for political influence. Of the six, NASW was ranked last and was
virtually unknown to a quarter of the respondents. (Mathews 1982) Collective
action is powerful action and in the mid 1970's a national political action committee, dubbed PACE (Political Action for Candidate Election) was formed. The
first state chapter PACE was initiated in 1978 in Florida. This well-organized
effort was to serve as a model for virtually all of the state chapters to follow
suit. Their by-laws, for example, were used as a basis for the by-laws of other
PACE committees. In the five years since Florida led the way, between 30 and 35
2
state chapters of NASW have formed PACE committees. Some see the development of
PACE committees as a positive sign. "The creation of political action committees
by NASW chapters across the country represents a new level of mature involvement
in the political system and a recognition that even good politicians realistically expect professions to put their money and their volunteer hours behind their
values." (Abrams and Goldstein in Mahaffey and Hanks, 1982)
Strategies for Action
How do state chapters organize a PACE and once it begins, what considerations are
involved in the implementation of its activity? Every challenge involves overcoming obstacles. What are the obstacles and how can state chapters anticipate,
3
minimize or overcome them? What are some of the most common myths that we as
social workers hold about the political process? A question of equal importance
is one of theory. What theoretical perspectives provide the basis for decisionmaking? Which informed perspective directs the machinery once constructed?
Initiation of a PACE by a state chapter of NASW is necessary to the support of
local candidates and issues. For legal and organizational reasons, a state PACE
is required to be separate and distinct from the national NASW PACE. Moreover,
there are significant areas of social policy which are operationalized at the
state level. Some examples of these decision-making areas are welfare, mental
health and education. Other policy controversies occuring at the state level
are the ERA, capital punishment, and abortion. (Lause 1979)
Several important ingredients are necessary to the successful initiation of
a state PACE. The first ingredient is a strong and genuine interest in a politi-348-

cal action committee by the state NASW chapter board of directors. The active
support of the chief executive officer is also a key. Next, a small cadre of
people willing to serve as active members of the PACE committee must be recruited.
They will ideally have similar goals for the committee and not have diverse intentions.
Barbaro has noted that increased political activity by social workers is
aided by "...a desire to maintain a consistent organizational self image (BarAnother finding by the same author bears out the experience of the state
barj)
PACE committees. He reports that "The amount of organizational resources had
(Barbaro, 1978)
little impact on a groups decision to become involved in an issue."
Once Board support is established and a small group is convened the next
step is usually to solicit expert advice. The national office has been generous
4
in supplying a staff person to the state chapters. Along with advice copies of
sample by-laws (a !a Florida PACE) are customarily supplied. The next step is
filing with the State Board of Elections or a similar state agency and the work
of the committee may begin in earnest.
There are three tasks which most state chapter PACE committees must accomplish to be successful. One is to endorse candidates and issues at the state
level. Another is contributing financially and otherwise to their campaigns. A
third is spreading the word among the membership of the state NASW that politics
is an activity worthy of their time, their attention, and their money.
All three tasks are important and all three are closely connected. They require communication with the grass roots of the organization membership. This
communication is time consuming but is at the heart of the success of the whole
process. If the committee does not garner the support, opinions, enthusiasm and
money of the membership the committee fails to function effectively.
For these reasons the state PACE must use every available means of communication. The state chapter newsletter provides an immediate means of doing so.
A highly visible presence at the annual state program meeting is helpful. Guest
speaking at local unit meetings is another tactic. The organization of special
forums to speak to special policy issues is a tactic which is often useful in
election years.
One illustration of the application of the above tactics is the Michigan
PACE response to a proposed tax issue in the 1980 election. Proposal D, also referred to as the Tisch Tax Cut was a proposed gigantic tax cut which would have
reduced the state budget by 57%. PACE mobilized the chapter membership in a
variety of ways.
The October, 1980 issue of the Chapter Newsletter was filled with articles
directly or indirectly coming from PACE. The front page consisted of a letter
by the President of the Board opposing the tax cut, an article about how the
state chapter had joined a coalition called "Citizens to Save Our State" (from
Tisch), and an article about the Chapter formally opposing the tax cut. Headlines from the remainder of that issue of the newsletter are self-explanatory:
-Highlights of the Property Tax Reform Proposals
-Suggestions for Follow-up in Your Community Regarding the Tax Proposals
-Overview of Budget Implications of Tax Proposals
-M-PACE Announces Endorsements
5
Social Worker in the State Capitol
-Debbie Stabenow:
In other words, of eight feature stories in that issue, six were about the tax
cut and the other two were about PACE endorsements of candidates for state office.
Members of the state PACE committee also made presentations at almost every
local unit meeting in the months preceeding. the election, A special mailing
went out two weeks before the election from the M-PACE chair, opposing the Tisch
Tax Cut. A final touch was a statewide Tisch Tax-cut Workshop which was held in
the state capitol. Speaking at this workshop were the Director of The Michigan
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Department o Social Services, sev-

eral state legislators, and other state officials. This well-attended workshop
had other significant pay-offs. Without exception, the speakers commented on how
pleased they were that social workers were getting politically involved. Ironically, the Director of D.S.S., a non-social worker, stated that the only other contact he had experienced from NASW was a letter opposing his appointment from the
Detroit Metropolitan Unit years ago.
As a post-script, the Tisch Tax-cut was soundly defeated. Who is to say
that the PACE committee's work did not contribute somewhat to that defeat?
Another subject of communication with the membership is the myths and fallacies many social workers hold about politics. Few, if any, schools of social work
offer courses on the role of social work in politics. Most social workers still
talk in conflict neutral terms like social planning, policy analysis, and program
development as if these endeavors occurred external to a political process. Nothing could be further from the truth. Political social work takes stands on the
issues, fights to have those positions win out over other positions and then defends and participates actively in the consequences of those positions. Social
workers have been operating under some prevailing myths. Seven of these are pre6
sented below.
Seven Political Myths Commonly Held By Social Workers
Myth 1. Campaign work is the best way to influence politicians.
Campaign work is important but is often not the most effective pathway to
influence. Virginia W. Smith wrote an excellent article which explains
the wide variety of ways to influence legislators. (Virginia Smith, 1979)
Myth 2. A letter-writing campaign is only effective if hundreds or thousands of
letters can be generated.
Amazing as it may seem, at the state level, if a legislator receives as
few as three letters on a topic, they consider it to be a "hot" issue!
Myth 3. The only way to lobby effectively is to hire a professional lobbyist.
Professional lobbyists are a complement to a well-organized, politically
active professional association, not a substitute for an involved constituency. Lacking an involved membership, a professional lobbyist is a
waste of money.
Myth 4. Politicians already know what social work is about and how we stand on
the issues, so there is no need to get involved.
Most politicians have a narrow and distorted opinion of what social work
is and rarely associate our profession with legislative issues.
Myth 5. Politicians already have their minds made up on legislative votes so why
lobby?
The fact that politicians are open to tactics aimed at capturing their
votes is corroborated by the immense organizational structure and resources established for that purpose. Put another way, if lobbying did
not work, there would not be so many people and organizations doing it.
Myth 6. Liberal politicians enjoy social workers and are happy to talk to them.
Conservatives do not like social workers and avoid them whenever possible.
The authors research discovered that some conservative politicians would
like more contact from social workers and feel "snubbed" by the profession. At the same time, some liberal politicians consider themselves
well enough acquainted with social work issues that they prefer less frequent contacts.
Myth 7. Rural legislators are less likely to want contact with social workers
than are urban legislators.
Rural legislators are often interested in meeting social workers and,
having fewer resources of all kinds within their districts, are often
anxious to take advantage of possible contacts.
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There are four important obstacles to the formation of statewide political
action committees for social work professionals. These four obstacles, while not
all inclusive, are a useful beginning list. They are: geography, leadership, finances, and a hostile public arena.
I. Geography--Most states are large enough to make regular travel even to a
centrally located chapter office problematic. This distance barrier is exacerbated
by skyrocketing gasoline prices. This concern is generic to the state organization of the chapters and as such, is one understood and acknowledged by most NASW
members. In Michigan this problem is made more difficult by the fact that a constituency exists in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan, which is, at its furthest
point a longer drive than from Detroit to New York City.
It is important to hold meetings in a centrally located place so that no one
has to drive an inordinate distance. In Michigan, as in most other states, the
largest metropolitan area is not centrally located geographically. This means
that perhaps a third to a half of the persons attending any given meeting will be
coming from the urban area of the state and can carpool. Another part to solving
the dilemma of long distance travel is to be prepared for less than perfection.
For instance, a representative from the Upper Peninsula of Michigan was invited
to participate in our meetings and this did not occur. On the other hand everyone can fully appreciate the extreme hardship of travel to and from the UP and
there were no hard feelings.
Communication is also important as a way of overcoming distances, and this
issue has already been addressed.
2. Leadership--It was our experience that for the most part the established
leadership of the social work political scene did not come to meetings and did
not participate actively in developing the political action committee. They did
become involved later in the process. Those who did participate early on were
reliable, responsible, and willing to take risks. It did not matter whether they
were extremely well-connected or not. It seemed that where one person was weak
or poorly informed, another committee member would be knowledgeable. Fear of inadequacy is an initial concern that is quickly dispelled.
In retrospect, it is clear that the "big wheels" have neither the time nor
the energy to do the grassroots work required to make a success of PACE. It also
has become clear as the PACE Committee members gained experience they developed
competence, contacts and confidence, to "play hard ball with the big boys." 7
While the original Michigan PACE Committee members were by no means the most wellconnected and well-established social workers in the state, several of them have
developed into political heavyweights. Since the Committee's initial successes,
it has recently boasted two past national presidents of NASW as members.
3. Money, money, money--Money is important.
But it is so much less important than we think. The Michigan PACE budget for 1980 was about $1,300. A laughable sum when compared with most other PAC's, and a sum that was so insignificant
that it caused innumerable problems in dealing with the State campaign finance
bureaucrats. They just couldn't accept that the budget was so small. Politicians
are moved by more than money, though, just as social workers are motivated by
more than money. As a matter of fact, there is almost a reverse snobism attached
to receiving contributions from a political action committee as poor as the Michigan PACE. It could be argued that receiving a $50 donation frum us is in some
ways more a symbol of support than receiving $500 would be from a wealthy committee. A state legislator in Michigan mentions nine kinds of power that are available to organizations seeking to influence government. These include:
money,
use of media, relationships, positions, unity, coalitions, numbers, knowledge,
8
voting.
To read the media or to watch TV one could easily conclude that political
action committees are only as effective as the size of the purses. It is widely
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believed to be true that large budget equals large political influence while
small budget equals small political influence. Social workers have never been
known for their affluency, nor for their ability to contribute large sums of money to worthy causes. This could lead one to conclude that a social work political action committee is defeated before it begins, but it is just not true.
4. The Public Arena--In spite of the fact that social workers find many job
opportunities in the public sector, we are reluctant to approach the bureaucracy
as consumers. We have perhaps become too comfortable with making the rules and
playing the game from a position of power in our narrow segment of government programs to adapt to the quite different role of the participant or customer. When
dealing with the State Board of Election and the Secretary of State's office, it
becomes clear all too quickly that we are just another person standing in line
rather than the one giving out the numbers. Along with this difficulty in negotiating the maze of government regulations is a lack of familiarity in dealing
with politicians. Many of us see politicians as intimidating, disparaging, and
for the most part opponents in terms of philosophy. It is easy to develop a sense
of being overwhelmed by the rules and regulations on one hand and the necessity
of dealing directly with politicians and their staff members on the other. Perhaps the most important thing to remember in an ongoing relationship with the
state campaign finance division is that a committee treasurer familiar with finances and reporting is essential. As far as politicians being intimidating and
the political arena being overwhelming, experience is a good teacher. Experience
and familiarity removes the mystery from political relationships.
Why participate in your state PAC? What could possibly come from particiIt is easy to develop a scenario in which
pating on a political action committee?
one will receive criticism from many constituencies and appreciation by few. Perhaps nowhere else in the structure of the profession is visibility more a guarantee than in the political arena. Social workers are often trained to take a
back seat, to stay out of the limelight, and to be in a supporting role. But
when the issues are public and the other players in the game are public, then social workers must be prepared to go public as well.
There are no doubt many other obstacles to the implementation of state poliIn addition to the ones discussed above, there are the
tical action committees.
problems of minority representation, of open versus closed meetings, of selection
criteria for the endorsement of candidates, of separation of finances between the
political action committee and the rest of the chapter organization, of educating
the membership, and the usual stresses and strains of committee decision-making.
This discussion of state chapter PAC's would be incomplete without mention
of the mission of the enterprise. Are social work PAC's destined to be selfserving mechanisms for more exclusive licensing legislation? And if our newly
acquired political clout is used to benefit our clients instead, will the aim be
at "deficient individuals" or at the problems inherent in the social structure?
There is a distinct choice to be made here and a knowledge of sociological theory
is helpful in making it.
Goroff tells us that conflict theory applies directly to politics but that
there are actually two kinds. "Marx postulates the existence of ruling elite
based on ownership of the means of production ....The pluralist view is that interest groups compete with each other... that no one group is strong enough to
gain complete power or control ...." He goes on to point out that social workers
choose either to acknowledge the basic structural changes needed or to "champion
(Goroff, 1978)
worthy causes separate and apart from issues of social class.
Regardless of what choices are made, it is encouraging to note that social workers are at least entering the "ball park" and familiarizing themselves with the
Social workers are undeniably becoming more aware-of
basic rules of the game.
political power and the steps necessary to obtain it. During the 1982 elections
more than $7,000 was contributed to the Michigan PACE, up from $1,300 in 1980.
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Also, for the first time in recent memory, hundreds of hours of volunteer time
was donated, not by individuals who happened to be social workers but by social
workers as social workers. Finally, social workers are learning the meaning of
power. Once that happens eventually the knowledge could filter down to clients.
"Power has to do with whatever decisions men make about the arrangements under which they live, and about the events which make up the history of their times
... the problem of who is involved in making them is the basic problem of power.
in so far as they could be made but are not, the problem becomes who fails to
make them?"
(Mills, 1963)

NOTES
1.

PACE is the name that the national office and all of the state chapters of
NASW have taken for their political action committees.

2.

This estimate was obtained during a telephone conversation to the national
office of NASW in May, 1983.

3.

Material for this section came in part from a presentation made by the author
at the "Social Workers in Politics Conference", Washington, D.C., 1981.

4.

Ms. Carol Sheffer-Hartman, PACE staff person of the national office of NASW
has traveled extensively to encourage and cultivate the development and operation at PAC's at the state level.

5.

State Representative Stabenow, M.S.W., was endorsed by the Michigan PACE and
is now serving her third term in the state legislature. Rep. Stabenow sponsored the 1982 Michigan Children's Trust Fund Legislation which includes an
innovative voluntary $2 checkoff on state income tax forms which goes to
child abuse prevention programs.

6.

These myths were first identified and addressed following the completion of a
Field Studies in Research and Practice project entitled "Southwest Michigan
Politicians: Influence and Interactions with Social Workers", 1981, Western
Michigan University School of Social Work. This material was presented in
slightly different form at the 5th Annual Social Workers in Politics Conference, sponsored by NASW and PACE, Washington, D.C., April, 1982.

7.

While this is hardly an original statement, Michigan readers will recognize
it as a favorite saying of Patricia Curran, current chairperson, Michigan
PACE.

8.

Hon. David Hollister, Michigan House of Representatives.
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